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ABSTRACT 
Corruption is a serious impediment to the prosperity and development of societies. 
It is typically a significant social and economic problem in less-developed countries, 
but its various aspects and consequences have long been recognised in more 
developed countries, too. Corruption significantly fosters inequalities and poverty 
by undermining institutions, leading to the misallocation of resources, the blurring 
of public policy and the hindering of private sector development. Strictly from the 
perspective of the Public Choice current, corruption must be monitored at all costs 
because the role of the public sector is gradually being privatised. Furthermore, 
corruption considerably affects any representative debate on public decisions. The 
first empirical studies on the economic consequences of corruption began in the 
1990s, and these studies found that corruption damages the economic performance 
of countries. However, the negative effect of corruption has not proven systematic. 
Indeed, corruption may have virtues in the contexts of inefficient government 
policies and institutions. The underpinning of this dissertation lies in the problematic 
of the effect of corruption on economic performance. 
Using data from a total of 99 countries worldwide over 2006–2014, this 
dissertation concludes that the influence of corruption on the economy is mixed. In 
particular, corruption reduces per capita GDP growth in the presence of high 
political instability, violence and terrorism. Furthermore, corruption seems to 
exacerbate the negative consequences of such governance failures on growth. 
While underlining its detrimental aspects, the study at the same time argues that 
corruption may nevertheless have virtue. This therefore gives credit to the ‘efficient’ 
corruption hypothesis, albeit contradictory with collective morals. Indeed, 
corruption becomes beneficial to per capita GDP growth in the presence of (i.) poor 
public administration displaying strong political pressure and inefficient public 
policies; (ii.) a deficient regulatory framework to promote private sector 
development; and (iii.) weak rule of law, likely to question contracts and threaten 
private properties. In such cases, corruption rather seems to mitigate the costs of 
governance failures on economic growth. 
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Furthermore, the dissertation tackles the recurring causality issue between bad 
governance and corruption. Although the mainstream line of economic research 
suggests that distorted bureaucracy provokes corruption, it is also well known that 
bureaucrats deliberately encourage distortive tediousness within the 
administration in order to raise motives for bribery. At this level, the dissertation 
examines a series data for 117 countries worldwide with a time span of 1996–2013. 
The empirical analysis yielded substantial evidence of causal effects à la Granger 
between poor governance and corruption. In particular, a unidirectional causal link 
was found between the absence of Voice and accountability to corruption. 
Meanwhile, the data indicate a bidirectional causal nexus between corruption and 
other aspects of institutional shortcomings, including (i.) political instability, 
violence and terrorism; (ii.) poor public administration with strong political pressure 
and inefficient public policy; (iii.) a deficient regulatory framework to promote 
private sector development; and (iv.) weak rule of law, likely to question contracts 
and threaten private properties. 
Moreover, another interesting topic debated in the dissertation relates to the 
cyclical behaviours of corruption. Although volumes of research have analysed the 
relationship between corruption and economic growth, few studies observed 
corruption from the angle of economic cycles. For instance, according to Galbraith 
(1997), embezzlement flourishes in business booms and withers in recessions. In 
this context, the dissertation tests the empirical validity of this hypothesis using data 
from 110 countries worldwide over the 1984–2011 period. The findings are rather 
contradictory regarding the benchmark hypothesis. Our data suggest that 
corruption shrinks when transitory income increases, which means that economic 
booms encourage integrity, while recessions make corruption bloom. 
In particular, our findings show that economic booms significantly help in 
reducing corruption habits in high-income countries, or in those with a good quality 
of rule of law. At the same time, economic depression constitutes a considerable 
risk for more corruption. On the other hand, our results indicate that integrity gains 
resulting from the growth in economic activities overall remain low in low-income 
countries, or in those with a poor rule of law. For these countries, expansion cycles 
do not necessarily mean a decline in corruption practices, nor do recessions mean 
further corruption. Note also that such a result does not mean that corruption is low 
in these countries – indeed it is quite the opposite. 
In the end, the dissertation examines total factor productivity (TFP) (also referred 
to as Solow residual in the economic literature) as a channel through which 
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corruption might undermine the economic prosperity of countries. The rationale for 
such a study is that extensive research has shown that TFP also contributes 
significantly to the growth of output of countries, as does human or physical capital. 
In addition, economic growth is becoming increasingly sensitive to variance in TFP 
growth rather than to variance in twin growth factors. The study therefore assumes 
that corruption could channel TFP to affect economic growth. Using statistics from 
90 countries worldwide over a time span of 1996–2014, the empirical survey tests 
the effect of corruption on such productivity. Then, it attempts to measure the 
influence of tax burden on the hypothetical relationship. Our findings 
unambiguously conclude that corruption and tax burden lower productivity. In 
particular, a one-unit increase in the corruption standard deviation is associated 
with a decrease in productivity of about 0.041 %. Moreover, when the effect of tax 
burden is considered, the overall effect of corruption on TFP becomes positive, 
which means that tax rate increases can alleviate the cost of corruption in terms of 
productivity. 
Keywords: corruption, bureaucracy, economic growth, investment, governance, 
business cycles, institutions, total factor productivity, tax burden 
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TIIVISTELMÄ 
Korruptio on tyypillisesti merkittävä sosiaalinen ja taloudellinen ongelma 
vähemmän kehittyneissä maissa, mutta sen piirteet ja seuraukset ovat jo pitkään 
olleet tuttuja myös kehittyneissä maissa. Korruptio kasvattaa epätasa-arvoa ja 
köyhyyttä, heikentää instituutioita, johtaa resurssien väärinkäyttöön, vääristää 
politiikkaa ja vaarantaa yksityisen sektorin kehityksen. Lisäksi korruptio vaikuttaa 
julkiseen keskusteluun, mielipideilmastoon ja kansalaisten käyttäytymiseen. 
Korruptiota on siis suitsittava kaikin keinoin.  
Korruption taloudellisten vaikutusten empiirinen tutkimus käynnistyi 1990-
luvulla. Tutkimusten mukaan korruptio on pääosin haitallista kansantaloudelle, 
mutta ei välttämättä kaikissa tapauksissa. Siitä voi olla jopa hyötyä, jos virallinen 
hallinto ja instituutiot ovat kelvottomia. Korruption vaikutus kansantalouden 
suorituskykyyn on hyvin monisyinen. 
Väitöskirjassa tarkastellaan korruption vaikutusta talouskasvuun maailman 99 
maassa vuosina 2006–2014. Yleinen havainto on, että korruptio heikentää 
talouskasvua, kun maassa on poliittista epävakautta, väkivaltaa ja terrorismia. 
Korruptio myös voimistaa virallisen hallinnon heikkouden kielteisiä 
kasvuvaikutuksia. Väitöskirjassa osoitetaan kuitenkin myös, että korruptio saattaa 
joskus toimia toiseenkin suuntaan. Korruptiolla voi olla positiivisia vaikutuksia, jos 
hallinto on poliittisesti jyrkkää ja tehotonta, sääntely estää yksityisen sektorin 
kehityksen ja oikeusvaltioperiaate ei toimi. Tällaisissa tapauksissa korruptio saattaa 
lieventää hallinnon virheiden negatiivisia kasvuvaikutuksia. Niin sanottu "tehokkaan 
korruption hypoteesi" saa siis osittaista tukea. 
Väitöskirjassa paneudutaan huonon hallinnon ja korruption väliseen syy-
seuraussuhteeseen. Huono hallinto mahdollistaa sinänsä korruption, mutta 
poliitikot ja byrokraatit saattavat myös tarkoituksellisesti vääristää hallintoaan 
synnyttääkseen itselleen hyödyllistä korruptiota. Asiaa tutkitaan 117 maan 
aineistolla ajanjaksolla 1996–2013.  Syy-yhteys on yksisuuntainen, kun vastuu 
korruptioon puuttumisesta on heikosti määritelty. Kaksisuuntaista syy-yhteyttä 
esiintyy, kun maassa on poliittista epävakautta, väkivaltaa ja terrorismia, hallinto 
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voimakaan poliittinen ja tehoton, sääntely estää yksityisen sektorin kehityksen ja 
oikeusvaltioperiaatteessa on vakavia puutteita. 
Aikaisemmassa tutkimuksessa on laajalti paneuduttu korruption 
kasvuvaikutuksiin, mutta sen kytkentää taloussuhdanteisiin on tutkittu vähän. 
Väitöskirjassa asiaa tutkitaan 110 maan aineistolla vuosina 1984– 2011. Tulokset 
antavat osittaista tukea hypoteesille, että korruptio vähenee noususuhdanteessa, 
mutta lisääntyy talouden taantumassa. Suhdannevaikutus on erityisen selvä 
korkean tulotason maissa ja maissa, joissa oikeusvaltioperiaate on vahva. Matalan 
tulotason maissa ja niissä, joissa oikeusvaltioperiaate on heikko, nousukausi ei 
välttämättä vähennä (yleensä runsasta) korruptiota eikä laskukausi lisää sitä.  
Väitöskirjassa tutkitaan myös korruption vaikutusta talouden 
kokonaistuottavuuteen. Ideana on, että korruptio voi vaikuttaa talouteen niin 
sanotun Solow-residuaalin kautta. Asiaa tarkastellaan 90 maan aineistolla vuosien 
1996–2014 aikana. Havaintona on, että korruptio alentaa kokonaistuottavuutta, 
mutta kun verorasituksen vaikutus otetaan huomioon, korruption vaikutus 
kokonaistuottavuuden kääntyy positiiviseiksi. Toisin sanoen veronkorotukset voivat 
lieventää korruption tuottavuushaittoja. 
Avainsanat: korruptio, byrokratia, talouskasvu, investoinnit, hallinto, 
suhdannesyklit, instituutiot, kokonaistuottavuus, verotus 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General background 
For four decades, the problematic of corruption has been one of the hot topics for 
researchers in economics. After the 2003 United Nations convention against 
corruption, which took place in Mérida (Mexico), a total of 140 countries signed 
cooperation agreements. However, despite being singled out, phenomena linked to 
corruption tended to increase. It has many aspects and concerns systematically all 
the countries. Although for some countries the magnitude of corruption appears to 
be relatively weak, for others it is severe, often leading in the long run to social 
unrest. Indeed, one of the main arguments highlighted by the well-known ‘Arab 
Spring’ was bribing, as well as embezzlement committed by those in power to the 
detriment of the public. A report from Transparency International (TI) declared that 
‘corruption is one of the greatest challenges of the contemporary world. It 
undermines good governance, systematically distorts public policy, leads to a 
misallocation of resources, deteriorating the private and public sector development 
and specially affects the poor’. 
This doctoral dissertation constitutes an empirical contribution to investigations 
of the macroeconomic implications of corruption and governance. For many years, 
studies have agreed that the development of contemporary societies necessarily 
goes hand in hand with good governance, as well as with effective institutions 
(North and Thomas, 1973; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson, 2001; Mo, 2001; Paul, 2010). In particular, the commonly 
shared viewpoint is that corruption is detrimental to economic growth and 
development, as it breaks the fair frame of competition, distorts the markets and 
hinders investments, among other impacts (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Mauro, 1995; 
Mo, 2001; Egger and Winner, 2005; Virta, 2010). 
However, economists claim that government intervention through good 
regulations prevents market failures and encourages economic performance. Good 
regulations tend to foster economic development (Djankov, McLiesch, and 
Ramalho, 2006; Gillanders and Whelan, 2014), increase productivity and output 
1ϵ 
(Barseghyan, 2008; Aghion, Bundell, and Griffith, 2009), stabilise the 
macroeconomy (Loayza, Oviedo, and Serven, 2005), promote trade (Freund and 
Bolaky, 2008) and enhance entrepreneurism (Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan, 2006). 
Conversely, excessive regulation can stifle economic development, thus raising 
questions about the appropriate number of regulations that should be applied. For 
instance, Huntington (1968) cautions against the absence of flexibility often 
inherent to excessive regulation, then puts forward that ‘[…] in terms of economic 
growth, the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, over-centralized, dishonest 
bureaucracy is one with a rigid, over-centralized, honest bureaucracy’.  
However, good practices in the conduct of development policies, which include 
the battle against corruption, stand high on the agenda of International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
These institutions help secure transactions and guarantee high productivity of their 
loans for economic development.  
Notions relative to the quality of governance and corruption are deeply 
intertwined (Kaufmann, 2005). Khan (1996) defines corruption as ‘behavior that 
deviates from the formal rules of conduct governing the actions of someone in a 
position of public authority because of private-regarding motives such as wealth, 
power, or status’. Governance is perceived as institutions and practices by which 
authority is exercised in a country for the common interest (Kaufmann, 2005). In 
their theoretical analyses, Banerjee (1997) and Guriev (2004) argue that corruption 
and poor institutions are the key determinants of existing poor regulations and bad 
governance (see also Breen and Gillanders, 2012).  
A substantial number of studies suggest that corruption is harmful to economic 
development, as it is commonly known to be negatively correlated with economic 
growth, investments or welfare (Mauro, 1995; Mo, 2001). Metaphorically, 
corruption is seen as sand in the wheels of the economy (Sanding the wheels 
hypothesis, SWH). In the same line, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue that corruption 
hampers economic development because of its distortive effects on investments, 
particularly foreign direct investments. This is also highlighted in the seminal work 
of Wei (2000). Bliss and Di Tella (1997) in turn argue that corruption encourages 
monopolies, whose profits are drained by bureaucrats.  
As opposed to SWH, an alternative claim, i.e. Greasing the wheels hypothesis 
(GWH), maintains that corruption can have virtues, especially in the presence of 
more profound distortions in the economy. According to Bardhan (1997), in a 
ϮϬ
second-best world with pre-existing distortions, additional distortions caused by 
corruption may indeed improve welfare despite absorbing some resources. 
Accordingly, one might argue that the extent to which corruption affects economic 
performance is conditional on the quality of institutions, or of governance. In the 
same line, relatively recent empirical work shows that corruption is even more 
detrimental to growth in countries with effective institutions; whereas, conversely, 
corruption shows beneficial effects vis-à-vis economic growth when governance is 
poor (Méndez and Sepúlveda, 2006; Aidt, Dutta, and Sena, 2008; Méon and Weill, 
2008; Aidt, 2009). 
In spite of arguments in favour of GWH, corruption remains a serious problem. 
For instance, Myrdal (1968) and Kurer (1993) emphasise bureaucrats’ self-interests 
in the creation of economic distortions. This viewpoint is shared by Kaufmann and 
Wei (2000), who contend that corruption endogenously leads to poor governance 
and exacerbates economic distortions. To put it differently, corruption itself causes 
the second-best world (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer 2002; 
Guriev, 2004; Breen and Gillanders, 2012). 
The underpinning of this thesis rests on the deep analysis of the Sanding–
Greasing the wheels hypotheses. The dissertation is organised as follows: The next 
sections respectively explore the definitions of key concepts related to corruption; 
they then analyse its main measurements. The introductory part of the dissertation 
concludes with summaries of four empirical studies (essays), all of which employed 
modern econometric methods. The remainder of the dissertation successively 
presents these studies in detail. 
1.2 Definition of key concepts 
1.2.1 Definition of corruption 
Corruption has increasingly become a fundamental issue, since the importance of 
the state is increasingly being stressed, with a particular focus on institutions as 
indispensable actors in economic development. Thus, disciplines such as political 
science, economics or sociology are becoming increasingly interested in the issues 
of corruption (Fisman and Golden, 2017). 
2ϭ 
In the literature, there are several definitions of corruption. For instance, Nye 
(1967) defines it as ‘behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role 
because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or 
status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-
regarding influence’. Khan (1996) moves in the same direction by defining 
corruption as ‘behavior that deviates from the formal rules of conduct governing 
the actions of someone in a position of public authority because of private-regarding 
motives such as wealth, power, or status’. The World Bank also uses the same 
definition, in, however, much simpler terms: ‘the abuse of public agent for private 
ends’. However, according to Rose-Ackerman (1999), it is ‘an illegal payment in 
favour of a public agent to obtain an advantage that may or may not be deserved 
without reward’. The definition provided by Rose-Ackerman seems to slightly 
deviate from the perception of corruption as a contract conditioned by an exchange 
between those involved in corruption. In this case, the reward to be perceived by 
the corrupt is relative. In other words, one might argue that the present approach 
relies more on the fact that public service is privatised due to the opportunistic 
behaviour of the representative of the State. A similar viewpoint is highlighted in 
the work of Shleifer and Vishny (1993), who perceive corruption under the prism of 
a sale by a government agent of public authority for personal ends (Thompson, 
1993).  
Furthermore, Kurer (2005) suggests a more generalised definition, one more 
common to all societies, while taking into account the main features of the other 
definitions. To him, corruption is the violation by a public official of non-
discriminatory standards for the purpose of obtaining private profit. In this 
definition, one can see that the focus is more on the infringement act of norms that 
are fundamentally non-discriminatory in nature. At the same time, this description 
considerably reduces the complexity and specificity usually associated with the 
phenomenon. Moreover, it also goes beyond the classical perception of the term, 
as it generalises the norms, hence including any action contrary to normative 
requirements regulating the administration. The impartiality principle therefore 
remains the underpinning of this definition, as it embodies the essence of public 
services. As a result, several illegal practices are included in the acceptance of 
corruption, such as bribery, embezzlement, breach of trust, conflict of interest or 
fraud.  
Faced with these multiple forms, de Sardan (1996) uses the term ‘complex of 
corruption’. He defines corruption as a range of illegal practices associated with 
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governmental, parastatal or bureaucratic functions, in contradiction with the ethics 
of public goods/services, allowing illegal forms of enrichment or the abuse of those 
positions of power. Such an apprehension of corruption, founded on both the 
violation of rules governing the conduct of bureaucratic procedures and the non-
exclusion principle, is universal and even covers other activities, such as money 
laundering or insider trading, for example. It applies to any bureaucracy 
independent of country, region or sector (private or public) – unlike in previous 
definitions, where one might imagine that corruption is exclusively limited to the 
clerks of the state. Yet, the private sector also experiences opportunistic behaviours, 
such as hiring relatives or acquaintances, or giving gifts for contracts (Rose-
Ackerman, 1999). 
1.3 Forms of corruption 
Depending on how it is conducted, corruption may have many facets, as discussed 
in the previous sub-section. However, it can also be categorised with respect to 
actors involved in the process – or more specifically, according to the magnitude of 
power at their disposal due to their hierarchical positions within the administration. 
To Rose-Ackerman (2002), the consequences of corruption are more or less 
dramatic in line with the degree to which the actors involved hold more or less 
important responsibilities. With this classification, which is the most widespread in 
the literature (Rose-Ackerman, 2002; Amundsen, 1999), one can distinguish, 
respectively, ‘political’ corruption and ‘bureaucratic’ corruption.  
Moreover, in addition to the political and bureaucratic categorisation of 
corruption, Amundsen (1999) theorises the power relationships between the state 
and society to derive another scheme of corruption. This time, depending on how 
the act of corruption is planned and especially on who the beneficiaries and victims 
are, one can also distinguish ‘extractive’ and ‘redistributive’ corruption. In a corrupt 
society, when the balance of power turns in favour of the state (the beneficiary) to 
the detriment of the society (the victim), extractive corruption occurs. On the other 
hand, in a corrupt society in which society holds the balance of power to the 
detriment of the state, redistributive corruption predominates. However, this 
dissertation only focusses on the former categorisation of corruption. 
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1.3.1 Political corruption 
In the classical sense, political corruption (also called grand corruption) refers to 
opportunistic behaviours of elected politicians who are popular mandate holders, 
such as the heads of the state, deputies, senators or other, locally elected officials. 
In contrast, to Heidenheimer, Johnston and LeVine (1993), political corruption can 
be defined as a transaction between the non-state sphere and an actor of the public 
administration within which public authority is oriented toward private interest.  
This approach, also in line with the classical definition of corruption, does not 
specify the appointed or elected status of the actor of the public administration. As 
a result, following Heidenheimer and Johnston (1993), political corruption would 
occur when a clerk of the state deviates from the formal rules governing his/her 
administration against a private agent. In a relatively recent work, one can, 
however, observe some significant differences in the definition of political 
corruption. For instance, Transparency International (TI) associates corruption 
among non-elected senior administrative officials (e.g. ministers, chiefs of staff) to 
political corruption; hence the Anglo-Saxon name grand corruption in reference to 
the importance of the responsibilities of the participants. According to Méry, cited 
in de Sardan (1990: 49), political corruption is a sort of social secret sharing by which 
those in power (political or administrative) receive personal benefits of various kinds 
due to their mandate or position. One may point out that the present definition 
slightly deviates from the previous ones, as it specifies the nature of the mandate: 
administrative or political. 
Moreover, note that political corruption comes in many forms, such as bribery, 
extortion and patronage, all of which have as their objective either obtaining private 
revenues or controlling economic markets. Here, our discussions focus more on 
bribery, which seems to be the most common form. In addition to bribery, political 
extortion may also involve high-level decision-makers. McChesney (1997) provides 
an example of political extortion: ‘politicians [that] may maximize returns by 
threatening expropriation of existing private rents and then forbear implementation 
of the threat in exchange for a payoff’. The ‘private benefit’ of political extortion, 
however, does not need to be pecuniary; it can be in the form of buying voting 
support or suppressing future opponents from running in elections. Patronage and 
nepotism appear to be other forms of political corruption. These forms are most 
often specific to countries with institutional shortcomings (Alence, 2004); thus, 
those in power can ensure loyalty around the executive power. However, they may 
seriously hinder the effectiveness of public policy.  
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As for the consequences, a consensus exists: they can be dramatic. By example, 
Rose-Ackerman (2002) concludes that corruption by state senior bureaucrats leads 
to economic ineffectiveness and significantly affects foreign investment decisions in 
the country, primarily due to the uncertainty that it encourages. The absence of a 
threat on investments is likely to encourage investment decisions. Tanzi and 
Davoodi (1997) also share this analysis. Their empirical investigations conclude that 
countries with a serious level of grand corruption are also those with low levels of 
foreign direct investments (FDIs) (see also Bayley, 1966; Myrdal, 1989; Wei, 2000; 
Egger and Winner, 2005; Aidt, 2009); however, such countries also have a large 
share of public investments in gross domestic product (GDP) as well as a low quality 
of infrastructures (Kenny, 2009). Further, Hussain and Faruqee (1994) argue that 
such an important proportion of public investments can be explained by the 
flowering of white elephant large projects, with very few incidences in terms of 
economic development. These public investments, arranged by decision-makers, 
constitute at the same time their own sources of personal enrichment; therefore, 
they can extract and maximise their rents (Rose-Ackerman, 2002; Nellis and Kikeri, 
1989, 2001). In order to monitor such behaviours, Manzetti and Blake (1996) 
encourage privatisation, which is associated with a competitive system, is less 
opaque and is subject to market forces instead of discretionary regimes (Manzetti, 
1999). However, procedures towards privatisation are also likely to foster attempts 
at corruption and lobbying (Nellis and Kikeri, 1989; Manzetti and Blake, 1996). 
Beyond the economic aspect, and more importantly, political corruption 
represents a serious threat to the legitimacy of institutional structures, which it 
progressively destroys (Nye, 1967) – this is facilitated by corrupt officials who violate 
the law to serve the interests of certain groups rather than those of the entire 
population. The social injustice created by this situation, in turn, can lead to major 
social crises, revolts and even military coups (Nye, 1967). All this further contributes 
to the weakness of a democracy, with possibly detrimental implications for 
economic development. 
1.3.2 Bureaucratic corruption 
Originally, the first person to refer to bureaucracy was the French philosopher Jean 
Claude Marie Vincent de Gournay (1712–1759). Etymologically, bureaucracy is 
composed of two terms: Bureau, a French word meaning desk, and by extension 
office, including administrative departments in charge of a specific service; and 
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kratia, which means power, force or rule. The bureaucracy concept appeared in 
France just prior to the well-known French Revolution of 1789, and then it spread 
to the rest of the world (Le Maux, 2006). 
In sociology, or in political science, bureaucracy has two meanings. On the one 
hand, the first understanding, also called the Weberian approach, as influenced by 
the work of Weber (1922), argues that a bureaucrat is a highly skilled person whose 
talent is at the service of his/her hierarchy in order to satisfy the collective interest. 
On the other hand, the second understanding is related to managerial concerns. 
This understanding sees bureaucrats as private agents who are likely to make 
decisions according to their own preferences (Krueger, 1974; Brennan and 
Buchanan, 1980). The rationale for this alternative approach is that even though 
bureaucrats are mandated to make decisions with respect to collective interest, 
they likely deviate from this formal duty by prioritising choices that first maximise 
their own salaries, perquisites, power, honours and authority (Wyckoff, 1988a, 
1990). This understanding is the most common in the economic sciences. 
Moreover, the main actors of bureaucratic corruption are 
appointed administrators whose role is to implement government policies. In 
this case, the corrupt official has the resources of power and can opportunistically 
exploit them if there is no effective control from the hierarchy. Following Rose-
Ackerman (1998), bureaucratic corruption can therefore be described as ‘corrupt 
acts of appointed bureaucrats in their dealings with either their superiors (political 
elites) or with the public’.  
Bureaucratic corruption, which mainly involves the use of bribery, is also referred 
to as petty corruption, due to the low-level officials involved in the activity (Rose-
Ackerman, 1998; Leff, 1964). It is mainly explained by the lack of high wages in 
exchange for labour. Thus, with the need to compensate for low remuneration, the 
bureaucrat may resort to backhanded deals (Mauro, 1998). Ehrlich and Lui (1999), in 
addition, argue that when bribery levels are high or the probability of detection and 
fines is low, the salaries necessary to eliminate corruption are high. This may explain 
why, in poorer countries, corruption is generalised and difficult to eliminate.  
The literature identifies three main ways through which the bureaucrat can 
become corrupt. The corrupt official can act on economic markets by using bribes to 
make supply and demand equal (Ackerman, 1998). Put differently, in the public 
procurement framework, the criterion for winning a permit or contract is neither 
talent nor efficiency, but rather the highest bidder in terms of the bribe (Cadot, 
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1987; Mishra, 2006; Jain, 2001). Such a method seriously hampers competition and 
its legitimacy. Another means of corruption relates to receiving payments as a 
pledge to expedite the administrative process. Moreover, for corrupt bureaucrats, 
it is not uncommon to bribe in order to reduce or set aside a criminal sentence, or 
even to lower costs (Ackerman, 1998). 
Even though this type of corruption primarily involves low-level officials, its 
aggregate effects in a country negatively influence overall socioeconomic 
development, diminish public sector effectiveness and hinder private sector 
development (Thompson, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Khan, 2002). In particular, 
Mauro (1995) shows that corruption is negatively associated with investment ratio 
and economic growth (Swaleheen, 2011; Mallik and Saha, 2016; Kim, Ha, and Kim, 
2017). 
However, although the harmful effects of corruption are not in dispute, it has 
also been demonstrated that bureaucratic corruption can boost the productivity of 
the economy by reducing red tape. For investors, less time spent in the queue 
dealing with bureaucratic procedures also means fewer barriers to investments, and 
thus more incentive to invest, all things being equal. Aside from acting as an 
incentive for bureaucrats to speed up administrative process, bureaucratic 
corruption has also been shown to increase the productivity of capital. For instance, 
Leff (1964) argues that the readiness to bid a bribe is associated with individual skills 
and talent, with the implication that licenses tend to be allocated to the most 
efficient firms (Méon and Sekkat, 2005). Beck and Maher (1986) show that, in a 
bribery game in which licenses are illicitly issued to the firm bidding the highest 
bribe, the lowest-cost firm always wins the game. That is, corruption enables the 
imperfectly informed bureaucrat to choose the best potential investment, with due 
effects on the proper allocation of capital. This is in line with an original idea by Leff 
(1964): ‘if the government erred in its decision, the course made possible by 
corruption may well be the better one’. 
1.4 Measurements of corruption 
Two main indices of corruption appear to be the most frequently used in the 
empirical work: the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), published by Transparency 
International (TI), and Control of Corruption (CC), computed by a team of 
researchers led by Daniel Kaufmann at the World Bank (WB) through the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI).  
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Both indices are constructed on the basis of methodologies that assess 
subjective opinions about how corruption is perceived in various countries. In order 
to reduce measurement error, both indices attempt to average different sources, 
and they both use similar and intertwined sets of inputs (Treisman, 2007). The 
sources include surveys of international or domestic businesspeople, public sector 
organisations, non-government organisations, country risk ratings provided by 
business consultancies, and polls.  
Statistics from the CPI have been published annually since 1995, in 54 countries. 
They have, over time, covered an increasing number of countries and territories 
around the world, with 176 in 2016. Since 2012, the CPI has applied a two-step 
method summarised through the following formula: ሺሺ௫೔ି௠௘௔௡ሺ௫ሻ௦௧ௗሺ௫ሻ ሻ ൈ ݏ݅݃݊ ൈ ʹͲ ൅
ͶͷǤ All the sources are standardised by subtracting the mean of the data and dividing
by the standard deviation (std). They are then readjusted such that the mean and
the standard deviation respectively equal 45 and 20 (TI, 2012a). The final index
varies between 0 to 100, with 0 standing for the utmost perceived corruption, and
100 indicating full integrity.
Since its first publication in 1996, CC has covered a much broader number of 
countries and territories: from 204 countries and territories in 1996 to 214 in 2016. 
The data were bi-annually published between 1996 and 2002, and then made 
available for subsequent years. The WB applies an Unobserved Component Model 
(UCM) (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2006) in which corruption is approximated 
as a linear function of unobserved corruption g, in a country j, and a disturbance u. 
The formula then reads: ݕ௜௞ൌܽ௞൅ܾ௞ሺ ௜݃൅ݑ௝௞ሻ; thus, the observed score y of 
corruption in a country j depends on the value of the unobserved corruption g (or 
any other governance variable available in WGI) in country j and an error term u. 
The parameters a and b are used to rescale the data from each source into common 
units. The standardised indices lie between -2.5 and 2.5, with the lower bound 
meaning utmost corruption and the upper bound standing for full integrity. 
Both indices have strengths and weaknesses. Regarding the construction of their 
indices, TI takes into account countries and territories for which there are at least 
three component ratings. While this may be restrictive in terms of countries covered 
(especially in the first years of publication), it provides more precision and seems 
relatively robust. TI essentially uses the averages of standardised values and adjusts 
them to reduce sensitivity to changes in the surveys and countries (Treisman, 2007). 
As opposed to the CPI, in the case of CC, each country with at least one component 
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rating can be included; however, this entails the possible consequence of a lack of 
precision. 
Moreover, the CPI and CC indices display a comparative deficit problem. The 
standardisation, which places different indicators on a common scale, does not 
promote the detection of changes over time. Comparing scores or rankings across 
years would not make sense, as their variations are also explained by adding a new 
source or dropping an outdated one in the calculation of the index (Andvig, 
Amundsen and Søreide, 2000).  
Accordingly, from 2012, TI (2012b) significantly amended its methodology by 
aggregating data from each of the data sources, including just one year’s data from 
each data source. As a result, ‘any change from year to year in the raw scores will 
therefore be translated into a change in the rescaled score from that data source’ 
(TI, 2012b). More generally, Arndt and Oman (2006) point out the likelihood of the 
correlation of errors among sources of WGI (see also Kurtz and Shrank, 2008). 
Although the WB clearly rejects these criticisms, labelling them as either 
‘conceptually incorrect or empirically unsubstantiated’ (Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi, 2007), it does, however, recognise, alongside TI, the need to further 
examine both conceptual and methodological constraints. 
Furthermore, both corruption measurements attempt to estimate the degree of 
precision of each country’s rating. For the CPI, using a bootstrap methodology, the 
standard errors associated with countries are very different, suggesting a lack of 
consensus about the level of corruption. Likewise, for the CC, the standard errors 
resulting from the estimation of the UCM tend to decrease with the number of 
sources available (Treisman, 2007). Regarding the CC, Lambsdorff (2006) argues that 
using sources such as Global Insight (Standard and Poors/DRI), International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) or Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI) can be 
problematic. In particular, the first two sources assess the potential political risk of 
corruption in a country, while the third source adopts a definition of corruption 
considered ‘inappropriate’ because it uses ‘mentality’ as one of the criteria for 
measuring the level of corruption in the country.  
However, although the CPI and CC differ with respect to methodologies 
employed and sometimes sources, they nevertheless remain highly correlated (e.g. 
r = 0.96 in 2002, r = 0.98 in 2004, 2013). Alongside TI and WB, Political Risk Services 
(PRS) also produces cross-national corruption ratings (ICRG). Its statistics have the 
advantage of being systematically available since the early 1980s. Being itself a 
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source for the CC, ICRG unsurprisingly displays a strong correlation with the CC (r = 
0.84 in 1996), as with the CPI (r = 0.88 in the same year).     
Although widely used in research, subjective-based indices generally face many 
criticisms. Undoubtedly the most obvious of these is that perceptions of corruption 
do not measure corruption itself but only opinions about how people perceive 
corruption in the country (Treisman, 2007). Since these opinions are not built on 
facts, they could simply be wrong. Some studies argue that many cognitive biases 
can affect the perception of corruption. First, interviewees’ responses about their 
perceptions of corruption may be affected by the ‘bandwagon effect’. This means 
that their perceptions may tend to agree with common – i.e. majority – perceptions 
about corruption in a given country (Sequeira, 2012). Media, government anti-
corruption campaigns, politically motivated denunciations by political opponents, 
and pressure groups significantly help in the construction of such opinions.  
The second cognitive bias is the ‘halo effect’, which refers to the tendency to 
associate corruption with a lower standard of development (Sequeira, 2012). In line 
with this idea, Treisman (2007) argues that ratings by commercial risk-rating 
agencies and experts might disproportionately evaluate corruption in a non-realistic 
way, on the basis of their greater familiarity with certain cultures or their 
preconceptions that corruption is higher in underdeveloped countries, and lower in 
developed countries (Glaser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2004).  
As Treisman (2007) points out, another source of bias in perceived corruption is 
related to the fact that cross-national differences in data can also reflect differences 
in the extent to which people identify with their government, in the extent of social 
and economic injustice, and in the degree of cynicism and opportunism among 
politicians in the society. This can be confusing, even puzzling, as at the same time, 
studies have used these statistics to examine the links between social trust, 
inequality and democracy on the one hand, and corruption on the other. 
Another factor that calls into question the validity of subjective-based indices 
relates to their sources, which sometimes measure quite different things, thus 
making their aggregation inconsistent. This is evidenced through the sheer variety 
of both questionnaires and their respondents. Some surveys, for instance, focus on 
the size of bribes, while some ask about their frequency; others examine the relative 
seriousness of the problem, still others the burden that it imposes on the economy. 
In terms of scope, some capture low-level administrative corruption, whereas 
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others have a narrow, regional or even worldwide focus. Furthermore, other 
assessments include ‘dirty’ political behaviours. 
At the same time, respondents include country inhabitants, western experts or 
pools of international business agencies. Given this ‘confusion’, it becomes difficult 
to say exactly what the resulting indices actually measure. Besides, it appears that 
‘most factors that predict perceived corruption do not correlate with recently 
available measures of actual corruption experiences’ (Treisman, 2007). 
1.5 Summary of the essays 
This doctoral dissertation represents an empirical contribution to investigations of 
the economic implications of corruption at the macroeconomic level. The literature 
review clearly shows two main views on the impact of corruption on economic 
performance. In fact, conventional wisdom indicates that corruption is detrimental 
to growth and economic development, as it does not foster a fair frame of 
competition, which in turn distorts markets (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Mauro, 
1995; Knack and Keefer, 1995). For advocates of such a claim, corruption is 
metaphorically like sand in the wheels of the economy. And yet, marginal but 
appealing counter-arguments hypothesise that corruption may have virtues, since 
it may help to remove some pre-existing distortions (Leff, 1964; Huntington, 1968; 
Bardhan, 1997; Méon and Sekkat, 2005). Corruption is, in this view, considered an 
efficiency-enhancing factor, one which metaphorically lubricates the wheels of the 
economy.  
Basically, much of this dissertation is devoted to this debate. Another part of the 
work assesses the cyclical behaviours of corruption, after which it measures how 
corruption could impact productivity. To examine these issues, four essays were 
developed with the aim of empirically checking specific hypotheses. Beforehand, 
the dissertation, in its introductory section, shed some light on the concept of 
corruption by reviewing its general background, definitions of key concepts and 
measurements of corruption. The setting will be finally completed with the 
summaries of the essays. The second part is devoted to the four essays. 
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1.5.1 Essay I. Corruption and governance – Sand or grease in the wheels? 
In the analysis of the impact of corruption on economic performance, most studies 
determine corruption to be detrimental to economic activities and economic 
development (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Mauro (1995) and Knack and Keefer 
(1995) are known as pioneering studies that provided empirical justifications for this 
hypothesis. Subsequent contributions, such as Brunetti and Weder (1998) or Mo 
(2001), also go in the same direction, concluding that corruption hinders economic 
growth (Mallik and Saha, 2016). Regarding the correlation with investment, studies 
show that corruption also tends to reduce capital stock (Hines, 1995; Wei, 2000; 
Paul, 2010). These sceptical views suggest that corruption is like sand in the wheels 
of economies, hindering their good performance and in fine their development (i.e. 
Sanding the wheels hypothesis (SWH)). 
Alternative studies, however, suggest that corruption nevertheless has virtues in 
some circumstances. The premises of the ‘efficient corruption’ theory are put 
forward in Leff (1964), Leys (1965) and Huntington (1968). They claim that 
corruption might be beneficial in the presence of distortions caused by poor 
governance, or by ineffective institutions. The major underpinning of this hypothesis 
is that inefficient bureaucracy constitutes a serious obstacle to investment (Beck 
and Maher, 1986; Méon and Sekkat, 2005; Méndez and Sepúlveda, 2006). 
Inefficient bureaucracy, for instance, includes rigidity, tediousness, sluggishness or 
red tape within the administration. In those circumstances, bribes may act as 
lubricants to ease, or eventually boost, the functioning of a bureaucracy in the grips 
of inefficiency (hence, Greasing the wheels hypothesis (GWH)). According to this 
view, Bardhan (1997) therefore concludes that in a second-best world with pre-
existing distortions, additional distortions caused by corruption may indeed improve 
welfare despite absorbing some resources. 
The first article examines the validity of GWH. Following the empirical 
investigations conducted by Méon and Sekkat (2005), this study tests the effect of 
corruption on changes in the real GDP per capita growth of 99 countries worldwide, 
over a time span of 2006–2014. In addition, four dimensions of governance are 
adopted in order to capture the quality of institutions: Political instability and 
violence/terrorism, Government inefficiency, Regulatory burden and the absence of 
Rule of law.  
In order to capture the extent of corruption, the empirical investigations focus 
on data from the factors Bribe incidence and Bribe depth. Notably,unlike
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perception-based indices, these factors are based on facts. More specifically, Bribe 
incidence measures the proportion of firms experiencing at least one bribe payment 
request out of six transactions dealing with utilities access, permits, licenses and 
taxes. Bribe depth, on the other hand, captures the percentage of transactions 
whereby a gift of informal payment was requested, again out of six transactions 
dealing with utilities access, permits, licenses and taxes. Their respective statistics 
were generated from surveys of more than 131,000 firms from 139 countries 
worldwide. These statistics have been available since 2006 through the Work Bank 
Enterprise Survey of Business Managers (World Bank Group).  
Regarding the effects of bad governance on economic growth, our findings show 
that a politically unstable environment with omnipresent violence and terrorism 
reduces economic growth. Likewise, a public administration of poor quality with a 
strong influence of the political system, or inefficient public policies with a weak 
government, also tend to affect the growth of the economy. The study also provides 
substantial evidence that the economy is impacted when governments fail to 
formulate effective policies, including implementing regulatory mechanisms to 
promote the development of the private sector. Finally, our data suggest that flaws 
in terms of rule of law that question the security of the economic environment also 
negatively affect economic growth. 
As for testing the validity of GWH, we found that corruption clearly reduces per 
capita GDP growth in the presence of political instability and/or violence/terrorism. 
In such a context, corruption becomes increasingly costly to the economy, as it 
amplifies the negative effect of the instability on the GDP. This is consistent with the 
alleged sand effect of corruption (SWH). However, our investigations show that 
corruption becomes more virtuous in the presence of inefficient public policies and 
the absence of sound policies or a regulatory framework to support private sector 
growth. Likewise, the data again point to the beneficial effects of corruption on 
growth when the quality of rule of law is poor. In both cases, in addition to its 
positive effect on economic growth, corruption clearly alleviates the cost of 
institutional distortions on growth – which is the strict definition of the grease effect 
(GWH).  
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1.5.2 Essay II. Testing for Granger causality between corruption and 
governance  
Promoting good practices in the conduct of development policies, i.e. the battle 
against corruption, stands high on the agenda of international financial institutions 
such as the World Bank (WB) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Government intervention to guarantee the good quality of regulation may 
significantly help in preventing market failures while also encouraging economic 
performance (North and Thomas, 1973; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Hall and Jones, 
1999; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001). While suitable regulations seem to 
have positive economic implications (Gillanders and Whelan, 2014) on the one 
hand, excessive regulations on the other are likely to stifle economic development, 
as they could be the source of red tape and disproportionate bureaucratic delays, 
which could in turn pave the way for further corruption.  
We hypothesise that an endogeneity problem may exist between corruption and 
poor regulation. On the one hand, governmental ill functioning, such as lags in 
allotting licenses and permits, lack of information, red tape and sluggish 
administration, are all likely to encourage corruption (Leff, 1964; Huntington, 1968; 
Acemoglu and Verdier, 1998; Mo, 2000; Méon and Sekkat, 2005). Conversely, one 
might also imagine that opportunistic bureaucrats deliberately create distortions in 
the administration in order to raise motives for bribery (Myrdal, 1968; Murphy, 
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1993; Kurer, 1993; Kaufmann and Wei, 2000).  
In order to assess a possible causal link between corruption and governance, the 
dissertation applies the empirical technique developed by Granger (1969). Panel 
data from 117 countries worldwide over the 1996–2013 study period was used. Five 
governance dimensions were captured, including absence of Voice and 
accountability; Political instability and violence/terrorism; Government inefficiency; 
Regulatory burden; and absence of Rule of law. 
Our investigations uncovered a unidirectional causal link from the deterioration 
of the quality of absence of Voice and accountability (i.e. citizens’ ability to select 
their government, and freedom of expression, association and media) to increasing 
corruption.  
Moreover, a strong bidirectional causal link clearly emerged for the relationship 
between corruption and the remaining governance variables (i.e. Political instability 
and violence/terrorism: the likelihood that the government will be destabilised or 
overthrown by unconstitutional means, including politically motivated violence and 
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terrorism; Government inefficiency: quality of public services, independence of civil 
servants from political pressures, quality of policy formulation and implementation, 
and government commitment to policies; Regulatory burden: government’s ability 
to implement policies and regulations that promote private sector development; 
Absence of Rule of law: agents’ confidence in the rules of society, the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, police and courts, and the likelihood of crime 
and violence). 
Our investigations show to some extent how much corruption can be difficult to 
pinpoint. While economic reasons seem to be the mainstream, the results highlight 
the fact that corruption strongly challenges the field of governance too. Moreover, 
interestingly, the empirical analyses yield the ‘bad governance–corruption–bad 
governance’ vicious circle. Given the connection between ill-functioning institutions 
and the economic sphere, one may easily understand that the battle against 
corruption is not led solely on the economic terrain alone. 
1.5.3 Essay III. Do business cycles trigger corruption? 
Although multiple studies have unambiguously found that corruption is negatively 
associated with income (Mauro, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Mo, 2001), little is 
known about its possible cyclical effects. Yet, economic disruptions exist and are 
inherent to economic activities. In the financial field in particular, cycles are often 
considered to be provoked by human opportunistic behaviours, also referred to as 
Animal spirit. Akerlof and Shiller (2009) claim that this would constitute a powerful 
psychological force, one that leads to disturbances at any given interval of time. 
However, the original idea, which highlights the existence of corruption dynamics 
(Minsky, 1975, 1986), comes from Keynes (1936).  
More specifically, this paper empirically tests the proposition by Galbraith (1997) 
that ‘[…] At any given time there exists an inventory of undiscovered embezzlement 
in – or more precisely not in – the country’s businesses and banks. This inventory – 
it should perhaps be called the bezzle – amounts at any moment to many millions 
of dollars. It also varies in size with the business cycle. In good times, people are 
relaxed, trusting, and money is plentiful. But even though money is plentiful, there 
are always many people who need more. Under these circumstances the rate of 
embezzlement grows, the rate of discovery falls off, and the bezzle increases rapidly. 
In depression all this is reversed. Money is watched with a narrow, suspicious eye. 
The man who handles it is assumed to be dishonest until he proves himself 
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otherwise. Audits are penetrating and meticulous. Commercial morality is 
enormously improved. The bezzle shrinks’.  
To put it simply, Galbraith (1997)’s assertion suggests that corruption conditions 
business cycles in such a way that, during economic booms, corrupt practices are 
more pervasive in society, while periods of recession, on the other hand, coincide 
with a decline in those types of behaviours. The study by Gokcekus and Suzuki 
(2011), which was based on 39 countries worldwide for the 1995–2007 period, 
confirms this theory. 
The dissertation tackles the issue differently. Following the mainstream 
reasoning that corruption tends to spread in low-income contexts, one may also 
assume that economic booms, which are basically associated with increases in 
income, revenues or profit, could at the same time foster more integrity. On the 
other hand, during recessions, when economic benefits usually decline, one could 
presume that economic agents would engage in corrupt activities to compensate 
for the loss resulting from the decline in income-generating activities. Such analyses 
fundamentally go against Galbraith’s assertion. 
Following Gokcekus and Suzuki (2011), the study basically estimates two 
econometric models. First, corruption is estimated with respect to permanent 
income with the aim of capturing the long-term correlation between both variables. 
Second and most importantly, in order to determine whether there are any cyclical 
behaviours in corruption, changes in corruption indices are estimated with respect 
to transitory income. 
Data on the risk of corruption were derived from the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) dataset, and the study covered a total of 110 countries worldwide for 
the 1984–2011 period.  
For the first model, the paper verifies the findings of Gokcekus and Suzuki (2011) 
and those of most empirical research on the issue: an increase of permanent income 
tends to reduce corruption.  
For the second model, the study contradicts Gokcekus and Suzuki (2011). The 
results show that short-term fluctuations in income are positively correlated with 
integrity. That is, economic booms reduce corruption, while recessions trigger it. 
Our conclusion remained unchanged when the estimations strictly focused on 
countries covered by Gokcekus and Suzuki (2011), or when an alternative corruption 
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measure (Control of Corruption (CC), from the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI) dataset – World Bank) was adopted.  
Moreover, we dig further by considering a sample split with respect to income 
and the quality of rule of law. Again, our previous conclusion about the cyclical 
behaviour of corruption still holds. More specifically, most democratic countries, or 
richest countries, seem to be more sensitive to business cycles. For these countries, 
the growth of income-generating activities may significantly help in reducing 
corruption habits, and economic crises constitute an important risk for more 
corruption. Meanwhile, such sensitivity is very low in less democratic countries, or 
in poor countries – which means that expansion cycles do not necessarily yield a 
significant decline in corrupt practices, nor do recessions generate significant 
additional corruption. 
Of course, this does not mean that less democratic countries, or poor countries, 
experience low levels of corruption – actually, it is quite the opposite. The very low 
elasticity could be explained by the strong corruption habits in these societies, in 
such a way that low income or the absence of accountability contexts, seen as 
natural triggers of corruption, become ‘ineffective’ in amplifying it further. 
1.5.4 Essay IV. Does corruption affect total factor productivity? An 
empirical analysis  
Nowadays, the issue of how corruption impacts economic activities has been 
explored in a significant number of studies (Mauro, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1995). 
However, most seemed to concentrate on the effects of corruption on economic 
growth (Mauro, 1995; Mo, 2001) or investment (Mauro, 1995; Wei, 2000).  
In particular, the influence of corruption on productivity (Lambsdorff, 2003) has 
received little attention, even though such a focus could be useful in many regards. 
Studies show that investment does not in itself suffice in explaining growth (Easterly 
and Levine, 2001; Caselli, 2005). Furthermore, productivity-based analyses have put 
forward that efficiency employed to transform the inputs to some extent explain 
economic growth (Hall and Jones, 1999). Such an efficiency is conditioned by 
countries’ institutions, government policies and innovation. Its contribution to 
growth (total factor productivity (TFP), or Solow residual) symbolises the deviation 
between the observed output and that forecasted through human and physical 
capital. 
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Many empirical studies highlight the integrality of TFP to economic growth 
(Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956). By example, the quantitative analysis of Abramovitz 
(1956) indicates that the growth of factors of production contributed only 10% of 
the output growth per capita in the US during 1869–1878 and 1944–1953, which 
suggests that 80% of the growth came from TFP. The survey from Solow (1957), 
covering 1900–1949, also points out that the output growth per worker explained 
by capital accumulation is only 12%. Such a finding also points to the significant 
contribution of TFP to growth. The empirical investigations of Baier, Dwyer and 
Tamura (2006), while confirming earlier studies regarding the meaningful 
contribution of TFP to growth, also indicate that the variation in output per worker 
is more sensitive to variations in TFP than to variations in classical factors. 
In line with Olson, Sarna and Swamy (2000), we assume that corruption could 
therefore channel TFP to impact growth. The foundation of this study rests on the 
extent to which corruption could affect TFP. In addition, we checked the possible 
consequences of tax burden on this possible link. Capturing the effect of tax burden 
might be interesting. The paper assumes that if there is any influence, it will be 
conditional on countries’ willingness to evade taxes as a response to tax rate 
increase. For instance, without tax evasion, we assume that tax burden may 
alleviate the negative effect of corruption on TFP. More tax revenue might enable 
countries to invest more and invest better, e.g. by financing changes in production 
technology, encouraging innovation, allowing for efficiency gains and allowing for a 
good quality of government policies and institutions, thus increasing future 
production capacity. If, in contrast, an increase in taxes leads to tax evasion, this 
clearly would exacerbate corruption (Alm, Martinez-Vasquez and McClennan, 
2016). 
The empirical study was based on 90 countries worldwide over a time span of 
1996–2014. Data on corruption are relative to the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 
provided by Transparency International (TI). The findings show that corruption, like 
tax burden, has a negative effect on TFP. When TFP is exclusively estimated with its 
lagged variable and corruption, the regressions indicate that a one-unit increase in 
the corruption standard deviation leads to a decrease in productivity of 0.04%. With 
the influence of tax burden, the overall effect of corruption on TFP becomes 
positive, demonstrating that tax rate increases alleviate the negative consequences 
of corruption on productivity. Robustness tests, including additional determinant 
variables of productivity, do not change this finding. 
3ϴ 
ϯϵ 
Our investigations recommend that optimal taxation and the efficient use of tax 
revenues both constitute useful instruments for monitoring corruption efficiently. 
As such, they may encourage economic progress. Their mishandling however, could 
exacerbate corruption and therefore affect their economic role for the community. 
ϰϬ 
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2 ESSAY I. CORRUPTION AND GOVERNANCE – 
SAND OR GREASE IN THE WHEELS? 
KOURAMOUDOU KÉÏTA 
ABSTRACT
Conventional wisdom holds that corruption is a major obstacle to economic 
development. A significant number of empirical studies find corruption detrimental 
to growth, thus regarding corruption like sand in the ‘wheels of the economy’. 
However, though such a conclusion is widespread in textbooks, alternative claims 
have at the same time found that corruption can be beneficial in circumstances 
where governance is badly malfunctioning (‘grease’ the wheels hypothesis). To 
check the validity of the ‘grease’ hypothesis, the study develops a non-linear growth 
model over a study period of 2006–2014. Country-level data from 99 countries 
worldwide are used. The empirical results show that governance indicators have a 
negative effect on the real GDP per capita growth. However, the conclusions as to 
the effect of corruption on the growth of the economy are mixed. When the level 
of political instability, violence and terrorism is high, corruption reduces economic 
growth. Notably, corruption seems to exacerbate the negative effects of such bad 
governance on growth. On the other hand, the findings surprisingly indicate that 
corruption has a positive effect on growth when the quality of public administration 
is poor with strong political pressure and inefficient public policies. The same 
conclusion holds when the private sector regulatory framework is deficient, or when 
the quality of rule of law is poor. In those cases, corruption actually reduces the 
respective costs of poor governance for economic growth.   
Keywords: corruption, governance, growth, investment 
JEL classification: D73 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
On the issue of corruption, conventional (global) wisdom unanimously suggests that 
it must be fought. Quite commonly, governments announce measures to combat 
corrupt practices, sometimes without real conviction; political opponents almost 
systematically put this struggle on their agenda, sometimes for electoral reasons 
only; the media also denounce corruption scandals. For international organisations 
(e.g. the UN, the IMF, the World Bank or the OECD), the battle against corruption 
stands high on their agenda (e.g. the 2009 Anti-Bribery Convention, the 2003 
Convention against Corruption). Thus, the question of whether corruption is 
beneficial or harmful to economic activities may seem inappropriate, even cynical, 
at first sight. 
The economic literature on the impact of corruption on economic activities is 
very extensive. Most studies are opposed to corrupt activities, which they consider 
to hinder the growth and economic development of countries (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1993). Mauro’s (1995) pioneering study provides empirical justification for this 
hypothesis. Making use of an older corruption index from Business International, 
Mauro found a negative relationship between corruption and the ratio of 
investment to GDP, which in turn influences economic growth. Studies like Keefer 
and Knack (1995), Brunetti and Weder (1998) and Mo (2001) also confirm this 
finding, while the conclusion of Hines (1995) and (Wei, 2000) is that corruption 
considerably alters countries’ ability to attract foreign capital (Egger and Winner, 
2005). Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) emphasise that high corruption is correlated with 
a bad quality of infrastructures.  
In contrast, other studies suggest that corruption can nevertheless have virtues. 
The premises of the efficient corruption theory are put forward in Leff (1964), Leys 
(1965) and Huntington (1968). Overall, they claim that corruption might be 
beneficial in the presence of distortions caused by ineffective institutions. The 
conceptual analysis undertaken in Bardhan (1997) illustrates the historical context 
in Europe and the US where corruption significantly allowed the development of 
entrepreneurship. Bardhan argues that in a second-best world with pre-existing 
distortions, additional distortions caused by corruption may indeed improve welfare 
despite absorbing some resources. Beck and Maher (1986) also maintain that 
corruption may improve efficiency within a bureaucracy. The most widespread 
argument about the possible beneficial side of corruption is the famous ‘grease the 
wheels’ hypothesis (GWH). Its justifications are based on the idea that inefficient 
bureaucracy constitutes a ‘bottleneck’ for investment that money helps remedy 
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(‘grease’). In other words, bribes act as lubricants to ease, or eventually boost, the 
functioning of a bureaucracy in the grips of inefficiency.  
However, studies that are sceptical about the presumed beneficial effects of 
corruption invoke the ‘sand the wheels’ hypothesis (SWH). SWH argues that 
corruption can endanger investment and growth. It is important to clarify that SWH 
is not radically inconsistent with the perspective of GWH, which clearly suggests that 
corruption may be beneficial in countries displaying shortcomings in other aspects 
of governance but remains detrimental when such for countries that do not 
experience deficient governance. Various studies have tested the effect of 
corruption on economic performance; with, however, mixed conclusions. Likewise, 
various studies have produced mixed results when assessing the relative veracity of 
GWH or SWH. 
Mauro (1995)’s empirical approach evaluates the hypothesis against two 
samples (high red tape and low red tape) – however, it fails to show a significant 
difference between the two regimes of red tape. Using firm-level data, Kaufman and 
Wei (2000) assess the impact of bribes on administrative delays and determined 
that firms that pay more bribes are also those that spend more time negotiating 
with local administrations, a finding which drastically contrasts with the ‘grease’ 
money idea. The investigations of Méon and Sekkat (2005) to a large extent reject 
the alleged beneficial effects of corruption as suggested by GWH. Making use of a 
set of governance variables computed by the World Bank, Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Zoido-Lobaton (1999) determine that weak rule of law, inefficient governance or 
political violence contribute to exacerbating the detrimental effect of corruption on 
investment. Their findings further indicate that corruption diminishes growth more 
so in economies facing both weak rule of law and an inefficient government. 
Méndez and Sepúlveda (2006) estimate a quadratic model to examine the impact 
of corruption on growth with respect to different political freedom regimes. 
Broadly, their result argues for the existence of a growth-maximising level of 
corruption, thereby lending support to GWH. More specifically, corruption tends to 
have a beneficial effect on long-run growth in countries with a low degree of political 
freedom, whereas such an effect is negative in high political freedom frameworks. 
Méon and Weill (2008) also find strong evidence in favour of the efficient corruption 
theory. For each of the five dimensions of governance that they empirically 
examine, GWH holds (Cooray and Schneider, 2018). Moreover, Aidt, Dutta and Sena 
(2008) apply a non-linear technique that allows for the threshold effect, leading to 
mixed results. Their conclusion corroborates the argument that corruption hampers 
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economic growth in countries with high-quality institutions; however, when the 
focus is on low- quality institutions, no statistical relevance can be found in their 
estimates. Although the list of empirical studies that test GWH against SWH is not 
exhaustive, those mentioned in this discussion are sufficient to highlight their 
respective controversies. 
This study estimates the validity of GWH under the angle adopted in Méon and 
Sekkat (2005). Based on the four dimensions used in their empirical analysis, this 
work finds that corruption tends to reduce both changes in the real GDP per capita 
and capital stock. In addition, substantial evidence exists in favour of the ‘greasing’ 
effect of corruption. In fact, when the quality of rule of law decreases, corruption 
tends to be less detrimental to economic performance. In extreme cases of such 
governance deterioration, corruption clearly has a positive effect on the real GDP 
per capita and investment. 
The rest of this study is organised as follows: Section 2 undertakes a brief review 
of the literature on both claims. Section 3 is devoted to describing the empirical 
methodology and data. The estimation results are reported and discussed in Section 
4, while Section 5 exclusively focuses on the empirical testing of GWH. The general 
conclusion of the study is presented in Section 6. 
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW OF GWH VERSUS SWH 
The theoretical underpinning of the ‘grease the wheels’ hypothesis is that 
corruption may coexist with a poor quality of governance and even alleviate the 
consequences of such poor quality. While the ‘sand the wheels’ hypothesis claims 
that although corruption can be beneficial, it tends to generate additional costs in 
the same circumstances. Here, the core of the argument rests on the existence of 
these costs. 
Concerning aspects of governance that corruption is likely to grease or sand, 
the literature mainly identifies the ill functioning of bureaucracy, and the other 
aspect focuses on the policy options by public authority. 
Concerning bureaucratic ill functioning, due attention is paid to its slowness in 
procedures relating, for instance, to the negotiation of licenses, permits or 
signatories. Relatively long administrative delays are seen as the basis of the 
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distortions and inefficiency of bureaucracy. Huntington (1968) summarises this as 
follows: ‘[…] in terms of economic growth, the only thing worse than a society with 
a rigid, over-centralized, dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid, over-centralized, 
honest bureaucracy’. According to some economists, corruption may considerably 
alleviate these distortions and make the bureaucracy more efficient (Méon and 
Sekkat, 2005). By example, the equilibrium queuing model of Lui (1985) shows that 
bribes may significantly lessen the time spent in queues, and therefore also reduce 
bureaucratic inefficiency. Leys (1964) suggests that corruption helps speed up 
processes in an otherwise sluggish administration. According to Aidt (2009), this 
stimulates the economy because investment is encouraged by relatively easy access 
of firms to the market.  
On the other hand, a counterargument to the presumed existence of the 
distortions that corruption is postulated to reduce is highlighted in studies like 
Myrdal (1968), Kurer (1993) and Kaufmann and Wei (2000). They emphasise the 
bureaucrats’ self-interest in the creation of distortions that would otherwise not 
appear (Reinikka and Svensson, 2004; Li and Wu, 2007; Pande, 2008; Rosenbaum, 
Billinger and Stiglitz, 2013). In other words, corrupt bureaucrats see these 
bottlenecks in the administrative machine as opportunities to extract rents; they 
therefore have a motive to amplify them to benefit even more. This claim is 
consistent with the point made by Kaufmann and Wei (2000) that corruption 
endogenously leads to poor governance and exacerbates associated distortions. 
Mankiw and Whinston (1986), however, seriously question the entry of firms in the 
market and its possible implications. They instead demonstrate that marginal entry 
is gainful to the entrant but causes an output reduction in other firms. 
Consequently, such a process is ineffective in terms of welfare. This viewpoint is also 
supported by Rose-Ackerman (1997), who suggests that when a firm is the higher 
bidder and pays the highest bribe, the quality of future produced goods will be 
compromised. 
Another important argument in favour of corruption is related to its possible role 
in enhancing the quality of civil servants. For instance, Leff (1964) shows that 
licenses tend to be allocated to the most efficient firm. He then argues that the 
willingness to offer a bribe is associated with talent, suggesting in parallel that 
corruption may have a positive impact on the productivity of capital. Furthermore, 
using a bribery game model, where permits are illicitly issued to the private firm 
bidding the highest bribe, Beck and Maher (1986) conclude that, under incomplete 
information, the lowest-cost firm always wins the license. These works implicitly 
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suggest that in circumstances in which officials do not have sufficient information 
to evaluate the quality of bidders, and thus potential investments, corruption 
facilitates the right decision. This is in line with Leff (1964)’s idea that ‘if the 
government erred in its decision, the course made possible by corruption may well 
be the better one’. In contrast, Kurer (1993) attempts to deconstruct such an 
opinion, emphasising the costs of corruption in terms of the quality of officials, and 
of public services. Namely, he stresses the fact that corruption can prevent people 
(especially competent people) from accessing key positions at their level of 
competence. Likewise, corruption can negatively affect the normal provision of 
public services. For instance, such a provision can be opportunistically rationed in 
line with the expectations of the highest bidder.  
Regarding the other aspect of governance, studies argue that bribery can help 
reduce risks in the economic environment. Consistent with this contention, 
Amundsen (1999) recalls that in the Neo-patrimonialism1 political systems, 
individuals use corruption as a hedge to guard against expropriation or violence 
from higher decision-makers. Since corruption reduces those risks, it may thereby 
increase investments, which become less risky (Bayley, 1966). Furthermore, Nye 
(1967) stresses that bribery may also contribute in stabilising the political 
environment because it facilitates citizens’ access to scarce services that they 
otherwise would not receive. This would to some extent increase their confidence 
in the political institutions they rely on to satisfy their needs. However, one may 
have some doubts regarding this reasoning, as corruption-tainted contracts can 
easily be questioned when exposed. According to Campos, Lien and Pradhan (1999) 
and Lambsdorff (2003), the unpredictability of the corruption environment 
constitutes a real risk that is not reassuring for capital inflows and investment. 
Bardhan (1997) also argues that the uncertainty inherent to corruption-tainted 
agreements may affect the possible ‘grease’ money effect. 
1 Neo-patrimonialism: In political science, neo-patrimonialism refers to a political system whereby the 
chief executive exercises authority through personal patronage instead of law or ideology. Such 
practices are observed in non-democratic and semi-democratic regimes and are characterised by 
pervasive patron–client structures, with no distinction between public and private, and political 
weakness (Amundsen, 1999). 
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2.3 METHODOLOGY 
2.3.1 Model 
As discussed in the above sections, the ‘grease’ effect hypothesises that corruption 
might be beneficial in the presence of ill functioning in other aspects of governance. 
However, the hypothesis does not reject the detrimental side of corruption. This 
study, therefore, does not aim to determine whether corruption fosters or impedes 
economic performance. The main interest is rather in examining such influences 
when other aspects of governance are poor. As a result, while considering the 
influence of other aspects of governance, we assess the effect of corruption on per 
capita GDP growth.  
Consistently, the baseline model of the study reads: 
  (1) 
where the subscripts i and t stand, respectively, for individual (countries) and 
time (years), with i = 1, …, N and t = 0, …, T. The errors terms of both equations are 
symbolised by ߝ and ߤ, while ߙ:s and ߚ:s are the coefficients to be estimated.  
On the left-hand side of Equation (1),  measures the economic performance 
of country i at period t.   
On the right-hand side, Y0 symbolises the economic performance of country i at 
the initial period, 2006. Its use in the model is justified by the conditional 
convergence hypothesis (Barro, 1991; Mankiw and Weil, 1992). The hypothesis 
suggests that when countries possess the same technological possibilities and 
population growth rate, there should be convergence to the same growth rate, even 
if they do not display the same savings propensities and initial capital–labour ratio. 
In other words, poorer countries catch up to the richer ones.  
Also on the right-hand side of Equation (1), α2 in particular symbolises a vector 
of coefficients weighting Zi,t, which is a vector of variables that takes into account 
classical determinants of real GDP per capita growth (see Levine and Renelt, 1992).  
Moreover, in the benchmark equations, Cor represents the corruption variable, 
which aims to capture the prevalence of corruption within countries, while  
symbolises the influence of governance. In fine, the interaction effect of both 
variables is considered through , as Equation (1) suggests. 
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The description of data, sources and their expected effects on the dependent 
variable is presented in the next sub-section (See Table 1 and Table 2). 
2.3.2 Data 
The study focuses on panel data from 99 countries worldwide, listed in Appendix, 
for the 2006–2014 period. In the forthcoming estimations, three main data sources 
are used in accordance with the GWH.  
First, economic data are systematically derived from Penn World Tables version 
9.0 (Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer, 2015). They, among others, include per capita 
real GDP growth, which is used as the dependent variable. The same variable is also 
used for the initial level of economic performance in 2006. We expect the growth 
rate of income to be negatively associated with the dependent variable, which 
would verify the conditional convergence hypothesis (i.e. α1<0). This means that the 
development dynamic is such that poorer countries catch up to the richer ones. The 
related statistics are based on the output side real GDP per capita at chained (in 
2005 PPP dollars US). In their study, Méon and Sekkat (2005) instead use the average 
growth rate of per capita income over the sample period 1970–1998 as the 
dependent variable, while the index for the initial period is also used as initial 
income. 
The rest of growth’s basic control variables include physical and human capital, 
population growth and inflation in the time period 2006–2014. For physical capital, 
the capital stock (also in 2005 PPP dollars US) over the period is used, whereas Méon 
and Sekkat (2005) instead use the average ratio of investment to GDP over their 
sample period. For human capital, the index of human capital per person is used. 
The index is computed by combining both schooling years (Barro and Lee, 2010) and 
the returns to education (Psacharopoulos, 1994).2 As a proxy variable for the human 
capital in their growth model, Méon and Sekkat (2005) instead use the initial level 
of schooling. Following Levine and Renelt (1992), investments in both physical and 
human capitals should enhance the growth of real per capita GDP. Furthermore, the 
price level of household consumption (price level of USA GDPo in 2011=1) is also 
taken into account. Still in line with Levine and Renelt (1992), countries that grow 
2 The index of human capital is based on the following function: hc = ݁׎ሺ௦೔೟ሻ, where s represents the 
average years of schooling in country i at time t. A standard assumption is that the marginal product 
of education diminishes schooling time (see also Psacharopoulos, 1994 and Caselli, 2005). 
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faster than the average tend to have lower inflation rates than slower-growing 
countries. The estimated coefficient associated with inflation is hence expected to 
be negative. Méon and Sekkat (2005) instead use the openness of trade, even more 
adopted in the estimation of growth models. Population growth rate incorporates 
the demographic factor of growth. When measured in terms of GDP per capita, 
population growth should hinder growth (Levine and Renelt, 1992). At this level, 
Méon and Sekkat (2005) proxy the demographic factor using the average growth 
rate of population over their sample period. 
Furthermore, we use two indicators to capture the extent of corruption. The 
resulting statistics are based on surveys of more than 131,000 firms from 139 
countries worldwide. The first indicator is relative to Bribe incidence (BI), which 
measures the proportion of firms experiencing at least one bribe payment request 
out of six transactions dealing with utilities access, permits, licenses and taxes. The 
second, Bribe depth (BD), captures the percentage of transactions in which a gift or 
informal payment was requested, again out of six transactions dealing with utilities 
access, permits, licenses and taxes. Noteworthy, these variables are based on facts, 
not on individual perceptions of corrupt activities, unlike commonly used data on 
corruption. They are, alongside other variables measuring the prevalence of bribery, 
available since 2006 through the World Bank Enterprise Survey of Business 
Managers (World Bank Group). The estimated coefficients of BI and BD are expected 
to be negative, meaning that corruption hampers the per capita GDP growth rate. 
In order to capture the scope of distortions, as stressed in the ‘grease’ literature, 
the study examines five different aspects of governance over the study period.  
Like in Méon and Sekkat (2005), the WB indices as described in Kaufmann, Kraay 
and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) are used. The relevant data have been available since 
1996. However, for this study, the upgraded version, which provides statistics for 
the time span of 1996–2014, is used (i.e. Worldwide Governance Indicator dataset 
2014). The quality aspects of governance include: (i) Voice and accountability (VA), 
which ‘reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom 
of association, and a free media’; (ii) Political stability and lack of violence/terrorism 
(LV), which ‘reflects perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including 
politically-motivated violence and terrorism’; (iii) Government effectiveness (GE), 
which ‘reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of 
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policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to such policies’; (iv) Regulatory quality (RQ), which ‘reflects 
perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development’; (v) 
Rule of law (RL), which ‘reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence’; and (vi) Control of corruption (CC), which ‘reflects 
perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites 
and private interests’. However, CC is excluded from the empirical analysis. 
The original index values of these governance indicators also vary from -2.5 to 
2.5, with the upper bound representing the best quality possible, and the lower 
bound representing the exact opposite. A simple transformation technique is 
applied in which governance statistics are subtracted from 3.5, which consequently 
makes them vary from 1 to 6, where 1 stands for the best quality a country can 
achieve, and 6 stands for the lowest quality.  
While using the same governance indicator, the investigations of Méon and 
Sekkat (2005), however, use only the data point from 1998. 
Following Equation (1), the analysis also includes interaction terms, denoted as 
. They were constructed by multiplying the corruption variables (BI and 
BD) and the transformed governance variables (VA, LV, GE, RQ, and RL), thus yielding 
10 interaction terms in total. 
More generally, this study diverges from that conducted by Méon and Sekkat 
(2005) in many respects.  
First, from the perspective of statistical data, aside from the fact that the sources 
of our economic data are different, our analyses also focus on alternative corruption 
measures. Méon and Sekkat (2005) themselves underlines in their conclusion the 
need to improve their work – which, according to them, could be done namely by 
taking advantage of improvements in the assessment of the level of corruption and 
in the measurements of other aspects of governance, and using longer time series.  
Second, it is important to emphasise that their quantitative analyses focus on 
one data point per country for both the corruption and governance variables. We 
titi CorGov ,,
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believe, however, that using as many data points as possible would be statistically 
more informative, and would therefore help improve the quality of the estimations. 
Third, our study applies a panel data model, which attempts to capture two 
dimensions (country and year). In the analysis of the effect of corruption, such an 
approach may ultimately be useful. For instance, Méon and Sekkat (2005) succeed 
in generating evidence for the validity of the GWH, despite using one-point data on 
corruption and governance. However, as such, there is no guarantee that one would 
yield similar findings when using another benchmark year. Panel data models, in 
particular, help mitigate this issue.  
Fourth, in addition to using interaction terms to measure the joint influence of 
corruption and governance variables, the forthcoming estimations also consider the 
direct effects of these governance variables, which in turn sheds light on their 
independent effects on the dependent variable alongside those of corruption. Such 
an exercise is neglected in Méon and Sekkat (2005).  
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Descriptive statistics of variables in logarithm 
Variables Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum Sources 
Real GDP per 
capita 
11.468 1.94941 7.634 16.657 Feenstra, Inklaar, Timmer, 
(2015), Penn World Table 
9.0 
Human capital 0.8342 0.2948 0.1191 1.3176 Feenstra, Inklaar, Timmer, 
(2015), Penn World Table 
9.0 
Population 2.480 1.6736 1.291 7.222 Feenstra, Inklaar, Timmer, 
(2015), Penn World Table 
9.0 
Inflation -0.5995 0.4436 -1.4705 0.5750 Feenstra, Inklaar, Timmer, 
(2015), Penn World Table 
9.0 
Capital stock 12.547 2.0725 7.979 18.055 Feenstra, Inklaar, Timmer, 
(2015), Penn World Table 
9.0 
Bribery 
incidence 
2.545 1.0552 2.747 4.256 Bank Enterprise Survey of 
Business Managers, World 
Bank 
Bribery depth 2.2643 1.03609 -0.3567 4.1636 Bank Enterprise Survey of 
Business Managers, World 
Bank 
VA 1.2164 0.26772 1.2693 1.6630 World Development 
Indicators 2014, World 
Bank 
LV 1.2720 0.2474 0.6949 1.8446 World Development 
Indicators 2014, World 
Bank 
GE 1.203 0.319936 0.134 1.677 World Development 
Indicators 2014, World 
Bank 
RQ 1.1928 0.2883 0.3664 1.6706 World Development 
Indicators 2014, World 
Bank 
RL 1.2305 0.30815 0.3363 1.6908 World Development 
Indicators 2014, World 
Bank 
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Expected sign of dependent variables 
Independent variable Expected sign on the 
dependent variable 
Studies 
Yo െ Barro (1991), Mankiw and Weil 
(1992) 
Z(Capital stock) ൅ Levine and Renelt (1992) 
Z(Human capital) ൅ Levine and Renelt (1992) 
Z(Population) െ Levine and Renelt (1992) 
Z(Inflation) െ Barro (1995) 
Cor െ Mauro (1995), Mo (2000), Méon
and Sekkat (2005) 
Gov െ Méon and Sekkat (2005) 
Cor×Gov ൅ Méon and Sekkat (2005) 
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Unit-root test for stationarity 
Variables Augmented-Dickey-Fuller test Philipps-Perron test 
D-F statistics p-value D-F statistics p-value
Real GDP per capita -10.045 < 0.01 -32.198  0.01 
Capital stock -9.0461 < 0.01 -30.809  0.01 
Bribery incidence -9.4731 < 0.01 -33.635  0.01 
Bribery depth -9.073 < 0.01 -29.338  0.01 
VA -9.8467 < 0.01 -31.332  0.01 
LV -10.778 < 0.01 -32.583  0.01 
GE -10.035 < 0.01 -31.959  0.01 
RQ -9.9539 < 0.01 -31.645  0.01 
RL -10.821 < 0.01 -31.664  0.01 
Human capital -9.3407 < 0.01 -30.515  0.01 
Population  -11.458 < 0.01 -33.032  0.01 
Inflation -10.397 < 0.01 -31.15  0.01 
Notes. Series are stationary if the probabilities associated with the DF statistics are smaller 
than 0.05. 
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2.4 RESULTS 
The study develops three specifications of Equation (1). In the first estimation, the 
independent variables only include the variables of interest – that is, corruption, 
governance and their interaction terms. The second estimation incorporates, in 
addition, growth basic control variables. The third estimation includes regional 
dummies. The estimation results are reported in Tables 4–7. Like Méon and Sekkat 
(2005), this study did not lead to conclusive findings when estimations involved VA. 
For the sake of space, the related regressions are not displayed in the tables. 
Notably, time dummies were taken into account in the Fixed effects regressions. 
However, their estimated coefficients were not statistically significant. Likewise, 
their results are not shown for the sake of space. 
Furthermore, all the estimations systematically use the logarithmic values of 
variables in the dataset, in line with Mankiw and Weil (1992). This may help in 
making the observations conform more to a normal distribution and thus improve 
the quality of predictions.  
Table 4 reports the results relative to the estimations of Equation (1) when LV 
(now labelled Political instability/Violence/Terrorism due to the rescaling it was 
subject to, along with the other governance variables) is the governance variable.  
The estimations show that the estimated coefficients associated with the 
variables of interest show some consistency, displaying the same signs throughout. 
In particular, the partial effects of corruption and LV are found to be negatively 
associated with the growth in per capita real GDP. Their respective costs vis-à-vis 
economic performance are even more obvious when one looks at their respective 
overall effects (the overall effect of one being the sum of its partial effect and that 
of the interaction variable). 
The positive sign displayed by the estimated coefficients of the interaction 
variables (ߙହ) means that the negative effect of corruption on growth is exacerbated 
with more political instability, violence and terrorism. The same analysis applies the 
other way around, that the harmful influence of these types of violence on 
economic growth is further amplified when corruption spreads. In that respect, 
corruption generates an additional cost to growth – which is consistent with the 
‘sand the wheels’ hypothesis.  
Despite varying the number of independent variables from Column 1 to 3 using 
the panel least square, the estimated effects of the variables of interest are not 
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affected – their respective signs remain unchanged. Controlling for fixed (Column 4) 
effects, the conclusion stays unchanged. In both the Bribery incidence (BI)- and 
Bribery depth (BD)-related regressions, the estimated coefficients overall remain 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Moreover, the estimations also show that 
economic variables consistently display their expected signs, with estimated 
coefficients that are, overall, statistically significant at the 5% level as well.  
Table 5 presents the estimation results based on GE (now referred to as 
government inefficiency). Concerning the effects of the variables of interest, the 
conclusion scheme slightly differs in many respects. Regardless of the specifications 
and estimators adopted for Equation (1), the results consistently determine that the 
partial effect of corruption is beneficial to growth. Even when the indirect effects of 
corruption are considered through the interaction variables, the positive effects of 
corruption unexpectedly hold. Thus, the more firms are subject to bribe claims, and 
the more transactions are tainted by illegal payments, the greater the growth in per 
capita real GDP. Although this result suggests a positive influence of corruption, the 
negative sign of the interaction variables clearly underlines its fragility in the 
presence of an inefficient government. Indeed, the beneficial effects of corruption 
on growth gradually diminish as the quality of public administration, its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, or the credibility of government also deteriorate.  
Regarding the effect of an inefficient government, the estimations unequivocally 
show that it directly tends to reduce the economic growth. Furthermore, the 
assessment of the overall effect in turn puts forward that inefficient government is 
seriously costly in terms of growth. In addition, concerning the governance variable, 
the negative sign displayed by the interaction terms implies that corruption tends 
to alleviate such costs – which is the guideline defended by the ‘efficient’ corruption 
theory.   
Statistically, the estimated coefficients of these variables of interest are 
significant at the 5% level. 
Tables 6 and 7 respectively report the estimation results of Equation (1) when 
Regulatory burden (RQ) and Absence of rule of law (RL) are included into regressions 
as governance variables. For the sake of space, we refrain from more detailed 
comments about them. Noteworthy, the estimation results concerning the variables 
of interest are obviously more consistent with the alleged lubricating role of 
corruption (GWH). Meanwhile, the partial effects of corruption are positive in both 
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cases – regulatory burden, just like absence of rule of law, directly tends to reduce 
the growth in per capita real GDP. More interestingly, the interaction terms 
between corruption and governance proxies are less than 0 (ߙହ<0). While being 
beneficial, corruption does not foster additional costs, as SWH claims. On the 
contrary, it seems to mitigate the negative incidences of regulatory burden and 
absence of rule of law that affect growth. Again, the estimated coefficients of the 
variables of interest are generally statistically significant at the 5% standard level.  
Also important, the respective overall effects of the variables of interest remain 
consistent with their respective partial effects, in a big picture. That is, the frequency 
of requests for bribes to firms or in transactions for utilities access, permits, licenses 
and taxes seems to have an accelerating effect on economic growth. While, on the 
other hand, the government’s inability to formulate and implement sound policies 
and regulations that favour private sector development stifles the growth of the 
economy. Likewise, an absence of rule of law, a deficient regulatory framework to 
secure contracts and protect properties, a poor quality of police and courts, and the 
omnipresence of crime and violence pose serious threats to growth. 
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Estimation of per capita GDP growth, based on LV 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel Least Squares Panel Least Squares Panel Least Squares Fixed Effects 
BI BD BI BD BI BD BI BD 
Corruption -0.004***
(0.004)
-0.005***
(0.004)
-0.004***
(0.005)
-0.005***
(0.005)
-0.007***
(0.006)
-0.008***
(0.006)
-0.025***
(0.019)
-0.02**
(0.019)
Violence (LV) -0.0064*
(0.009)
-0.0081
(0.009)
-0.0036*
(0.010)
-0.0087*
(0.011)
-0.0081**
(0.012)
-0.006
(0.012)
-0.089*
(0.058)
-0.08**
(0.055)
Corruption×Violence 0.002**
(0.003)
0.002* 
(0.003) 
0.002**
(0.004)
0.0025** 
(0.004) 
0.004*** 
(0.004) 
0.004*** 
(0.004) 
0.021*** 
(0.015) 
0.019*
** 
(0.015) 
Growth2006 -0.016**
(0.089)
-0.015**
(0.091)
-0.002*
(0.095)
-0.003*
(0.098)
Capital stock 0.002***
(0.0006)
0.002*** 
(0.0007) 
0.002*** 
(0.0008) 
0.001*** 
(0.0008) 
0.028*** 
(0.010) 
0.027*
** 
(0.010) 
Human capital 0.006** 
(0.005) 
0.0039*** 
(0.005) 
0.005*** 
(0.006) 
0.005*** 
(0.007) 
0.255*** 
(0.088) 
0.244*
* 
(0.089) 
Population growth -0.184**
(0.063)
-0.181**
(0.063)
-0.210**
(0.073)
-0.208**
(0.073)
-0.289**
(1.067)
-0.275
(1.085)
Inflation -0.006***
(0.004)
-0.006***
(0.004)
-0.008**
(0.004)
-0.008***
(0.005)
-0.010**
(0.012)
-0.01**
(0.012)
Latin America 0.007*** 
(0.008) 
0.006*** 
(0.008) 
Africa -0.004
(0.009)
-0.004
(0.009)
Middle East 0.008** 
(0.011) 
0.009*** 
(0.012) 
Southeast Asia 0.003*** 
(0.010) 
0.004*** 
(0.010) 
Southwestern Asia -0.0003**
(0.011)
-0.0003*
(0.011)
Eastern Europe 0.0006*** 
(0.009) 
0.001*** 
(0.009) 
Central Europe -0.002
(0.010)
-0.001
(0.010)
Intercept 0.044*** 
(0.0120) 
0.034** 
(0.011) 
0.011*** 
(0.015) 
0.012* 
(0.014) 
0.012*** 
(0.019) 
0.010 
(0.018) 
Adj.-R2 0.1801 0.1923 0.6359 0.6375 0.6693 0.6686 0.5063 0.5185 
N 78 77 76 75 70 69 76 75 
Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The superscripts ***,** and * represent statistical significance at 0.1, 1 and 5% 
levels, respectively. 
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Estimation of per capita GDP growth, based on GE 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel Least Squares Panel Least Squares Panel Least Squares Fixed Effects 
BI BD BI BD BI BD BI BD 
Corruption 0.003*** 
(0.004) 
0.006*** 
(0.005) 
0.002*** 
(0.004) 
0.006*** 
(0.006) 
0.002*** 
(0.006) 
0.01*** 
(0.007) 
0.007*** 
(0.019) 
0.01*** 
(0.019) 
Government 
inefficiency (GE) 
-0.008***
(0.009)
-0.003**
(0.009)
-0.008***
(0.010)
-0.002***
(0.010)
-0.005***
(0.012)
-0.003***
(0.011)
-0.03**
(0.066)
-0.054**
(0.065)
Corruption×GE  -
0.001*** 
(0.003) 
-0.003**
(0.004)
-0.001***
(0.003)
-0.003**
(0.004)
-0.001***
(0.004)
-0.004***
(0.005)
-0.001**
(0.015)
-0.003*
(0.015)
Growth2006 -0.011***
(0.086)
-0.007***
(0.087)
-0.031**
(0.093)
-0.033*
(0.094)
Capital stock 0.002***
(0.0006)
0.003*** 
(0.0007) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.023*** 
(0.01) 
0.023** 
(0.010) 
Human capital 0.004***
(0.005)
0.004*** 
(0.005) 
0.004*** 
(0.007) 
0.003*** 
(0.006) 
0.022** 
(0.086) 
0.02*** 
(0.086) 
Population growth -0.193**
(0.062)
-0.190*
(0.062)
-0.213**
(0.072)
-0.214*
(0.072)
0.484 
(1.051) 
0.497 
(1.054) 
Inflation -0.006**
(0.004)
-0.0070*
(0.004)
-0.007**
(0.005)
-0.0087*
(0.005)
-0.013**
(0.012)
-0.013**
(0.012)
Latin America 0.0057** 
(0.01) 
0.006*** 
(0.006) 
Africa -0.003*
(0.009)
-0.004*
(0.009)
Middle East 0.005*** 
(0.011) 
0.01*** 
(0.012) 
Southeast Asia 0.002** 
(0.010) 
0.004** 
(0.01) 
Southwestern Asia -0.003
(0.011)
-0.001
(0.011)
Eastern Europe 0.001** 
(0.009) 
0.002* 
(0.009) 
Central Europe -0.002**
(0.01)
-0.001*
(0.01)
Intercept 0.004*** 
(0.010) 
0.004** 
(0.011) 
0.001** 
(0.015) 
0.001*** 
(0.015) 
0.004** 
(0.018) 
0.0012 
(0.017) 
Adj.-R2 0.2003 0.2057 0.6128 0.6298 0.6401 0.6318 0.5110 0.5243 
N 78 77 70 76 76 69 76 75 
Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The superscripts ***,** and * represent statistical significance at 0.1, 1 and 
5% levels, respectively.
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Estimation of per capita GDP growth, based on RQ 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel Least Squares Panel Least Squares Panel Least Squares Fixed Effects 
BI BD BI BD BI BD BI BD 
Corruption 0.004*** 
(0.004) 
0.006*** 
(0.006) 
0.002*** 
(0.005) 
0.005*** 
(0.006) 
0.002*** 
(0.006) 
0.007*** 
(0.007) 
0.002** 
(0.014) 
0.004* 
(0.015) 
Regulatory burden 
(RQ) 
-0.004***
(0.009)
-0.002**
(0.01)
-0.003***
(0.01)
-0.0006**
(0.015)
-0.004***
(0.012)
-0.008*
(0.011)
-0.038*
(0.055)
-0.038*
(0.053)
Corruption×RQ -0.001**
(0.003)
-0.003***
(0.004)
-0.003***
(0.004)
-0.002**
(0.004)
-0.001***
(0.005)
-0.004***
(0.005)
-0.002**
(0.011)
-0.003*
(0.014)
Growth2006 -0.006***
(0.087)
-0.005***
(0.100)
-0.026***
(0.100)
-0.028***
(0.093)
Capital stock 0.007***
(0.006)
0.011***
(0.006)
0.0002**
*
(0.001)
0.0002**
*
(0.0008)
 0.023** 
(0.010) 
0.037** 
(0.015) 
Human capital 0.005***
(0.005)
0.004*** 
(0.005) 
0.006**
(0.007)
 0.005*
(0.006)
0.221** 
(0.086) 
0.413** 
(0.081) 
Population growth -0.194**
(0.062)
-0.192**
(0.063)
-0.221**
(0.073)
-0.223**
(0.073)
-0.480*
(1.028)
-0.488*
(1.027)
Inflation -0.006**
(0.004)
-0.007*
(0.004)
-0.008**
(0.005)
-0.009**
(0.005)
-0.013*
(0.012)
-0.034
(0.013)
Latin America 0.007*** 
(0.01) 
0.008*** 
(0.009) 
Africa 0.004* 
(0.01) 
0.005** 
(0.01) 
Middle East 0.007 
(0.011) 
0.011 
(0.012) 
Southeast Asia 0.003* 
(0.010) 
0.005** 
(0.010) 
Southwestern Asia 0.0004 
(0.011) 
0.002* 
(0.011) 
Eastern Europe -0.0002*
(0.009)
0.001 
(0.009) 
Central Europe -0.001***
(0.010)
-0.001***
(0.010)
Intercept 2.e-05** 
(0.010) 
0.003** 
(0.010) 
0.006** 
(0.015) 
0.008** 
(0.014) 
0.007** 
(0.017) 
0.010* 
(0.017) 
Adj.-R2 0.1844 0.1823 0.5090 0.5156 0.5731 0.5716 0.4452 0.4534 
N 78 77 76 75 70 69 76 75 
Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The superscripts ***,** and * represent statistical significance at 0.1, 1 and 
5% levels, respectively. 
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Estimation of per capita GDP growth, based on RQ 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel Least Squares Panel Least Squares Panel Least Squares Fixed Effects 
BI BD BI BD BI BD BI BD 
Corruption 0.006*** 
(0.005) 
 0.010*** 
(0.006) 
0.005*** 
(0.005) 
0.010*** 
(0.006) 
0.005*** 
(0.006) 
0.011*** 
(0.007) 
0.006** 
(0.017) 
0.007*** 
(0.018) 
Absence of Rule 
of law (RL) 
-0.002***
(0.009)
-0.003***
(0.008)
-0.004***
(0.017)
-0.012**
(0.008)
-0.028***
(0.012)
-0.022***
(0.011)
-0.046***
(0.070)
-0.045**
(0.069)
Corruption×RL -0.003***
(0.004)
-0.006***
(0.004)
-0.023***
(0.004)
-0.005**
(0.006)
-0.002***
(0.005)
-0.005***
(0.005)
-0.004**
(0.013)
-0.006**
(0.013)
Growth2006 -0.002***
(0.086)
-0.005***
(0.087)
-0.028***
(0.093)
-0.02***
(0.130)
Capital stock 0.001***
(0.006)
0.004*** 
(0.0006) 
0.038*** 
(0.001) 
0.053*** 
(0.001) 
0.024** 
(0.010) 
0.072*** 
(0.031) 
Human capital 0.004**
(0.005)
0.003*** 
(0.007) 
0.004*** 
(0.019) 
0.003*** 
(0.007) 
0.228** 
(0.087) 
0.226** 
(0.086) 
Population 
growth 
-0.184**
(0.062)
-0.177**
(0.062)
-0.209**
(0.073)
-0.211**
(0.072)
-0.579*
(0.108)
-0.570
(0.10)
Inflation -0.006**
(0.004)
-0.007**
(0.004)
-0.008*
(0.005)
-0.01**
(0.005)
-0.012**
(0.013)
-0.01***
(0.034)
Latin America 0.005* 
(0.018) 
0.006* 
(0.009) 
Africa 0.003*** 
(0.01) 
0.005** 
(0.01) 
Middle East 0.0049** 
(0.011) 
0.010 
(0.012) 
Southeast Asia 0.001** 
(0.010) 
0.004* 
(0.010) 
Southwestern 
Asia 
-0.001
(0.011)
-0.001
(0.011)
Eastern Europe -0.001
(0.01)
-0.0006
(0.01)
Central Europe -0.002
(0.010)
-0.002
(0.010)
Intercept  0.001*** 
(0.010) 
0.032*** 
(0.01) 
0.045** 
(0.014) 
0.005*** 
(0.013) 
0.001*** 
(0.017) 
0.003*** 
(0.016) 
Adj.-R2 0.2119 0.2247 0.5141 0.5202 0.5363 0.5398 0.4550 0.4661 
N 78 77 76 75 70 69 76 75 
Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The superscripts ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at 0.1, 1 and 
5% levels, respectively. 
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As can be seen, our empirical analyses give credit to SWH, which claims that 
corruption fosters additional costs to economic growth, when the estimations 
include political instability or violence/terrorism. Whereas, the opposite claim, 
GWH, prevails when the estimations involve government inefficiency, regulatory 
burden or absence of rule of law – thus stressing that corruption has virtues, as it 
mitigates the consequences of these poor qualities of governance.  
We test the robustness of these results in a simple way: by controlling the 
dependent variable with one of its determinants. Our results are considered 
relatively robust if the estimations following the introduction of the new 
determinant variable do not affect our previous conclusion about the validity or the 
rejection of GWH. 
Following Méon and Sekkat (2005), we introduce into regressions an interaction 
variable between Growth2006 and Human capital, based on the regression in Column 
2 of Tables 4–7. The results are shown in Table 8. The findings show a relative overall 
decrease in the significance of estimated coefficients. For instance, estimated 
coefficients of human capital are now negative, but statistically insignificant.  
More importantly, the new estimations remain robust about the validity of SWH 
in the regression including LV (Regression 2.1), while GWH in turn holds when the 
focus is on GE, RQ and RL (Regressions 2.2–2.4, respectively). The estimated 
coefficients of the variables of interest are generally statistically significant at the 
5% level. 
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Robustness test 
Column (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) 
LV GE RQ RL 
BI BD BI BD BI BD BI BD 
Corruption -0.007**
(0.0051)
-0.008**
(0.005)
0.004*** 
(0.005) 
0.007** 
(0.006) 
0.004** 
(0.004) 
0.006*** 
(0.006) 
0.007** 
(0.005) 
0.011** 
(0.006) 
Violence (LV) -0.005**
(0.0106)
-0.007*
(0.001)
-0.0004**
(0.010)
-0.002*
(0.010)
-0.001**
(0.010)
-0.002**
(0.009)
-5.6e-5**
(0.016)
- 0.002**
(0.008)
Corruption×Violenc
e 
0.003**
(0.003)
0.004*
(0.004)
-0.001**
(0.003)
-0.003*
(0.004)
-0.001**
(0.003)
-0.002**
(0.004)
-0.003**
(0.004)
-0.005**
(0.004)
Growth2006 -0.939**
(0.337)
-0.919**
(0.338)
-0.935**
(0.343)
-0.903**
(0.342)
-0.957**
(0.334)
-0.925**
(0.332)
-0.912**
(0.337)
-0.862*
(0.336)
Capital stock 7.1e-05*
(0.0006)
6.4e-05
(6.8e-04)
0.0003* 
(0.0006)
0.0003* 
(0.0006)
0.0001**
(0.0006)
0.0001* 
(0.0006)
0.0002**
(0.0006)
0.0002* 
(0.0006)
Human capital -0.017
(0.006)
-0.016
(0.006)
-0.017
(0.006)
-0.016
(0.006)
-0.017
(0.006)
-0.016
(0.006)
-0.016
(0.006)
-0.015
(0.006)
Growth2006×Human 
cap 
1.703**
(0.581)
1.6711**
(0.584)
1.655**
(0.595)
1.598**
(0.592)
1.694**
(0.576)
1.634**
(0.571)
1.628**
(0.583)
1.542**
(0.579)
Population growth -0.201**
(0.061)
-0.200**
(0.062)
-0.210**
(0.060)
-0.205**
(0.060)
-0.209***
(0.060)
-0.206**
(0.061)
-0.201**
(0.061)
-0.195**
(0.061)
Inflation -0.006*
(0.004)
-0.007*
(0.004)
-0.007*
(0.004)
-0.0073**
(0.004)
-0.006*
(0.003)
-0.007*
(0.004)
-0.006*
(0.003)
-0.007*
(0.004)
Intercept 0.0154
(0.0154)
0.025*
(0.015)
0.0159* 
(0.0160)
0.017**
(0.0157)
0.018**
(0.015)
0.018
(0.014)
0.016*
(0.014)
0.017**
(0.014)
Adj.-R2 0.6455 0.6569 0.6605 0.6652 0.6795 0.6831 0.6878 0.6914
N 78 77 76 75 76 75 76 75 
Notes. Robust standard errors of PLS estimators are in parentheses. The superscripts ***, ** and * represent statistical significance 
at 0.1, 1 and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Signs associated with estimated coefficients of the variables of interest 
LV GE RQ RL 
ߙଷ (Gov) െ ൅ ൅ ൅ 
ߙସ (Cor) െ െ െ െ 
ߙହ (Gov×Cor) ൅ െ െ െ 
Decision (effect) sand grease grease grease 
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2.5 ALTERNATIVE TESTING OF GWH 
Our estimates of Equation (1) yielded mixed results about the role of corruption, 
where, on the one hand, it increases the cost of poor governance (LV); and, on the 
other, it helps to mitigate the cost (GE, RQ and RL) (see Table 8).  
We delve further into this first conclusion by performing recursive estimations 
based on the partial effects of corruption and governance indicators. These partial 
effects are computed as follows: 
 (2a) 
   (2b). 
For Equation (2a), if , then this implies that a one-percentage point 
increase in the corruption index leads to a greater decrease in per capita GDP 
growth with a further deterioration in the quality of governance. In this equation, 
ߙହ indicates how much poor governance costs to growth in terms of corruption.  
For Equation (2b), if , then this implies that a one-percentage point increase 
in the poor governance index generates a greater decrease in the level of growth 
with a higher level of corruption. On the other hand, ߙହ assesses what corruption 
costs to growth in terms of poor governance.  
In this regard, Méon and Sekkat (2005) provide recursive estimations as 
‘preliminary investigations’ of the impacts of corruption with respect to sub-samples 
built based on qualities of rule of law. That is, in their GWH validity test, their 
recursive estimations are limited to checking the effects of corruption on different 
RL regimes, i.e. Equation (2a). They do not evaluate the potential additional costs of 
corruption (costs of poor governance), i.e. Equation (2b). If there are costs, it is 
unclear whether corruption alleviates them. Yet, this is an essential point of the 
‘grease’ argument, as we pointed out at the beginning of Section 2.  
Equations (2a) and (2b) are estimated with respect to several levels of 
governance and corruption, respectively. We follow Méon and Sekkat (2005)’s 
approach to determine the different levels (or sub-samples) of governance and 
corruption. Countries in the whole sample are ranked from the highest to the lowest 
average quality of governance/corruption over the 2006–2014 study period. For 
instance, we consider the first and best level of LV to include the 70 countries with 
the best average levels of LV over this time span. The second level covers 
tititi CorGovG ,53,, DD  ''
tititi GovCorG ,54,, DD  ''
05 %D
05 %D
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observations from the 2nd best to the 71st, and so on. In other words, the average 
level of LV gradually falls. The same procedure is applied for the other governance 
indicators, and then for BI, which was alone used as a corruption variable 
throughout the recursive estimations. Then, new equations were estimated using 
the Fixed effects estimators with respect to successive sub-samples.  
The findings are summarised through Figure (1), which plots the successively 
estimated coefficients. Figures 2a.1 to 2a.4 relate to the estimations of Equation 
(2a), including LV, GE, RQ and RL, respectively. Figures 2b.1 to 2b.4 show the 
estimations of Equation (2b), also including governance variables in the same order. 
- GWH vs LV: Overall, the testing shows a negative effect of corruption on
economic growth (Figure 2a.1). More specifically, these harmful effects on the 
economy tend to worsen as political instability increases, the level of violence is 
high, and terrorism is omnipresent. However, Figure 2b.1 goes in the same direction, 
clearly showing that corruption generates additional costs. In other words, political 
instability, violence and terrorism tend to hinder the emergence of the economy. 
On the other hand, the higher the level of corruption, the greater the negative 
effects of political instability, violence and terrorism on growth. Such a finding 
suggests that corruption produces a ‘sand’ effect – which is consistent with the 
estimations including LV in Table 4. 
- GWH vs GE/RQ/RL: The results concerning the other governance variables are
almost similar. The partial effects of corruption are all positive, and Figures 2a.2–
2a.4 plot downward – nonetheless meaning that the beneficial effects of corruption 
for growth gradually dissipate as the quality of governance deteriorates. On the 
other hand, when analysing the potential costs of poor governance (Figures 2b.2–
2b.4), the figures plot upward, with negative estimated coefficients for the poor 
governance indicators. These estimations imply that flaws in the governance 
captured by these indicators reduce economic growth. Interestingly, this negative 
influence on economic performance gradually declines as corruption increases. As 
a result, in addition to not favouring additional costs, corruption helps to mitigate 
those costs caused by weak governance. Our findings therefore show that 
corruption, in this other frame, produces a ‘grease’ effect, to the benefit of the 
economy. Our previous estimations including the same governance indicators 
(Tables 5–7) also led to the same conclusion. 
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Figure 1. Effects of poor governance/corruption on per capita real GDP growth 
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Figure 2. (Figure 1 continued) Effects of poor governance/corruption on per capita real GDP growth 
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2.6 CONCLUSIONS 
The paper attempts to test the validity of GWH on a database of 99 countries over 
a time span of 2006–2014. The study is based on a basic economic growth model, 
tested using the statistics of four governance indicators (Political instability, 
violence/terrorism; Government inefficiency; Regulatory burden; Absence of Rule 
of law) and two indicators that assess the prevalence of corruption to which firms 
are subject (Bribe incidence; Bribe depth).  
The results unambiguously show that these governance indicators have negative 
effects on per capita real GDP growth. The empirical analysis thus shows that a 
politically unstable environment, strongly marked by violence and terrorism, slows 
down economic growth. In the same way, our results show that public 
administrations of low quality, with a strong grip of the political system, and 
inefficient public policies with a weak government also reduce economic 
performance. It also appears that the growth of economies is affected when they 
fail to formulate effective policies or put in place regulatory mechanisms that 
promote the development of their private sector. The study also shows that the 
absence of rule of law, which seriously compromises the security and protection of 
contracts and properties, reduces economic growth.  
Regarding corruption, our data highlight a double influence. Our results show 
that corruption clearly hampers economic growth in the presence of political 
instability or violence/terrorism. In these circumstances, corruption is costlier for 
the economy because it tends to exacerbate the impact of this instability on GDP – 
which sheds further light on the detrimental side of corruption. On the other hand, 
corruption tends to be more virtuous in contexts of inefficient public policies, 
absence of sound policies and a regulatory framework aimed at boosting private 
sector development, or when the quality of the rule of law is seriously questionable. 
In addition to having a beneficial effect on GDP growth, corruption does not 
generate costs elsewhere. Our study shows that it even helps to mitigate the 
negative consequences of such poor qualities of governance on the economy – a 
finding which is in line with the alleged ‘grease’ effect of corruption. 
These findings remain robust despite the use of an alternative empirical 
approach. 
In a rather original way, the study is in line with the conclusions made by new 
theories of economic growth. These theories emphasise the need for effective 
76 
institutions. By perceiving effective institutions as factors of capital or labour 
production, these approaches suggest that traditional factors of production cannot 
alone guarantee the development of countries. Institutions play a central role: that 
of guaranteeing the efficiency of the use of collective resources. 
More specifically, the conclusions of the study challenge countries on 
governance, and therefore also on the quality of these institutions. More financial 
and technical efforts should be geared, in particular, to the prevention of internal 
conflicts or to the fight against terrorism. In the same way, important reforms of the 
public sector are essential to ensure economic development. These reforms should 
particularly focus on areas such as improving the quality of public services and 
promoting sound public, as well as private sector development, policies. The reform 
of judicial institutions is, in the same way, an inescapable task if development is to 
be ensured. The fight against corruption, the security of people and their property, 
and the strict application of laws must be relentless, because such initiatives have a 
real positive effect on the economic development of countries. 
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APPENDIX 
List of countries/territories in the dataset 
Albania, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, 
Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burundi, 
Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, 
Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos People’s, 
Liberia, Lesotho, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, 
Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Republic of 
Congo, Republic of Korea, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Tanzania, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United 
Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia. 
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3 ESSAY II. TESTING FOR GRANGER CAUSALITY 
TEST BETWEEN CORRUPTION AND 
GOVERNANCE 
KOURAMOUDOU KÉÏTA 
ABSTRACT
This paper tackles the endogeneity issue between corruption and ill functioning 
within institutions. While malfunctioning bureaucracy makes firms turn to 
corruption, it is also known that rent-seekers deliberately provoke institutional 
malfunctioning in order to extract private gains. While following the Granger 
causality test, the study uses dynamic panel data from 117 countries worldwide over 
a study period of 1996–2013. Using the Two-step System Generalised Method of 
Moments estimator, the paper finds substantial evidence for causal effects between 
poor governance and corruption. A one-directional causal link was found from the 
absence of Voice and accountability to corruption. Meanwhile, a nexus was 
identified between corruption and other examples of ill-functioning governance, 
such as political instability, violence and terrorism, government inefficiency, 
regulatory burden, or absence of rule of law, points to a bidirectional causality. 
Keywords: endogeneity, governance indicators, institutions 
JEL classification: D73 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The economic theory of regulation is the subject of an important discussion of public 
economics. The theory is essentially of two kinds. On the one hand, the ‘private 
interest theory of regulation’ suggests that benevolent regulators pursue their own 
interests, which might or might not be consistent with public interest. On the other 
hand, the ‘public interest theory of regulation’ postulates that regulations as well as 
their implementations proceed with totally disinterested initiatives and actions. In 
their approach, benevolent regulators are assumed to have sufficient information 
and enforcement power to effectively promote the public interest. The latter case 
is the rationale of government intervention for correcting market failures, such as 
externalities or monopolies (Allais, 1947; Meade, 1948; Lewis, 1949; Shleifer, 2005). 
As a result, governments tend to control prices in natural monopoly frameworks, 
impose safety standards to prevent accidents such as fires or mass poisonings, 
regulate security issuances so investors are not cheated, regulate jobs, etc. 
However, the main line of attack against the ‘public interest theory of regulation’ 
was developed by the Chicago School of Law and Economics. According to the 
school, regulations might make things even worse, as regulators are incompetent, 
compromised or corrupt. The justification of this essay lies in the possible nexus 
between the fact that government intervenes to regulate sectors and the possible 
opportunistic behaviours that might simultaneously result.  
A larger number of studies argue that the quality of regulation matters. In fact, 
good regulations help to prevent market failures and encourage economic 
performance (North and Thomas, 1973; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Hall and Jones, 
1999; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001). In particular, empirical studies find 
that good regulations encourage economic development (Djankov, McLiesch and 
Ramalho, 2006; Gillanders and Whelan, 2014), increase productivity and output 
(Barseghyan, 2008; Aghion, Bundell and Griffith, 2009), stabilise the macroeconomy 
(Loayza, Oviedo, and Serven, 2005), promote trade (Freund and Bolaky, 2008) and 
enhance entrepreneurism (Klapper, Laeven and Rajan, 2006). Conversely, excessive 
regulations likely stifle economic development. Huntington (1968) argues that too 
much regulation, which leaves little room for flexibility, can be in fine harmful to 
economic activities. He then puts forwards that ‘[…] in terms of economic growth, 
the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, over-centralized, dishonest 
bureaucracy is one with a rigid, over-centralized, honest bureaucracy’.  
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That observation clearly raises the important issue of the appropriate ‘stock’ of 
regulations needed to avoid triggering adverse effects detrimental to economic 
performance. Noteworthy, excessive regulations or poor regulation may increase 
corruption through red tape. As stressed above, the regulators may well pursue 
their own interests, which are not necessarily consistent with those of the public. It 
is also possible that regulators may intentionally deregulate in order to provoke 
incentives from bypassing it. Kurer (1993) and Guriev (2004) show that when 
investors face long queues and delays, they may bribe regulators in order to bypass 
these distortions.  
In this section, we hypothesise and empirically test the existence of a potential 
causality nexus between poor regulation (or poor governance) and corruption. Up 
until now, studies have theorised a two-directional causality nexus between 
corruption and bad governance (Leff, 1964; Khan, 2004; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; 
Kaufmann, 2000, 2005; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silaned, Shleifer and Vishny, 1999; 
Méon and Sekkat, 2005; Méndez and Sepúlveda, 2006). To the best of our 
knowledge, there is no empirical investigation on this possible causality. So far, the 
existing literature has instead investigated the causal effects between corruption 
and the level of GDP, or growth (Husted, 1999; Treisman, 2000; Paldam, 2001; 
Lambsdorff, 2007; Brown and Shackman, 2007; Lučić, Radisić and Dobromirov, 
2016), aid (Menard and Weill, 2016), healthcare satisfaction (Habibov, 2016), 
income inequality (Apergis, Dincer and Payne, 2010; Huang, 2013) and poverty 
(Negin, Abd Rashid and Nikopour, 2011).  
Yet, the conclusion of such a study may contribute to the debate – in particular, 
the argument against the public interest theory of regulation, which states that 
regulation may also lead to perverse effects, such as corruption. In particular, any 
causality between poor regulation and corruption would at the same time 
strengthen the viewpoint defended by the Chicago School of Law and Economics – 
and overall, the questioning of the effectiveness of government intervention. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 is dedicated to a literature 
review on the nexus between poor regulation and corruption; Section 3 focuses on 
the method and data description; the empirical findings are shown and commented 
upon in Section 4; Section 5 concludes and suggests some policy recommendations. 
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3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Regarding the link between poor regulation, or distortion, and corruption, one of 
the prevalent lines of economic research starts from the assumption that distorted 
bureaucracy causes corruption. Basically, administrative ill functioning is often 
relative to its sluggishness, which in turn explains the long delay associated with 
procedures. According to Bardhan (1997), administrative lags in allotting licenses, 
permits or signatories make governance sluggish and inefficient. In order to speed 
up the process, corruption seems to be the most effective means (Guriev, 2004). 
Another form of inefficiency in the administration is associated with the amount of 
red tape. It is not rare to see in countries strongly influenced by corruption that the 
normal administrative procedure is unnecessarily split into many other sub-steps – 
with the implication that a bribe is paid at each level (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). 
Beyond bribes, one may underline the important impact of excessive red tape, 
which also constitutes a motive of corruption. Guriev (2004) argues that actors tend 
to bribe to either reduce red tape or circumvent it altogether. Taking this approach, 
Bardhan (1997) states that corruption in fact mitigates the pre-existing distortions 
caused by malfunctioning governance. Since corruption conveys virtues that foster 
a better provision of public services, smooth operations and a more efficient 
economy, it therefore becomes desirable (Leff, 1964; Huntington, 1968; Acemoglu 
and Verdier, 1998; Mo, 2000; Méon and Sekkat, 2005). In other words, corruption 
acts as a lubricant with a ‘greasing’ effect on the economy in the presence of ill 
functioning (‘greasing the wheels hypothesis’ (Méon and Sekkat, 2005; Aidt, Dutta 
and Sena, 2008; Méndez and Sepúlveda, 2006).  
This view is opposed to the ‘sanding the wheels hypothesis,’ which sees 
corruption as a hindrance to economic development (Mauro, 1995; Knack and 
Keefer, 1995; Méon and Sekkat, 2005; Aidt, 2009; Mo, 2000). 
The other way around, Kaufmann and Wei (2000) reject the idea that corruption 
can be helpful in mitigating pre-existing distortions, arguing instead that the latter 
is endogenous to poor governance. This is consistent with Myrdal (1968), who 
contends that it is in the bureaucrats’ self-interest to create distortive tediousness 
in order to raise motives for bribery (see also Kurer, 1993). That suggests that 
corruption is inclined to exacerbate pre-existing distortions in the economy. This 
perspective is backed up by a global survey on over 3000 multinational firms 
(Kaufmann and Wei, 2000), whose results suggest that bribery increases 
bureaucratic sluggishness. This implies that corruption would be likely to influence 
and explain the state of administrative processes, and more broadly the quality of 
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governance and institutions. The empirical analysis of Méndez and Sepúlveda (2006) 
show that the effect of corruption on economic growth is conditional on the quality 
of governance (Méon and Sekkat, 2005; Méon and Weill, 2008; Aidt, Dutta and Sena, 
2008; Aidt, 2009). Independent of the quality of regulation, the authors simply find 
corruption to be detrimental to growth. Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1993), for 
instance, demonstrate that private innovators are more subject to heavy bribes and 
expropriations, which negatively affect private investments and producible inputs 
in the long run (Mo, 2000). Mauro (1995)’s empirical investigation also concludes 
that corruption hinders growth and investment ratio. 
In short, there seems to be a profound distinction in viewpoints: some explain 
the effects of corruption by the exogenous state of governance, whereas others 
assess the interplay between corruption and the quality of governance endogenous. 
By no means does either viewpoint reject the other, but the distinction raises the 
important question of causality between corruption and bad regulation (or more 
broadly, poor governance, or even deficient institutions).  
3.3 METHOD AND DATA 
The relationship between the quality of governance and corruption, as described in 
the above section, is a typical example of a ‘chicken–egg’ paradox. In addressing 
such cases, the Granger method is commonly used in economics (Granger, 1969). 
When investigating the causality between corruption and aid, Menard and Weill 
(2016) also applied the Granger technique. This paper intends to largely follow the 
empirical methodology used in their study. There is Granger causality from 
corruption (Corr) to poor governance (PoorGov) when the utilisation of the histories 
of both Corr and PoorGov predicts PoorGov better than the history of PoorGov 
alone. Such causal relationships can in both ways be formalised by the following 
baseline models: 
ܥ݋ݎݎ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߛ଴ ൅ σ ߛ௝ܥ݋ݎݎ௜ǡ௧ି௝ ൅ σ ߛ௞ܲ݋݋ݎܩ݋ݒ௜ǡ௧ି௞ ൅௄௞ୀଵ௃௝ୀଵ ௜ܷǡ௧ ׷ ሺͳሻ 
ܲ݋݋ݎܩ݋ݒ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߛԢ଴ ൅ σ ߛ௞ᇱ ܲ݋݋ݎܩ݋ݒ௜ǡ௧ି௞ ൅ σ ߛ௝ᇱܥ݋ݎݎ௜ǡ௧ି௝ ൅௃௝ୀଵ௄௞ୀଵ ௜ܷǡ௧ᇱ ׷ ሺ2)
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There is Granger causality from PoorGov to Corr, if Model 1 fits better than 
ܥ݋ݎݎ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߛ଴ ൅ σ ߛ௝ܥ݋ݎݎ௜ǡ௧ି௝ ൅௃௝ୀଵ ௜ܷǡ௧ ׷ ሺͳԢሻ.
On the other hand, there is Granger causality from Corr to PoorGov, if model (2) 
fits better than 
ܲ݋݋ݎܩ݋ݒ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߛԢ଴ ൅ σ ߛ௞ᇱ ܲ݋݋ݎܩ݋ݒ௜ǡ௧ି௞ ൅௄௞ୀଵ ௜ܷǡ௧ᇱ ׷ ሺʹԢሻ,
in terms of overall statistical significance. In the different equations,ߣ, ߣԢ, ߛ and ߛԢ 
denote the coefficients to be estimated, u and u’ denote the error terms, the 
subscript i  = 1, …, N denotes cross-sections, t =1, …, T denotes time, and J and K 
denote the number of lag periods. Following this Grangerian view, bad governance 
would cause corruption, if the coefficients of the lagged indicator values of the 
quality of governance yield statistically significant non-zero estimates in a 
regression, where corruption is the dependent variable. The causality from 
corruption to the deterioration of governance can be examined in the alternative 
way. 
 In the estimations of the baseline Equations (1) and (2), main attention is paid to 
ߛ and ߛԢ, as their estimates point to the possible existence of causality. The choice 
of lag periods is critical, because too few lags provoke autocorrelated errors and 
thus spurious test statistics, while too many lags reduce the power of the test. Here, 
the choice of lag periods obeys the rule of Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012), which says 
that the minimum time extent for J and K should be chosen according to T>5+2z 
(where T is the number of time periods and z is the number of lags). In this study, 
we set this number of lags at 3. The error terms u and u’ are assumed to follow a 
one-way error component model. Since the study is based on balanced panel data 
(i.e. no unobserved specific effects), the error term in Model 1, for example, is 
reduced to the following equation: ui,t = μi+vi,t, where μi~IID(0,ߪμ2) stands for period-
specific effects and vi,t~IID(0,ߪv2) represents the error term. The same applies for 
Model 2, as well.  
Dynamic panel data regressions are basically subject to estimation bias over 
time. Since the lagged dependent variable ܲ݋݋ݎܩ݋ݒ௜ǡ௧ି௞ in Equation (1), or 
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ܥ݋ݎݎ௜ǡ௧ି௝ in Equation (2), could also be endogenous, their presence among 
explanatory variables in the respective models may cause correlations with the error 
term. Furthermore, individual effects caused by heterogeneity among the study 
units may also appear. With dynamic and endogenous regressors, the use of the 
Generalised Least Squares (GLS) estimators, or the Fixed Effects (FE) estimators, 
would lead to inconsistent estimates (Baltagi, 1995). Knowing that at least the 
asymptotic orthogonality condition between the regressor and the error is not met, 
it is wiser to use the instrumental variables method (Reiersøl, 1941). We adopted 
the two-step System Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimator proposed 
by Blundell and Bond (1998). This estimator is an augmented version of the 
Difference GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) that considers all 
orthogonality conditions and allows rigorous control over an instrument’s matrix.  
Referring to the baseline Models 1 and 2, as already mentioned, the variable 
PoorGov refers to poor governance, while the variable Corr refers to the extent of 
corruption. Data on these variables come from the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) 2014 dataset published by The World Bank. The dataset includes 
balanced panel data from 117 countries, listed in Appendix 1. The time span is from 
1996 to 2013, with statistics missing for the years 1997, 1999 and 2001. To keep the 
dataset balanced, statistics for these years were skipped for the other variables. 
Thus, the study includes 15 periodical observations in total on corruption and five 
other aspects of the quality of governance. The aggregated indicators for the quality 
of governance, as developed in Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999a, 1999b, 
2002), are as follows:  
Voice and accountability (denoted VA), which “reflects perceptions of the extent 
to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, 
as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media” 
Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (PS), which “reflects 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated 
violence and terrorism”; 
Government effectiveness (GE), which “reflects perceptions of the quality of 
public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence 
from political pressures, the quality if policy formulation and implementation, and 
the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies”;  
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Regulatory quality (RQ), which “reflects perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit 
and promote private sector development”;  
Rule of law (RL), which “reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence”; and  
Control of corruption (Corr). 
The Corr indicator is used for the corruption variable, since it attempts to capture 
the extent to which bureaucrats behave opportunistically for private ends. More 
precisely, the indicator is defined to reflect ‘perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests’. 
Consistent with earlier research on the corruption issue, such as Méon and Sekkat 
(2005), we use Control of Corruption (CC) as a corruption variable, as it attempts to 
capture meaningful aspects that characterise corruption. Originally, all governance 
indicators scored from -2.5 to 2.5, with the upper bound indicating the best possible 
quality of governance, and full integrity for Corr as a corruption variable. For ease of 
interpretation, the indicators are transformed by subtracting their original values 
from 3.5. As a result, the transformed indicator values vary from 1 to 6, with the 
upper bound standing for the worst quality of governance, and for utmost 
corruption with Corr. The implication of rescaling the indices is that the increase in 
the statistics means further deterioration of the integrity and the quality of 
governance.  
Figure 1 plots the average variations in the level of corruption and governance 
over 1996–2013. The graphs show an increasing trend that is relatively weak in 
some cases and rather high in others. In any cases, Figure 1 on average points to a 
certain deterioration in governance and more broadly to a decline in the 
effectiveness of the institutions. More specifically, one notices that graphics related 
to the average variations in Corr, GE and RQ are, to some extent, similar to a 
significant variation in the observations between 2004 and 2006, and a peak in 2005. 
This indicates a priori a relatively high correlation link between these variables. 
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Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variables Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum Sources 
Corr 1.1453 0.3995 -0.0895 1.7151 World Development 
Indicators 2014, World 
Bank  
VA 1.1922 0.2970 0.5150 1.7121 World Development 
Indicators 2014, World 
Bank 
PS 1.2317 0.2732 0.6054 1.8998 World Development 
Indicators 2014, World 
Bank 
GE 1.1418 0.3571 0.0679 1.7014 World Development 
Indicators 2014, World 
Bank 
RQ 1.1457 0.3139 0.2253 1.7771 World Development 
Indicators 2014, World 
Bank 
RL 1.1709 0.3393 0.4057 1.7457 World Development 
Indicators 2014, World 
Bank 
Notes. The descriptive statistics are based on the logarithmic values of the variables. 
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Figure 1. Average variations with confidence intervals in corruption and poor governance over 
1996–2013 
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3.4 RESULTS 
The first thing is to ensure that the time series are stationary, meaning that their 
distribution neither follows any trend nor changes over time, which is a key 
requirement for the validity of time series regressions. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) method is used with the null hypothesis that all panels contain a unit root, 
indicating that the series are nonstationary. The alternative hypothesis of 
stationarity is accepted if the probability is less than the critical value of 0.05. As can 
be seen from Appendix 2, the conclusion is that all series are stationary. This is also 
confirmed by the Philipps-Perron (PP) unit-root test, the result of which is also 
reported in Appendix 2. Likewise, its null hypothesis suggests that the series are 
nonstationary, and the decision rule is also the same as with the ADF test. The PP 
method is widely applied along with the ADF, as it makes it possible to consider both 
the autocorrelation and the heteroskedasticity of the errors. It is based on the same 
models as those of the Dickey-Fuller test but offers a non-parametric correction of 
the t statistic.  
To test the existence of Granger causality between the quality of governance and 
the extent of corruption, the Two-step System GMM is used. GMM yields 
asymptotically robust estimators, and all variables enter regression with their 
logarithmic values. The lag length of 3 seems optimal since it overall enables the 
elimination of serial correlation in the residuals (Arellano, 2003). The autoregressive 
tests of order 1 (AR (1)) and order 2 (AR (2)) are used to respect the condition of 
Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012). The diagnostic statistics are conclusive: AR (2) 
indicates that there is a second-order autocorrelation, and the Sargan test suggests 
that the null hypothesis that instruments are valid cannot be rejected.  
In Equation (1), the test of whether poor governance causes corruption is based 
on the Wald test for coefficients, about which the null hypothesis indicates that the 
values of the lagged variables of poor governance are zero, i.e. γ1=γ2=…=γK=0. These 
regressors have predictive contents for Corri,t – the estimated coefficient of the sum 
of the lagged governance variables is always statistically significant, at least at 5% 
level. This therefore means that the failures in governance, ‘Granger-causes’ 
corruption. These results remain true for each of the five governance variables. As 
for Equation (2), it is the other way around, i.e. corruption also seems to cause poor 
governance. Likewise, the null hypothesis of the Wald test for coefficients claims the 
reverse direction that γ’1=γ’2=…=γ’K=0; likewise meaning that corruption cannot 
predict poor governance. In all cases, attention is paid to the strict statistical 
significance of the coefficient of the sum of the lagged corruption variables. In this 
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case, too, the coefficient of corruption is always statistically significant, at least at 
the 5% level. Again, the conclusion remains valid for the five governance variables. 
However, when dealing with causality, whether coefficients are positive or 
negative does not matter, as it has the same interpretation.3 
The estimates’ result relative to possible Granger causality links between 
corruption and the five governance indicators are summarised in Table 2, with a 
focus on the sum of the lagged corruption and governance variables. However, 
further details on this nexus are afterwards reported in Tables 3–10. In each of the 
tables, two tests are presented: first ‘does PoorGovi,t—k cause Corri,t?’; then, ‘does 
Corri,t—j cause PoorGovi,t?’ 
Table 3 reports the general causality test between corruption and the different 
governance variables. As for whether poor governance Granger-causes corruption, 
the null hypothesis of no causality is clearly rejected. The respective estimated 
coefficients associated with the sums of lagged governance variables are all 
statistically significant. The findings indicate that VA, which is captured in the extent 
to which citizens can freely choose their government, freedom of 
expression/association and free media, causes corruption at the 1% level. More 
specifically, their past information helps improve the prediction of corruption. 
Whereas, the other way around, the findings suggest the absence of a causal link 
from corruption to VA. The coefficient of the sum of lagged corruption variables is 
not statistically significant at the standard level of 5%. 
Unlike the previous case, our estimations lead to a bidirectional causal link 
between corruption and political instability, violence and terrorism (LV) – meaning 
that previous statistics from one can predict the current information of the other, 
and vice versa. The null hypothesis of the Wald test for coefficients, which 
postulates non-predictive contents for Corri,t and PoorGovi,t, respectively, is rejected 
in both cases. In the respective estimations of Equations (1) and (2), the estimated 
coefficients associated with the sum of lagged PoorGovt-1 and Corrt-1 are all 
statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Likewise, a bidirectional causal link is found regarding the nexus between 
corruption and the remaining governance variables (GE, RQ and RL). In all cases, our 
results show that past information on these governance failures can predict the 
3 Note that the signs of the estimated coefficients tell about effects rather than causes. Yet, the 
interpretation in this case is similar. 
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current state of corruption. Similarly, corruption predicts these failures in 
governance. 
We checked the robustness of these major results by smoothing out fluctuations 
in the variables via the adoption of a three-year average. This helped verify whether 
our findings were driven by some extreme values. Even though one may expect a 
loss of information on some of our variables, the method is nevertheless known to 
eliminate first-order autocorrelation. As a second robustness check, we applied 
alternative estimations: One-step GMM and Fixed effects estimators. The results of 
these tests are respectively summarised in Tables 4, 5 and 6. Overall, the estimations 
lead to a similar conclusion, with a statistically significant bidirectional causality 
between WGI and the last four governance variables, i.e. LV, GE, RB and RL. 
Meanwhile, the nexus between corruption and VA was seldom significant 
throughout the study. 
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3.5 CONCLUSIONS 
The paper empirically examines the causal nexus between corruption and other 
aspects of regulation, including Absence of Voice and accountability; Political 
instability, violence and terrorism; Government inefficiency; Regulatory burden; 
and Absence of rule of law. The study covered a total of 117 countries worldwide, 
over the period 1996–2013. Data relative to key variables, i.e. corruption and 
governance, were gathered from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
dataset 2014 (The World Bank).  
Following the methodology à la Granger (1969), econometric regressions were 
carried out based on dynamic panel data models using the GMM system estimators. 
Throughout the study, the investigations did not yield a statistically significant 
causal link between the deterioration of aspects of Absence of Voice and 
accountability (citizens’ ability to select their government, and freedom of 
expression, association and media) and increasing corruption.  
Moreover, for the relationship between corruption and governance indicators, 
including Political instability, violence and terrorism (the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilised or overthrown by unconstitutional means, including 
politically motivated violence and terrorism); Government inefficiency (quality of 
public services, independence of civil servants from political pressures, quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and government’s commitment to 
policies); Regulatory burden (government’s ability to implement policies and 
regulations that promote private sector development); and Absence of rule of law 
(agents’ confidence in the rules of society, quality of contract enforcement, property 
rights, police and courts, and the likelihood of crime and violence), our findings yield 
a strong bidirectional causal link. This finding remained consistent to different 
robustness tests, including the year averaging, or to the use of alternative 
estimation techniques, such as the One-step GMM and Fixed effects methods. 
Regarding the main criticism from the Chicago School of Law and Economics 
against government intervention, the findings likewise show that regulations that 
constitute the rationale of such an intervention are an important source of 
corruption, and thus of deregulation. This, in fine, seriously questions the important 
issue of the effectiveness of regulations, in line with the viewpoint defended by the 
Chicago School of Law and Economics. 
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3.6 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The study emphasises that poor regulations, to a large extent, are very likely to 
trigger corruption. This seems particularly true in contexts of political instability, 
violence and terrorism, or of weak rule of law. From the economic perspective, too, 
governments should in particular pay attention to their approaches for regulating 
businesses as well as the conduct on their political economy. Regulations aiming to 
boost private sector development, the quality of public services, policy formulation 
and implementation all matter. When poorly implemented, they generate 
corruption. 
Regarding the subject of corruption, which remains the primary focus of this 
study, the phenomenon is markedly complex and difficult to pin down. Although 
economic and socio-cultural reasons are regularly mentioned to explain its causes, 
a large part of the literature on the subject critically points to shortcomings in 
governance. Our investigation, in addition to confirming this specific point, reveals 
in most cases a vicious circle of ‘bad governance–corruption–bad governance’. The 
fight against corruption cannot be waged on economic terrain alone, but must be 
conducted on other fronts as well, including that of governance. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Result of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
Variable AD-F Statistics P-value 
COR -10.814 < 0.01 
VA -9.8521 < 0.01 
PS -9.8957 < 0.01 
GE -9.9102 < 0.01 
RQ -8.5446 < 0.01 
RL -10.374 < 0.01 
Income -13.367 < 0.01 
Inflation -8.547 < 0.01 
Unemployment -8.956 < 0.01 
Notes. The series are stationary if all probabilities (P-values) associated 
with the D-F statistics are smaller than the critical value 0.05. 
109 
 Result of the Philipps-Perron Unit-Root Test
Variable D-F Statistics P-value 
COR -31.900  0.01 
VA -30.974  0.01 
PS -33.097  0.01 
GE -30.407  0.01 
RQ -32.014  0.01 
RL -31.423  0.01 
Income -36.725  0.01 
Inflation -32.846  0.01 
Unemployment -31.604  0.01 
Notes. The Phillips-Perron test is a variation of the basic Dickey-Fuller 
test, and the D-F statistics differ from the AD-F statistics. The null 
hypothesis is that the series will have a unit root against a stationary 
alternative. It is rejected if all probabilities (P-values) associated with the 
D-F statistics are smaller than the critical value 0.05.
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4 ESSAY III. DO BUSINESS CYCLES TRIGGER 
CORRUPTION? 
KOURAMOUDOU KÉÏTA 
ABSTRACT
In the economic literature, the nexus between economic growth and corruption is 
well covered, but there are only a few empirical studies on cyclical variations of 
corruption. In one such study, Gokcekus and Suzuki (2011) find that transitory 
income and corruption vary in parallel, thus confirming the famous claim of 
Galbraith (1997) that embezzlement flourishes in business booms and withers in 
recessions. This paper tests the general validity of the finding by using a more 
extensive dataset. The results are conflicting: corruption is found to shrink with the 
increase in transitory income. In other words, economic booms foster integrity, and 
recessions make corruption bloom. In addition, the results show that this negative 
effect of short-term changes in income on corruption is greater in high-income 
countries, or in those with good quality of rule of law. While in low-income or poor 
rule of law countries, such a beneficial effect on integrity overall is relatively low. 
Keywords: embezzlement, permanent income, transitory income 
JEL classification: D73, E32 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the economic literature on corruption, there are many empirical studies on the 
correlation between economic development and corruption. Most of these studies 
also show that corruption tends to diminish as national income rises (e.g. La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1999; Mauro, 1995; Treisman, 2000; Mo, 
2001; Pande, 2008; Mallik and Saha, 2016). Still, only a few empirical studies have 
tackled the question of the correlation between business cycles and corruption. In 
recent years, this viewpoint has become increasingly important due to the growing 
understanding that cycles and the behavioural patterns of economic agents are 
organically intertwined.  
This original idea came early on from Keynes (1936), and e.g. Minsky (1975, 
1986), while Akerlof and Shiller (2009) represent more recent contributions to the 
discussion. Behavioural analyses emphasise that the thought patterns of individuals, 
their constant ‘rational’ calculus, to a large extent dictates rent-seeking, which in 
turn considerably contributes to economic disruptions at given intervals of time 
(Cooray and Schneider, 2018). Quiggin (2010) and Varoufakis (2011) highlight the 
role of such biased behaviour during business cycles, which occasionally burst into 
earth-shattering economic crises, like that since the 2008 crash. 
The famous proposition by Galbraith (1997, p. 133) is that there always exists a 
considerable amount of undiscovered embezzlement in business life, and that it 
varies with economic cycles. In good times, people are not only trusting but also 
greedy, which makes the ‘bezzle’ grow. In depressions, people become cautious and 
suspicious, and money is audited meticulously. Improving business morality makes 
the ‘bezzle’ shrink.  
Gokcekus and Suzuki (2011) performed one of the few studies on the nexus 
between business cycles and corruption. Taking Galbraith (1997) as a starting point, 
they build on the fact that embezzlement is a key element of corruption and test 
the proposition by using comprehensive measures of perceived corruption. The 
study also finds substantial proof for the proposition: The results show that while 
long-term growth and integrity develop in parallel, corruption tends to accelerate in 
times of short-term booms, and shrink during economic recessions. This is exactly 
what Galbraith means in terms of the ‘bezzle’. 
The core idea of this paper is to examine whether the findings offered by 
Gokcekus and Suzuki (2011) on the intuitively appealing proposition of Galbraith 
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(1997) are valid in general. This is done simply by replicating the original study but 
also by using a more extensive dataset. The dataset includes both considerably more 
numerous country observations and a somewhat longer and more up-to-date time 
coverage. In line with the original study, both economic growth (namely changes in 
permanent income) and business cycles (namely changes in transitory income) are 
tested as possible determinants of corruption.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 specifies the model as well as the 
data used. Section 4 describes the estimation techniques and reports the estimation 
results. Alternative measures of corruption are used to check the robustness of the 
results and to secure exact comparability of the results to those of Gokcekus and 
Suzuki (2011). Section 5 discusses the findings and maps paths for further study.  
4.2 MODEL AND DATA 
4.2.1 Model 
The aim of the paper is to test the effects of changes in national income on 
corruption. Both the effects of long-term changes in permanent income and short-
term fluctuations in transitory income are studied. The modelling technique follows 
Gokcekus and Suzuki (2011), which in turn is an application of the original 
formulation of Mélitz and Zumer (2002). The basic model can be written as follows: 
(1) ܥ݋ݎ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߛ଴ ൅ ߛଵܲܫ௜ ൅ ߛଶܶܫ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߤ௜ǡ௧.
In Equation (1), all country variables are expressed in relation to the whole 
sample. Cori,t stands for the level of corruption in country i (i = 1,…, N) in period t (t 
= 1,…,T) relative to the average level of corruption over all countries in the sample. 
Thus, Cori,t is derived by dividing the value of the corruption indicator for country i 
in period t by its average indicator value over the whole period T. On the right-hand 
side, parameters ߛ  denote the coefficients to be estimated, and μ is the disturbance 
term.    
Furthermore, PIi denotes country i’s permanent income, and TIi,t denotes 
transitory income, which captures temporary deviations from permanent income. 
Both PIi and TIi,t are measured in terms of GDP per capita, relative to the whole 
sample. Thus, PIi is derived by dividing country i’s GDP per capita value at period t 
by the average of GDP per capita values over the time span t = 1, …, T. To put it 
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simpler, PIi is the average of country i’s income shares over time. Then, TIi,t is simply 
the possible difference between country i’s income share and PIi in any period t. 
Note that ߛଵ reflects the response of corruption to the development of long-run 
average income PIi. Thus, it captures permanent changes in Cori,t. Likewise, 
ߛଶreflects the response of corruption to the transitory income variations, thus 
capturing changes in the time profile of Cori,t. These two effects can be separated, 
since the permanent effect remains even when there are no deviations in the time 
series, whereas the transitory impact hinges entirely on such movements. 
Decomposing Equation (1) yields   
(2) ܥ݋ݎ௜ ൌ ߛ଴ ൅ ߛଵܲܫ௜ ൅ ߟ௜
(3) ܥ݋ݎ௜ǡ௧ െ ܥ݋ݎ௜ ൌ ߛଶܶܫ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߝ௜ǡ௧ ,
where Cori is the average of Cori,t over the time span t = 1,…,T, and ߟ௜ǡ௧ and ߝ௜ǡ௧ are 
the new disturbance terms. Since Equations (2) and (3) add up to Equation (1), it 
follows that ߟ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߝ௜ǡ௧  = ߤ௜ǡ௧. Furthermore, as it is quite plausible that the effects 
from changes in transitory income to corruption are not instant, possible lags in 
these influences should be considered, too. In order to do this, Equation (3) can be 
re-written as follows: 
(4) ܥ݋ݎ௜ǡ௧ െ ܥ݋ݎ௜ ൌ σ ߛଶǡ௧ି௝ܶܫ௜ǡ௧ି௝௄௝ୀ଴ ൅ ߥ௜ǡ௧ ,
where j = 0, …, K denotes the number of lags, the cumulative sum of the time-specific 
coefficients ߛଶǡ௧ି௝ captures the cyclical behaviour of corruption, and ߥ௜ǡ௧ is the error 
term.  
Moreover, note that as well known in panel data econometrics, the estimates of 
ߛଵ and ߛଶ in Equations (2) and (3) are identical to those resulting from the estimation 
of Equation (1). The two parameters ߛଵ and ߛଶ are respectively referred to as 
‘between’ and ‘within’ coefficients and can be interpreted as different estimators of 
a single parameter ߛ. For this reason, Equations (2) and (3) are usually estimated 
separately.  
4.3 Data 
We use balanced panel data from 110 countries around the world over the time 
span 1984–2011 for the estimations of Equations (2), (3) and (4). These countries 
are listed in Appendix 1 in the end of the study. Country-wise time series of gross 
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domestic product (GDP) per capita, constant prices (in Purchasing Power Parity; 
2011 international dollar) are used to calculate the economic variables of the 
baseline models, i.e. permanent and transitory incomes, as described above. Data 
are collected from the World Economic Outlook 2014 (from the IMF website).  
On the other hand, for the corruption variable, we use the International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG)’s index, which attempts to capture, at the same time, several 
dimensions of corruption. Even though it is principally concerned with actual and 
potential corruption within the political system, such as excessive patronage, 
political party financing, nepotism, suspicious ties between politics and business and 
job reservations, it also takes into account the most common dimension 
encountered in the sphere of business, which is connected to specific payments and 
bribes related to import/export licenses, permits, fiscal controls, etc. We equally use 
data for the same time span (i.e. 1984–2011) and for the risk of corruption, varying 
from 0 to 6, with the lower bound indicating utmost risk of corruption, and the 
upper bound, perfect integrity. For ease of future interpretations of empirical 
findings, we rescaled the data so that higher risk means higher corruption. The 
ICRG’s indices are merely subtracted from 7 – thus making them vary from 1 to 7, 
symbolising the minimum and maximum risks of corruption, respectively. 
Moreover, in their similar study, Gokcekus and Suzuki (2011) adopt the 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) from Transparency International (TI) and the per 
capita GDP of 39 countries from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
databases (in constant US dollars) over the time span of 1995–2007 (i.e. 13 periods). 
Nevertheless, note that our two studies use the same method to calculate the 
income and corruption variables, namely their respective level at a given time as 
well as their respective short- and long-term change. 
Finally, we use instrumental variables – their use being justified a priori by a 
serious suspicion of endogeneity between corruption and income. A bidirectional 
causality might exist between the two variables. Studies agree that corruption can 
cause a drop in GDP, and therefore a decline in income and wages (Mauro, 1995; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). At the same time, a common reasoning is that low 
incomes are one of the main reasons why agents are corrupt. Moreover, empirical 
evidence shows that low-income countries are also those with a relatively strong 
tendency towards corrupt behaviour (Mauro, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Mo, 
2000; Swaleheen, 2011). 
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Since the asymptotic orthogonality between the error and regressor is not met, 
the OLS estimators become inconsistent. In such a case, an instrumental variable 
technique provides suitable estimators that may correct for the endogeneity bias. 
In dealing with the same issue, Chowdhury (2004), Keefer (2007) and Gokcekus and 
Suzuki (2011) use the absolute geographic distance (Latitude) from the equator to 
instrument GDP per capita. However, this variable can be intuitively problematic 
given the standards associated with the selection of instruments. In particular, it 
would be difficult to guarantee the exogeneity of this instrument vis-à-vis corruption 
in the first-stage regressions. We think that Latitude as an instrument could, at the 
same time, influence corruption through channels like colonial history, legal origin, 
etc. 
In this study, instruments used for permanent and transitory income are gross 
national savings, in percentage of GDP (Savings), and rainfall variation (Rainfall) 
from one year to the next.  
Savings data also come from the World Economic Outlook 2014. In the first-stage 
estimation for this study, Savings may certainly not be the perfect variable for 
instrumenting income. The exogeneity hypothesis may not be fulfilled, as savings 
may well influence corruption through channels such as investment or GDP. The 
literature argues that the level of corruption is closely related to income (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1993; Mauro, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1995). For example, high-income 
countries tend to have a low tendency towards corruption. Therefore, one can also 
imagine that in these countries, national savings is more important, because agents 
have a greater capacity for saving, unlike in the low-income countries. Indeed, the 
partial correlation coefficient between income and savings is 0.38, which is relatively 
important for a correlation that should ideally be zero.  
Rainfall data come from the monthly estimates of the Global Precipitation 
Climatology Centre (GPCC). From these series are derived the annual rainfall data 
recorded in country i, for year t, denoted Rainfalli,t. With these series, we precisely 
evaluate the proportional variations in rainfall, referred to as 'Rainfalli,t = (Rainfalli,t 
– Rainfalli,t-1)/Rainfalli,t-1. In seeking to estimate the impact of economic conditions
on the probability of civil conflict for 41 African countries, Miguel, Satyanath and
Sergenti (2004) also uses rainfall variation as an instrument for economic growth.
One can intuitively imagine that the precipitation recorded may, to a certain extent,
condition good agricultural results. This economic sector significantly contributes to
growth in many countries. Thus, a correct level of precipitation can afford suitable
conditions for high future agricultural production. Of course, this hypothesis is very
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relative – because while it may seem, for instance, consistent for sub-Saharan 
African countries, which are generally located in semi-arid tropical regions, these 
regions are sometimes threatened by drought; for other countries, such as those 
from Western Europe, the hypothesis may be false because of parameters such as 
agricultural techniques, crops, etc., which can do without a certain amount of 
precipitation while still maintaining agricultural production. In some countries, and 
depending on the type of agriculture, high precipitation can even have an adverse 
effect, causing damage. Given the very varied origins of countries in the dataset – 
and given the rainfall volatility from one region to another – it would not be 
surprising that 'Rainfalli,t is not sufficiently correlated with PIi and TIi,t. Yet such a 
correlation is important (here, it is 0.205 with PI, and 0.259 with TI). In addition, it is 
also feared that the exogeneity of the instrument is not perfect. Rainfall could also 
influence corruption through channels such as geographical latitude, as the highest 
rainfall totals are recorded near the equator, which is subject to strong heating by 
the Sun and hence prolonged heavy showers and frequent thunderstorms. At the 
same time, the literature suggests a relatively strong correlation between countries’ 
proximity to the equator and their corruption levels. 
Nevertheless, we think that despite intuitive assumptions on the instruments’ 
relevance, diagnostic tests associated with the instruments are worth considering. 
The OLS estimations of the supposedly endogenous variables (PI and TI) against 
instruments in the first stage are shown in Table a. The estimated coefficients 
associated with the instruments are statistically significant at the 5% level – meaning 
that they provide a good deal of information on the endogenous variables, which is 
crucial. Nevertheless, the significance level of 'Rainfalli,t is weak compared to that 
of Savingsi,t. Note that the significance of coefficients overall remains robust with 
Fixed effects estimations (but not shown here). Furthermore, the null hypothesis of 
the F-test on instruments, which postulates that the latter are weak, is 
systematically rejected (p-value being always less than 0.05). 
The exogeneity test (the second step of instrument tests) is shown in Table b. 
The latter shows that residuals in the first-stage estimations, introduced in the basic 
models as independent variables, are seldom statistically significant. When 
significant, this points to the rejection of the exogeneity hypothesis. Since 
endogeneity is present, OLS is biased towards the IV estimators that are consistent. 
In Table b, the p-value associated with the Wu-Hausman test is less than 5%. When 
statistically insignificant, on the other hand, endogeneity does not appear to be a 
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big problem, hence the OLS and IV estimates are similar. The p-value associated with 
the Wu-Hausman test is greater than 5% in those cases.  
The Sargan test, the third and last diagnostic test on instruments (also referred 
to as J-statistic), checks the exogeneity hypothesis of instruments against the 
endogeneity hypothesis. In this specific case, we have two instruments against a 
single endogenous variable – the Sargan test is only applicable when both 
instruments are simultaneously used. For Equation (2), the test indicates a 
probability lower than 5% (p-value = 4.79e-05), which rejects the exogeneity 
hypothesis of instruments. As a result, the findings invalidate at least one of the 
instruments used. While for Equation (3), most importantly, such a probability is 
greater than 5% (p-value = 0.288), meaning the instruments are exogenous, and 
therefore valid. 
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Table a. First-stage regressions 
Dependent variables: Permanent income Transitory income 
First-stage 1 First-stage 2 First-stage 3 First-stage 4 First-stage 5 First-stage 6 
Constant 8.208a 
(0.042) 
9.096a 
(0.022) 
8.205a 
(0.042) 
0.053a 
(0.007) 
0.007a 
(0.007) 
0.101a 
(0.018) 
Savingsi,t 0.042a 
(0.001) 
0.042a 
(0.001) 
0.002a 
(0.0003) 
0.001a 
(0.0006) 
'Rainfalli,t 0.005b 
(0.0007) 
0.000b 
(0.0000) 
0.001b 
(0.0001) 
0.001c 
(0.0001) 
Adjusted-R2 0.1589 0.0811 0.1591 0.0494 0.065 0.0594 
F-test (p-value) 6.22e-08a 7.36e-12a <2e-16a 2.09e-12a <2e-16a <2e-16a 
Number of obs. 3080 3080 3080 3080 3080 3080 
Notes. Estimation based on OLS  
a. Statistical significance at 0.1 percent level
b. Statistical significance at 1 percent level
c. Statistical significance at 5 percent level
d. Statistical significance at 10 percent level
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Table b. Exogeneity test 
Equation (2) Equation (2) Equation (2) Equation (3) Equation (3) Equation (3) 
Constant 0.596a 
(0.149) 
3.500a 
(3.869) 
0.602a 
(0.148) 
0.653a 
(0.009) 
0.346a 
(0.009) 
0.523a 
(0.009) 
Permanent income 0.1747a 
(0.016) 
0.494 
(0.425) 
0.175a 
(0.016) 
Transitory income 0.613c 
(0.324) 
1.921c 
(1.696) 
0.515b 
(0.317) 
Residuals (First-stage 1) 0.047b 
(0.017) 
Residuals (First-stage 2) 0.279a 
(0.4254) 
Residuals (First-stage 3) 0.046 
(0.017) 
Residuals (First-stage 4) 0.295a 
(0.327) 
Residuals (First-stage 5) 1.559 
(1.696) 
Residuals (First-stage 6) 0.896 
(0.437) 
Adjusted-R2 0.6607 0.6591 0.5802 0.4824 0.3997 0.3219 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 0.0478c 0.0348b 0.439 0.0012b 0.112 0.125 
— (conclusion) IV IV OLS/IV IV OLS/IV OLS/IV 
Number of observations 3080 3080 3080 3080 3080 3080 
Notes. Estimation based on OLS  
a. Statistical significance at 0.1 percent level
b. Statistical significance at 1 percent level
c. Statistical significance at 5 percent level
d. Statistical significance at 10 percent level
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4.4 RESULTS 
Basically, the estimations aim to test whether permanent and cyclical changes in 
national income have statistically significant effects on corruption. In the 
estimations, all data are log-transformed, which might make them conform more 
closely to normal distribution and possibly correct for skewed data. 
Consistent with the tests on instruments, Equations (2), (3) and (4) are estimated 
with appropriate techniques using the full sample. Then, constraints are included 
regarding the estimations of our basic models to further push the investigations. At 
first, the same estimations are carried out by focusing on countries covered by 
Gokcekus and Suzuki (2011) only. Then, the study again tests the cyclical behaviour 
of corruption, depending on whether the countries are rich or poor, and on the 
quality of their rule of law. 
The estimations’ results on the full sample are reported in Table 1. The effect of 
long-run income changes on corruption is tested with the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) estimator and Instrumental Variable - Two-Stage Least Squares (IV-2SLS) 
(Columns 2 and 3). The Wu-Hausman test shows that both methods are similar. 
Meanwhile, the estimations of the influence of short-term changes in income on 
corruption use the estimators of IV-2SLS and 2SGMM proposed by Blundell and 
Bond (1998) (Columns 4–8). Likewise, the Wu-Hausman test (Table b) concludes that 
endogeneity does not constitute a big problem: The OLS and IV-2SLS methods 
remain similar. However, we only show the estimation results from IV-2SLS. Along 
with it, 2SGMM is also displayed for comparison purposes. Also, whether IV-2SLS or 
2SGMM, our instruments are always used simultaneously. However, in the latter 
case, they are added to the automatically generated instruments.  
The results (OLS and IV-2SLS) show a negative relationship between permanent 
income and corruption. In other words, integrity improves with an increase in 
permanent income – which is consistent with the findings of Gokcekus and Suzuki 
(2011). Substantial research on the relationship between economic growth and 
corruption also leads to a similar conclusion (see e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; 
Mauro, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Mo, 2001).  
Although the literature on the long-term effects of incomes on corruption is very 
rich, there are much fewer studies under the prism of business cycles. The 
estimation of Equations (3) and (4) aims to tackle these economic realities. IV-2SLS 
and 2SGMM yield results that suggest a negative link between transitory income 
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and corruption. Moreover, the clearly negative estimated coefficients for Equation 
(3) (-0.362 with IV-2SLS and -0.452 with 2SGMM) are highly significant – indicating
that an increase in transitory income unambiguously dampens corruption. In other
words, it implies that business booms reduce rather than increase corruption. This
is in strict contrast to the belief that booms should stimulate rent-seeking
opportunities and pump up the ‘bezzle’, as described by Galbraith (1997), and as
supported by Gokcekus and Suzuki (2011). The estimations of Equation (4) test
whether the lagged effects of the changes in transitory income predict variations in
corruption. Gokcekus and Suzuki (2011) also follow the same approach, but with
only one period lag (that is, K=1). Here, Equation (4) is estimated separately with
one, two and three period lags. The 2SGMM method is used, and the results are
presented in Columns 6 (with K = 1), 7 (with K = 2) and 8 (with K = 3). Recall that the
effect of the transitory deviations in income on corruption is appraised through the
cumulative sum of the estimates of the coefficient ߛଶ in Equation (4).
Starting from the regression results in Column 6, the estimated coefficient of 
transitory income at period t is ߛଶǡ௧= -0.398, while that in period t-1 is ߛଶǡ௧ିଵ= -0.058. 
Both are statistically significant at the 0.1% and 1% levels. It follows that the 
aggregate effect of transitory income (that is, the cumulative sum of the two 
estimates) is -0.456. Likewise, with K = 2, the cumulative effect is -0.521, with the 
lagged estimated coefficients of transitory income always statistically significant. 
With K = 3, the cumulative impact is -0.553, and the coefficients are seldom 
significant (significant at 1% and 5% levels in t and t-2 at 10% level), but the 
cumulative sum is still always negative. This is in line with the estimation results of 
Equation (3), thus supporting the previous conclusion on how business booms 
influence corrupt activities. 
Furthermore, we want to delve further, carrying out the same empirical 
investigations but focusing only on the 39 countries (listed in Table 2) investigated 
by Gokcekus and Suzuki (2011). At this level, we seek to check whether our main 
results still hold even when the estimations exclusively focus on those countries. If 
so, that would to some extent suggest a certain robustness of our estimations 
results. In addition, one would be able to argue that the difference between our 
respective results has a different explanation than the difference in the data. Our 
own estimation results for these countries are also reported in Table 2. These 
estimates are consistent with the conclusions of the regressions on the total sample 
(Table 1). Here again, and more specifically, the estimation results of Equation (3) 
show that the estimated coefficients of transitory income are all negative and 
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statistically significant at the 0.1% level. Again, the aggregate effects of transitory 
income on corruption also remain negative for all three values of K in the 
estimations of Equation (4). This means that the increase in transitory income tends 
to reduce corruption, or that business booms have a positive effect on integrity.  
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Full sample estimation 
Columns 
Equation (2) Equation (3) Equation (4) 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
OLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS 2SGMM 2SGMM 2SGMM 2SGMM 
Constant (ߛ଴) 0.959a 
(0.060) 
0.596a 
(0.169) 
1.115a 
(0.004) 
Permanent income (ߛଵ) -0.214a 
(0.006)
-0.174a 
(0.018)
Transitory income (ߛଶ) -0.362a 
(0.054)
-0.452a 
(0.401)
-0.456 -0.521 -0.553
Transitory income (ߛଶǡ௧) -0.398a 
(0.464)
-0.410b 
(0.325)
-0.263b 
(0.421)
Transitory income (ߛଶǡ௧ିଵ) -0.058b 
(0.351)
-0.27c
(0.320)
0.122 
(0.293) 
Transitory income (ߛଶǡ௧ିଶ) 0.160c 
(0.312) 
-0.442c
(0.257)
Transitory income (ߛଶǡ௧ିଷ) 0.030 
(0.203) 
Year 2006 0.018c
(0.053) 
0.026d 
(0.063) 
0.015 
(0.026) 
0.035 
(0.033) 
Year 2008 0.031 
(0.058) 
0.042 
(0.052)d 
0.025
(0.041) 
0.046 
(0.050)
Year 2010 0.036d 
(0.042) 
0.047 
(0.058) 
0.018 
(0.072) 
0.057 
(0.085) 
Year 2012 0.021 
(0.062) 
0.020 
(0.037) 
0.036d 
(0.046) 
0.024 
(0.092) 
Year 2014 0.062 
(0.003) 
0.053 
(0.030) 
0.022 
(0.052) 
0.065d 
(0.036) 
Number of observations 110 110 110 5830 5830 5521 5384 
Adjusted-R2 0.4592 0.4358 0.0627 
Wald teste 90.5a 102.43a 164.465a 174.47a 159.27a 143.14a 
Sargan testf (p-value) 0.438 0.274 0.762 0.348 
Notes. The robust standard deviations are in parentheses below the estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables.  
OLS = ordinary least squares; IV-2SLS = instrumental variables - two-stage least squares; 2SGMM = two-stage generalised 
method of moments.  
a. Statistical significance at 0.1 percent level
b. Statistical significance at 1 percent level
c. Statistical significance at 5 percent level
d. Statistical significance at 10 percent level
e. The null hypothesis of the Wald test checks whether permanent income (PIi) = 0 for Equation (2) is rejected.
f. The over-identifying restrictions test (Sargan test) postulates in its null hypothesis that instruments are not correlated
with residuals. Here, the test is robust to autocorrelation (p-value > 0.05), thus the instruments are valid.
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Estimations based on the 39 countries used by Gokcekus and Suzuki (2011) 
Columns 
Equation (2) Equation (3) Equation (4) 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
OLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS 2SGMM 2SGMM 2SGMM 2SGMM 
Constant (ߛ଴) 0.264a 
(0.072) 
0.947a 
(0.274) 
0.837a 
(0.291) 
Permanent income (ߛଵ) -0.538a 
(0.004)
-0.283a 
(0.016)
Transitory income (ߛଶ) -0.904a 
(0.563)
-0.743a 
(0.249)
-0.759 -0.783 -0.801
Transitory income (ߛଶǡ௧) -0.452a 
(0.103)
-0.529b 
(0.231)
-0.402b 
(0.135)
Transitory income (ߛଶǡ௧ିଵ) -0.307c
(0.391)
0.328 
(0.214) 
-0.635
(0.246)
Transitory income (ߛଶǡ௧ିଶ) -0.582c
(0.632)
0.197c 
(0.134) 
Transitory income (ߛଶǡ௧ିଷ) 0.039 
(0.259) 
Number of observations 39 39 39 3821 3821 3570 2350 
Adjusted-R2 0.4247 0.3970 0.0968 
Wald teste 24.721a 38.034a 42.515a 35.26a 41.781a 56.429a 
Sargan testf (p-value) 0.133 0.473 0.284 0.425 
Notes. The robust standard deviations are in parentheses below the estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables.  
OLS = ordinary least squares; IV-2SLS = instrumental variables - two-stage least squares; 2SGMM = two-stage generalised 
method of moments.  
a. Statistical significance at 0.1 percent level
b. Statistical significance at 1 percent level
c. Statistical significance at 5 percent level
d. Statistical significance at 10 percent level
e. The null hypothesis of the Wald test checks whether permanent income (PIi) = 0 for Equation (2) is rejected.
f. The over-identifying restrictions test (Sargan test) postulates in its null hypothesis that instruments are not correlated
with residuals. Here, the test is robust to autocorrelation (p-value > 0.05), thus the instruments are valid.
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In addition, the study also considers sample split, in particular with respect to 
wealth and rule of law of the country. It might be interesting to know more about 
the cyclical behaviours of corruption from the perspectives of income and rule of 
law (RL). One would expect from the estimated coefficient of transitory income to 
stay negative, no matter the regime of rule or the level of income. This is supported 
by the fact that economic booms mean more generated surplus by firms in the 
economy, which is also consistent with higher wages, dividends and profits paid. 
One may therefore expect such an increase in income to enhance, in turn, integrity. 
But it is also possible that in countries where governance standards are missing, 
corruption nevertheless remains high, even in good times. In fact, in those countries 
where other dysfunctions of the state are very perceptible, corruption is deeply 
rooted in habits (Reinikka and Svensson, 2005; Asongu, 2013; Rosenbaum, Billinger 
and Stiglitz, 2013). However, one can also imagine that when the practices of such 
countries are rooted in cultures to the point of being erected as a management 
system, an increase in income may not lead to a decline in these practices. In these 
circumstances, it might be interesting to pinpoint the cyclical behaviour of 
corruption, and what that eventually implies. From an income perspective, such 
analyses might help reveal whether countries with more wealth can better 
withstand recessions without a decline in their integrity (Li and Wu, 2007; Mallik 
and Saha, 2016). The findings regarding the estimations with respect to rule of law 
(strong and poor quality) and income (high and low) are respectively summarised in 
Tables 3 and 4.  
In order to pinpoint countries with respect to these criteria, for RL, we use for 
each country the average RL index from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) dataset over the 1996–2014 period. Whereas for income, we make 
use of average GDP per capita (already calculated in this study) over the study 
period. Then, countries in the sample are sorted according to both factors. The 
estimations will now be based on four sub-samples, each including 39 countries. The 
Strong RL sub-sample includes the top 39 countries in terms of good quality in the 
ranking; whereas the Poor RL includes the bottom 39. The same applies for income. 
Unlike the previous tables, Tables 3 and 4 skip the estimation results based on 
the OLS method. Even when the new constraints are taken into account, the 
previous conclusion remain unchanged. Regarding the focus of this study, the 
estimations overall show that corruption tends to be less pervasive with business 
cycles. The estimated coefficients of corruption of transitory income stayed 
negative. In particular, the results show, on the one hand, that in the most 
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democratic countries, or the richest countries, corruption is much more sensitive to 
business cycles. This is justified by the higher estimated coefficients (in absolute 
values). In other words, economic booms significantly help to reduce corruption 
habits in these countries, while depressions appear to be a considerable source of 
risk for more corruption. On the other hand, the findings suggest, in the case of less 
democratic countries, or poor countries, that the negative effect of business cycles 
on corruption is clearly lower. The estimated coefficients of transitory income are 
smaller, and sometimes not statistically significant. This means that, in these 
countries, expansion cycles do not lead to a significant decline in corrupt practices, 
nor do recessions generate significant additional corruption. Of course, this does 
not mean that corruption is not at an already very high level in these regions. As 
well known in those countries, the standards of governance are indeed already 
sufficiently missing, with high levels of corruption in some cases. As we hint at 
above, one might explain this relatively low elasticity with the assumption that 
corruption practices are so rooted in those societies that it is difficult for another 
factor to significantly amplify them. 
Moreover, the study also considers an alternative corruption measure as a 
robustness test, using the Control of Corruption (CC) statistics provided by The 
World Bank for 94 countries (listed in Appendix 1) over the study period. The 
estimations results are reported in Table 5 (Appendix 2). More generally, the results 
challenge the intuitively appealing argument of Galbraith (1997) that economic 
booms should pump up the ‘bezzle’, and especially its empirical verification by 
Gokcekus and Suzuki (2011).  
4.5 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper is an econometric study on the possible correlation between the level of 
corruption and national income. The estimations concern the effects of permanent 
and transitory income on the risk of corruption for a maximum of 110 countries 
worldwide over 28 periods from 1984–2011. The benchmark for these 
investigations is Gokcekus and Suzuki (2011), which finds a positive correlation 
between permanent income and integrity, but a negative correlation between 
transitory income and integrity. In particular, the latter correlation would suggest 
that economic booms trigger corruption, and that recessions dampen it. This result 
is noteworthy, because the important question about the link between business 
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booms and corruption is rarely studied empirically, and because it confirms the 
famous description on the evolution of the ‘bezzle’ by Galbraith (1997).  
This paper verifies the findings of Gokcekus and Suzuki (2011), as well as those 
of most of the empirical research on the issue, that an increase of permanent 
income tends to reduce corruption. However, it contradicts the important finding 
that changes in transitory income and integrity should be negatively correlated. In 
contrast, the results show that short-term fluctuations in income are also positively 
correlated with integrity. That is, economic booms reduce corruption, while 
recessions trigger it. The conclusion remains robust even when the focus is on 
countries covered by Gokcekus and Suzuki (2011) – and also even when an 
alternative corruption measure is adopted.  
In addition, the study also considers a sample split based on countries’ wealth 
and the quality of rule of law to determine whether the initially observed cyclical 
effect of corruption is modified. Overall, our conclusion remains unchanged in this 
regard. In particular, we find that in the most democratic countries, or richest 
countries, corruption is much more sensitive to business cycles, with the implication 
that economic booms significantly help to reduce corruption habits in these 
countries, while depressions constitute, at the same time, a considerable risk for 
more corruption. For less democratic countries, or poor countries, on the other 
hand, one can observe that corruption is weakly sensitive to business cycles; this 
suggests that in those countries, expansion cycles do not necessarily mean a 
significant decline in corrupt practices, nor do recessions generate significant 
additional corruption. However, this does not mean that corruption is at relatively 
low levels in these countries – indeed it is quite the opposite. Our results point to a 
strong habit of corruption, to the point that ‘natural triggers’ of corruption, such as 
low income or a low accountability framework, seem almost ‘ineffective’ in 
amplifying it. 
Moreover, the result that corruption diminishes during economic upturns and 
increases during downturns has several implications. In particular, it means that the 
issue is highly data-dependent. The fact that the results of this paper are generated 
from more extensive data than those from Gokcekus and Suzuki (2011) does not 
necessarily justify rejection of the latter’s findings. Moreover, the setting shared by 
both studies has not yielded solid proof for the proposition by Galbraith (1997). 
Embezzlement is only one character of corruption among other, perhaps more 
visible, factors. It may well be that the extent of the ‘bezzle’ in the hidden operation 
of firms and banks is not properly monitored by the corruption indices.  
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There are alternative explanations for corruption, too. For example, from the 
‘grease the wheels’ viewpoint (Méon and Sekkat, 2005), it might be reasonable to 
suggest that such corruptive greasing would be especially necessary in downturns, 
but not so important when business is booming in any case. The power of alternative 
explanations may also differ between countries. The ‘bezzle’ explanation might be 
relevant in more developed countries, while the ‘grease the wheels’ explanation 
might fit better in less developed countries. In the latter countries, the role of 
economic booms in yielding resources to anti-corruption activities may also be 
crucial (Khan, 2004; Davigo and Mannozi, 2007). Consistent with this idea, the paper 
examines the issue under prisms such as rule of law and income. The paper to some 
extent suggests that whether strong or poor rule of law countries, or high-income 
or low-income countries, business booms are also associated with a decline in 
corruption, but with different magnitudes. In the richest countries, or those ranked 
first in terms of rule of law, the effect of business booms and recessions in 
respectively encouraging integrity and triggering corruption is much higher. 
Conversely, such an effect is lower in the poorest countries, or in those with other 
serious shortcomings in the field of rule of law.  
Finally, the setting shared by Gokcekus and Suzuki (2011) and this paper might 
also be inappropriate from the beginning. First, the application of the model of 
Mélitz and Zumer (2002) might be misleading. The original model is used to study 
regional redistribution, which makes it reasonable to express all variables in relation 
to the whole sample of countries. For the present purpose, this may be too 
confusing, thus blurring the findings. Second, the interpretation of e.g. Quiggin 
(2010) and Varoufakis (2011) is that corrupted behaviour and embezzlement, 
particularly in the financial sector, cause business cycles, rather than the other way 
around. In other words, corruption is a major driver of financial crises, which 
occasionally develop into economic catastrophes. Therefore, the direction of 
causality between business cycles and corruption should be examined carefully. 
Third, the perception-based measures might be a particular problem in this context, 
as one can imagine people thinking, ‘This country is booming! Its leaders must be 
honest and effective!’ or ‘That economy is in recession, so it must have been 
destroyed by corrupt leaders!’ All in all, there certainly is a need to dig deeper.  
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APPENDIX 1 
List of countries/territories in the sample 
Albania* 
Algeria 
Angola 
Argentina* 
Australia  
Austria*  
Bahrain* 
Bangladesh* 
Belgium*  
Bolivia*  
Botswana*  
Brazil*  
Bulgaria*  
Burkina Faso 
Cameroon*  
Canada* 
Chile*  
China*  
Colombia*  
Costa Rica*  
Cote d’Ivoire*  
Cyprus* 
Democratic Rep. of 
Congo* 
Denmark* 
Dominican Republic* 
Ecuador 
Egypt*  
El Salvador* 
Ethiopia 
Finland*  
France*  
Gabon* 
Germany*  
Ghana*  
Greece*  
Guatemala*  
Guinea 
Guinea Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras* 
Hong Kong SAR* 
Hungary*  
Iceland*  
India*  
Indonesia*  
Iran*  
Ireland*  
Israel*  
Italy*  
Jamaica*  
Japan*  
Jordan*  
Kenya*  
Korea, Republic of* 
Kuwait* 
Lebanon 
Luxembourg*  
Madagascar 
Malawi*  
Malaysia*  
Mali* 
Malta* 
Mexico*  
Morocco*  
Mozambique* 
Netherlands*  
New Zealand*  
Nicaragua 
Niger* 
Norway*  
Oman 
Pakistan*  
Panama* 
Paraguay*  
Peru*  
Philippines*  
Poland*  
Portugal*  
Qatar* 
Republic of Congo* 
Romania* 
Saudi Arabia* 
Senegal*  
Sierra Leone* 
Singapore * 
South Africa*  
Spain*  
Sri Lanka* 
Sudan* 
Sweden*  
Switzerland*  
Syrian Arab Rep.*  
Taiwan (China 
province)* 
Tanzania*  
Thailand*  
The Bahamas 
The Gambia* 
Togo* 
Trinidad and Tobago* 
Tunisia* 
Turkey*  
Uganda*  
United Arab Emirates 
United Kingdom* 
United States*  
Uruguay* 
Venezuela*  
Vietnam*  
Zambia* 
Notes. The full sample of 110 countries. 
*Countries (94 in total) covered by robustness tests with alternative ‘Control of Corruption’ (CC) 
index from the World Bank.
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APPENDIX 2 
 Estimations with respect to rule of law 
Equatio 
n (2), IV-2SLS 
Equation (3), 2SGMM Equation (4), 2SGMM (K=3) 
Strong RL Poor RL Strong RL Poor RL Strong RL Poor RL 
Permanent income 
(ߛଵ) 
0.421a 
(0.034) 
0.472a 
(0.331) 
Transitory income (ߛଶ) -0.320a 
(0.124)
-0.374a 
(0.164)
Transitory income 
(ߛଶǡ௧) 
-0.662a
(0.301)
-0.008c
(0.138)
-0.632 -0.012
Transitory income 
(ߛଶǡ௧ିଵ) 
0.272 
(0.302) 
-0.001c
(0.324)
Transitory income 
(ߛଶǡ௧ିଶ) 
-0.160
(0.242)
0.328 
(0.473) 
Transitory income 
(ߛଶǡ௧ିଷ) 
-0.744
(0.335)
-0.339
(0.373)
Number of 
observations 
39 39 39 1092 1063 982 
Adjusted-R2 0.3921 0.3782 
Wald teste 29.47a 40.40a 42.54a 41.18a 38.82a 43.20a 
Sargan testf (p-value) 0.486 0.240 0.315 0.253 
Notes. The robust standard deviations are in parentheses below the estimated coefficients of the explanatory 
variables.  
OLS = ordinary least squares; IV-2SLS = instrumental variables - two-stage least squares; 2SGMM = two-stage 
generalised method of moments.  
a. Statistical significance at 0.1 percent level
b. Statistical significance at 1 percent level
c. Statistical significance at 5 percent level
d. Statistical significance at 10 percent level
e. The null hypothesis of the Wald test checks whether permanent income (PIi) = 0 for Equation (2) is rejected.
f. The over-identifying restrictions test (Sargan test) postulates in its null hypothesis that instruments are not
correlated with residuals. Here, the test is robust to autocorrelation (p-value > 0.05), thus the instruments are
valid. 
Strong RL countries: Finland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, New Zealand, Austria, Iceland, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Canada, United Kingdom, Germany, Ireland, Singapore, United States, Australia, 
Malta, France, Hong Kong, Japan, Chile, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Cyprus, Israel, Republic of Korea, Taiwan, 
Hungary, Greece, Qatar, Botswana, Kuwait, Italy, Poland, Argentina, Morocco, Ghana. 
Poor RL countries: Uganda, Zambia, Mexico, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Mozambique, Peru, El Salvador, 
Niger, Bolivia, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Albania, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Togo, Honduras, Gabon, Kenya, 
Paraguay, Guatemala, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Nicaragua, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Venezuela, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Madagascar, Sudan, Guinea, Vietnam, Jamaica, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Ecuador, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Angola, Haiti. 
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Estimations with respect to income 
Equation (2), IV-2SLS  Equation (3), 2SGMM Equation (4), 2SGMM 
(K=3) 
High 
income 
Low 
income 
High 
income 
Low 
income 
High 
income 
Low 
income 
Permanent income 
(ߛଵ) 
0.266a 
(0.014) 
0.251a 
(0.037) 
Transitory income 
(ߛଶ) 
-0.431a 
(0.220)
-0.313b 
(0.201)
Transitory income 
(ߛଶǡ௧) 
-0.340a 
(0.164)
-0.012c
(0.024)
-0.473 -0.008
Transitory income 
(ߛଶǡ௧ିଵ) 
-0.138
(0.214)
-0.014c
(0.104)
Transitory income 
(ߛଶǡ௧ିଶ) 
0.210 
(0.410) 
0.101 
(0.120) 
Transitory income 
(ߛଶǡ௧ିଷ) 
-0.545
(0.122)
-0.095
(0.135)
Number of 
observations 
39 39 39 1092 1063 982 
Adjusted-R2 0.4218 0.3129 
Wald teste 34.60a 46.29a 57.41a 41.18a 44.76a 39.37a 
Sargan testf (p-value) 0.193 0.152 0.193 0.107 
Notes. The robust standard deviations are in parentheses below the estimated coefficients of the explanatory 
variables.  
OLS = ordinary least squares; IV-2SLS = instrumental variables - two-stage least squares; 2SGMM = two-stage 
generalised method of moments.  
a. Statistical significance at 0.1 percent level
b. Statistical significance at 1 percent level
c. Statistical significance at 5 percent level
d. Statistical significance at 10 percent level
e. The null hypothesis of the Wald test checks whether permanent income (PIi) = 0 for Equation (2) is rejected.
f. The over-identifying restrictions test (Sargan test) postulates in its null hypothesis that instruments are not
correlated with residuals. Here, the test is robust to autocorrelation (p-value > 0.05), thus instruments are valid.
High-income countries: Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Luxembourg, Kuwait, Norway, Switzerland, Singapore, 
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, United States, Denmark, Oman, Netherlands, Austria, Germany, Canada, Sweden, 
Belgium, Australia, France, Italy, Iceland, Hong Kong SAR, Japan, Finland, United Kingdom, The Bahamas, Ireland, 
Cyprus, Spain, New Zealand, Greece, Israel, Malta, Taiwan Province of China, Portugal, Gabon, Hungary, Trinidad 
and Tobago. 
Low-income countries: Mozambique, Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Malawi, Niger, Burkina Faso, 
Sierra Leone, Uganda, Guinea Bissau, Togo, Guinea, Mali, Madagascar, The Gambia, Tanzania, Bangladesh, Haiti, 
Senegal, Ghana, Vietnam, India, Kenya, Zambia, Cameroon, China, Cote d’Ivoire, Sudan, Nicaragua, Pakistan, 
Angola, Honduras, Guyana, Bolivia, Philippines, Morocco, Sri Lanka, Republic of Congo, Syria, Albania. 
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Robustness test using ‘Control of corruption’ (CC) indices from Worldwide 
governance indicators 
Columns 
Equation (2) Equation (3) Equation (4) 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
OLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS 2SGMM 2SGMM 2SGMM 2SGMM 
Constant (ߛ଴) 0.115a 
(0.314) 
0.763a 
(0.147) 
0.621a 
(0.138) 
Permanent income (ߛଵ) -0.225a 
(0.002)
-0.164a 
(0.029)
Transitory income (ߛଶ) -0.644a 
(0.306)
-0.592a 
(0.302)
-0.614 -0.637 -0.671
Transitory income (ߛଶǡ௧) -0.371a 
(0.214)
-0.477a 
(0.205)
-0.521b 
(0.126)
Transitory income (ߛଶǡ௧ିଵ) -0.243b 
(0.158)
0.175 
(0.186) 
 0.249 
(0.164) 
Transitory income (ߛଶǡ௧ିଶ) -0.335c
(0.412)
-0.376c
(0.128)
Transitory income (ߛଶǡ௧ିଷ) -0.023
(0.259)
Number of observations 94 94 94 1222 1222 984 927 
Adjusted-R2 0.4473 0.4106 0.1034 
Wald teste 52.85a 46.479a 39.248a 43.71a 47.25a 61.253a 
Sargan testf (p-value) 0.211 0.395 0.138 0.213 
Notes. The robust standard deviations are in parentheses below the estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables. 
OLS = ordinary least squares; IV-2SLS = instrumental variables - two-stage least squares; 2SGMM = two-stage generalised 
method of moments.  
a. Statistical significance at 0.1 percent level
b. Statistical significance at 1 percent level
c. Statistical significance at 5 percent level
d. Statistical significance at 10 percent level
e. The null hypothesis of the Wald test checks whether permanent income (PIi) = 0 for Equation (2) is rejected.
f. The over-identifying restrictions test (Sargan test) postulates in its null hypothesis that instruments are not correlated
with residuals. Here, the test is robust to autocorrelation (p-value > 0.05), thus the instruments are valid.
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5 ESSAY IV. DOES CORRUPTION AFFECT TOTAL 
FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY? AN EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS 
KOURAMOUDOU KÉÏTA 
ABSTRACT
Although the economic research strongly claims the negative role of corruption in 
economies, mixed evidence persists about how corruption specifically affects 
growth. The motivation of this study is that volumes of research show that growth 
of output to a large extent results from growth in total factor productivity (TFP), also 
referred to as the Solow residual. This paper therefore examines the effect of 
corruption on TFP as a potential channel through which corruption could influence 
growth. It then measures the impact related to an increase in tax rates on such an 
effect. The study uses data from 90 countries, for a time span of 1996–2014. Via the 
System GMM estimators, the estimations suggest that corruption, well as tax 
burden, have a negative effect on TFP. Our findings also highlight that a tax rate 
increase in turn induces a decline in the negative effect of corruption on TFP, 
implying that tax burden alleviates the negative consequences of corruption on 
productivity. These findings remain robust to the introduction of TFP determinant 
variables or alternative regressions.  
Keywords: total factor productivity, corruption, tax burden 
JEL classification: D7, O4, H2 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
When examining the relationship between corruption and economic performance, 
most studies mainly focus on how corruption influences investment or economic 
growth. The pioneering assessments of the economic consequences of corruption 
are Knack and Keefer (1995) and Mauro (1995). Their respective investigations 
conclude that corruption reduces economic growth. According to Knack and Keefer 
(1995) in particular, the negative relationship between corruption and economic 
growth holds even when the investment ratio is included among explanatory 
variables. This suggests that besides its negative effect on capital accumulation, 
corruption also has a direct effect on growth. This result is subsequently confirmed 
by the empirical work of Mo (2001). However, his study states in addition that the 
significant negative effect of corruption on growth disappears when human capital 
is used as independent variable. In the empirical findings of Mauro (1995), 
corruption is found to have no significant effect on growth when the latter is 
controlled for investment. Along the same lines, Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) find 
that corruption affects growth through investment, trade, schooling and political 
instability, by importance. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) also provide a thorough 
analysis to grasp the detrimental implications of corruption in the economy (see also 
Bardhan, 1997; Ades and Di Tella, 1999). Tanzi and Davoodi (1997), in turn, while 
making the assumption that the quality of investments may constitute an enhancing 
factor to the productivity of capital, conclude that corruption affects the quality of 
the infrastructures, in line with Gillanders (2013). However, few studies focus on the 
impact of corruption on human capital, albeit the mainstream view, again, argues 
for its detrimental aspects (Reinikka and Svensson, 2005; Seka, 2013; Dridi, 2014; 
Bryant and Javaldi, 2016). 
Note on the other hand that the literature on corruption also records an 
alternative view to the one previously claimed. This view argues that corruption 
might have a beneficial effect on economic dynamism in the presence of deficient 
governance or ineffective institutions – otherwise, it overall reduces economic 
growth. The following work shed light on this issue: Leff (1964), Leys (1965), 
Huntington (1968), Méon and Sekkat (2005), Méndez and Sepúlveda (2006) and 
Aidt, Dutta and Sena (2008).  
On the other hand, the impact of corruption on productivity has received less 
attention within the literature. Yet, the analysis of productivity levels seems to be 
an emerging field, as compared to growth rates.  
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Given the scarcity of resources, to be more effective, countries are working more 
to improve productivity than to provide immense resources, which tend to run out. 
Important studies have shown the positive correlation between high productivity 
and the economic growth of countries (Nordhaus, 2002; Auzina-Emsina, 2014). Such 
a nexus is based on the hypothesis that the efficiency with which a country’s inputs 
are transformed may explain its economic growth, as well as disparities in economic 
growth across countries (Hall and Jones, 1999). 
Such efficiency is determined by the ‘social infrastructure’, which groups all its 
institutions, and government policies, which in turn determine the economic 
environment and drive incentives for individuals and firms to invest, to create, to 
innovate and to transfer ideas (Hall and Jones, 1999; Salinas-Jiménez and Salinas-
Jiménez, 2011). From the quality of the ‘social infrastructure’ results a given level of 
efficiency that influences human and physical capital. Consistent with this 
reasoning, the study by Hall and Jones (1999) illustrates that countries may attain a 
high level of output per worker in the long run when their high levels of investment 
in human and physical capital are used with a high level of productivity. 
The issue of how much of growth in output results from growth in physical and 
human capital is an essential point of Solow’s growth theory (Solow, 1956; Swan, 
1956). Contributions on the subject show that under the assumptions of constant 
returns to scale and competitive factor markets, such an exercise (also termed as 
growth accounting) is possible (Abramovitz, 1956; Baier, Dwyer and Tamura, 2006). 
In particular, the investigations of Abramovitz (1956) show that the growth of 
factors of production contributed only 10% of output growth per capita in the US 
during 1869–1878 and 1944–1953. Over the time span of 1900–1949, the output 
growth per worker explained by capital accumulation was 12% (Solow, 1957). That 
is, both studies suggest that the growth of output per worker is explained more than 
average by sources other than human/physical capital. This deviation between the 
observed output and that forecasted through human and physical capital is total 
factor productivity (TFP), also referred to as the ‘Solow residual’. This a priori 
unknown productivity, actually, would come from sources like innovation or 
improvements in the institutional context: i.e. our so-called ‘social infrastructure’.  
Moreover, even though the results from later work lead to lower TFP levels, they 
nevertheless remain very far from zero (Kendrick, 1961; Jorgenson, Frank and 
Barbara, 1987; Abramovitz and David, 2000). For example, the empirical work of 
Baier, Dwyer and Tamura (2006) on 143 countries, 23 of which encompassed a time 
span of 100 years, finds TFP to contribute about 14% of the growth of the output 
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per worker on average in these countries, representing strikingly 26% of economic 
growth for Southern Europe, 26% for Newly Industrialised Countries, and 34% for 
Western countries. However, for Sub-Saharan Africa and Middle East countries, the 
effect of TFP is negative. More interesting, their study also reveals that variations in 
output per worker are more sensitive to variations in TFP than to variations in 
classical factors, i.e. human and physical capital.  
Thus, one may presume that any factors whatsoever might channel TFP to impact 
economic growth. This becomes even more likely when the growth of the economy 
is found to be highly elastic to TFP (Abramovitz, 1956; Baier, Dwyer and Tamura, 
2006). By example, Olson, Sarna and Swamy (2000), using several measures of 
institutional quality (one of them being corruption) to assess their contribution to 
TFP growth across countries, note that poor institutions significantly hinder 
productivity growth.  
Our paper empirically focuses on the hypothesis that corruption should be one 
of the determinant factors of TFP. This reasoning is also consistent with Paldam 
(1999), who suggests that the absence of corruption may constitute a growth factor 
(also supported by Lambsdorff, 1999). Following the studies supporting the 
detrimental side of corruption to growth or investment, we assume that corruption 
should also impede TFP growth.  
Furthermore, the paper in addition assesses the consequences of tax burden on 
the extent to which corruption could affect TFP. The justification behind this is that 
taxation and corruption are two intertwined topics, often linked through tax 
evasion. For instance, bribe payments by individuals and firms to tax officials are 
common practice within corrupt bureaucracies. In addition, corruption by its effect 
inevitably resembles taxation. Indeed, it is sometimes defined as a form of taxation, 
with the difference being that the resulting payments do not end up in the coffers 
of the State (Sanyal, Gang and Goswami, 2000). This thus deprives the government 
of revenue which would have made possible the financing of productive goods 
(Fisman and Svensson, 2007). Being illegal, corrupt activities are deeply uncertain 
and shrouded in secrecy (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993), which is incompatible with 
investment. Hence, Wei (2000) finds taxation less damaging. His empirical study 
shows that bribery has a much stronger negative impact on foreign direct 
investment than taxation. Fisman and Svensson’s (2007) empirical investigations 
also leads to a similar conclusion. Adopting data on the estimated bribe payments 
of Ugandan firms, they find that both taxation and bribery are negatively associated 
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with firm growth – with bribery having a significantly higher effect than taxation 
(Fisman and Svensson, 2007). 
Regarding the expected effect of tax burden in our study, one can assume that 
tax burden increases can influence the effect of corruption on TFP in one way or 
another. The rationale for such an interest is based on the following idea: If the 
increase in taxes does not trigger more corruption (namely through tax evasion and 
other opportunistic behaviours (Dzhumashev, 2014; Alm, Martinez-Vasquez and 
McClennan, 2016), then one can imagine that this increase may help reduce the 
negative effect of corruption on TFP. Indeed, with more tax revenue, the state can 
invest more, namely by financing changes in production technology, allowing more 
support for innovation, allowing for efficiency gains and allowing for good quality of 
government policies and institutions. On the other hand, if opposing agents find 
refuge in illegal activities in order to flee strong taxation, like bribing tax officials, 
then this should exacerbate the negative effect of corruption on TFP. Our 
assumption therefore suggests that the quality of governance to some extent 
conditions such a relationship. For instance, in Lambsdorff’s (2003) empirical study, 
which examines the effect of corruption on the productivity of capital, corruption 
reduces the ratio of GDP to the capital stock – and that is channelled by its 
correlation with poor bureaucracy. 
The paper is organised as follow: following this section, Section 2 presents the 
baseline model and data to be used, and explains the empirical method applied. 
Section 3 presents and discusses the empirical findings, while Section 4 is dedicated 
to conclusions and policy recommendations.  
5.2 DATA AND METHOD 
5.2.1 Data 
The paper develops an empirical study that covers a total of 90 countries worldwide 
for a time span of 1996–2014. The list is reported in the Appendix (Table A2). The 
choice of countries included in the sample is conditional on the availability of data.   
Following the discussions in the previous section, the paper focuses on Equation 
(1) below as the baseline model for the empirical analyses. The model reads:       
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ܶܨ ௜ܲǡ௧ ൌ ߚܥ݋ݎݎݑ݌ݐ݅݋݊௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߛܶܽݔܤݑݎ݀݁݊௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߣܼ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߸௜ ൅ ߟ௧ ൅ ߝ௜ǡ௧  (1), 
On the left-hand side of Equation (1), ܶܨ ௜ܲǡ௧, symbolises the levels of TFP at 
constant purchasing power parity (PPP) rates, relative to the United States in terms 
of the prices in that period, for country ݅ in period ݐ. It represents the dependent 
variable of the model. The associated statistics hereby come from Penn World Table 
version 9.0. (Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer, 2015). On the right-hand side, ܶܨ ௜ܲǡ௧  is 
estimated, among others, against ܥ݋ݎݎݑ݌ݐ݅݋݊௜ǡ௧  and ܶܽݔܤݑݎ݀݁݊௜ǡ௧. The study uses 
the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) from Transparency International (TI) as a 
proxy variable to capture the prevalence of corruption. However, note that as its 
name indicates, CPI is based on the perception of how widespread corruption is 
within the country. Put another way, such an assessment is likely to be biased 
because of its subjectivity. Since corruption is an illegal activity and therefore usually 
hidden deliberately, the statistics related to proven cases do not suffice to evaluate 
it. CPI ranges from 0 to 10, where 0 stands for the highest possible level of 
corruption and 10 indicates full integrity in the country. However, for ease in 
interpreting estimations, we have rescaled the corruption figures so that their 
increase also indicates further corruption in the country. The rescaling method is as 
follows: ܥ݋ݎݎݑ݌ݐ݅݋݊௜ǡ௧ ൌ ͳͳ െ ܥܲܫ௜ǡ௧. The variable of interest, ܶܽݔܤݑݎ݀݁݊௜ǡ௧ , 
assesses the level of fiscal burden borne by taxpayers. Its measurement includes 
both marginal tax rates and the overall level of taxation (both direct and indirect 
taxes) imposed by the government (both central and local levels) as a percentage of 
gross domestic product (GDP). Here, we use fiscal freedom statistics provided from 
the Economic Freedom Index database (The Heritage Foundation).  
A-more-than optimal taxation surtax is likely to discourage investment and
encourage tax evasion. This could result in lower public investment due to lower 
state revenues and FDI due to the low attractiveness of the country. Ultimately, this 
contributes to reducing the competitiveness of the economy. ߚ and ߛ stand for the 
respective coefficients of corruption and tax burden; they are expected to be 
negative ( , ). Figures 1.1–1.3 plot the nature of the nexus between the 
variables of interest. Figure 1.1 suggests a strong negative correlation between TFP 
and corruption. The paper also provides for a possible comparison of regional 
graphics plotting this relationship (see Appendix). Figure 1.2 at first glance also 
indicates a negative relationship between TFP and tax burden. However, the 
regression line representing fitted values is practically horizontal, which suggests a 
weak correlation between both variables. Figure 1.3 shows a positive linkage of 
143 
corruption and tax burden. Textbooks also argue that over-taxing may encourage 
agents to avoid paying taxes by bribing tax officials or resorting to frauds and black 
markets. These are known to considerably foster a shadow economy, which in turn 
leads to a decline in public revenue and implies, in fine, a less-than-optimal 
allocation of public resources, all things being equal. 
Furthermore, the modelling also includes a set of other explanatory variables. 
They are accounted for by ܼ௜ǡ௧ , which is their vector of variables, and ߣ, which is their 
vector of coefficients. Meanwhile, ߸௜ and ߟ௧  capture the respective country-specific 
effect and the relevant time effect. In the end,  ߝ௜ǡ௧, represents a random error term 
that takes into account the influence of all omitted variables in the estimation.  
Descriptive statistics relative to the variables as well as the sources are reported 
in Table 1. Since our data feature the time dimension, we first ensured that the time 
series are stationary, meaning that their distribution neither follows any trend nor 
changes over time. The Fisher type unit-root test was applied – with the null 
hypothesis that all panels contain a unit root, i.e. non-stationarity, against the 
alternative hypothesis that at least one panel is stationary. Table A1 in the Appendix 
reports the chi-squares and p-values associated with both Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(AD-F) and Phillips-Perron (P-P) methods. In both cases, the non-stationarity 
hypothesis is systematically rejected.  
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Figure 1. Total factor productivity (TFP) with respect to corruption 
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Figure 2. Total factor productivity (TFP) with respect to tax burden 
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Figure 3. Corruption with respect to tax burden 
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Descriptive statistics and data sources 
Variables Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum Sources 
TFP (level at current PPPs, in 
million 2011 US dollars) 
0.680 0.324 0.105 2.492 Feenstra, Inklaar, 
Timmer, (2015), Penn 
World Table 9.0 
Inflation (price level of 
household consumption, US 
GDP in 2011=1) 
0.615 0.311 0.143 1.713 Feenstra, Inklaar, 
Timmer, (2015), Penn 
World Table 9.0 
Openness (sum of shares of 
merchandise exports and 
imports in GDP, at current) 
-0.042 0.162 -0.846 0.588 Feenstra, Inklaar, 
Timmer, (2015), Penn 
World Table 9.0 
Corruption (Corruption 
Perception Index) 
5.633 2.373 1.000 9.600 Transparency 
International 
Property rights/100 (overall 
quality of legal framework) 
0.561 0.242 0.100 0.950 The Heritage Foundation 
Tax burden/100 (% of tax 
revenue to GDP) 
0.703 0.145 0.298 0.999 The Heritage Foundation 
Government spending 
(government consumption 
and all transfer)/100 
0.663 0.219 0.100 0.993 The Heritage Foundation 
Improved sanitation/100, rural 
(facilities, % of rural 
population with access) 
0.683 0.339 0.021 1.000 World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
Energy use/10,000 (kg of oil 
equivalent per capita) 
0.297 0.338 0.0009 2.276 World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
Transport service (% of 
commercial services 
exports/100) 
0.236 0.149 0.0007 0.880 World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
Electricity (Electric power 
consumption (in kWh per 
capita)/10000) 
1.030 3.786 1.030 55.578 World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
Military expenditure (% GDP) 2.612 3.943 0.000 63.100 World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
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5.2.2 Method 
     To estimate Equation (1), the paper sequentially proceeds by using Fixed effects 
estimation, Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) and Two-Stage System Generalised 
Method of Moments (System GMM). To determine which estimator best fit our 
data, we carried out the classical specification tests (or homogeneity tests) for panel 
data. First, a Fisher-type test for poolability was used. Its null hypothesis (H0) argues 
for a pool data structure against the existence of Fixed effects as an alternative 
hypothesis (H1). With an observed p-value (<2.2e-16), also less than the standard 
threshold of 5%, the null hypothesis is rejected, pointing to the existence of Fixed 
effects. Expressed in a different way, this implies that countries in the sample exhibit 
distinctive features. The OLS estimators are not appropriate, as we cannot assume 
an identical TFP function for all the countries in the sample, nor identical elasticities 
for corruption or for tax burden, for instance. Second, the paper performs the 
Hausman test to determine whether the individual effects are random (H0), or fixed 
(H1). Likewise, the p-value associated with the test is very low (<2.2e-16) – which is 
less than the standard 5% level. The null hypothesis, which suggests the presence of 
Fixed effects, is thus rejected. The Fixed effects method in such circumstances is 
suitable, as it provides consistent estimators. 
Even though the conclusion of the homogeneity test holds for the use of Fixed 
effects, some doubts may remain, mainly related to the possible existence of an 
endogeneity problem. Following the discussion on TFP in the first section, one may 
have serious reasons to suspect corruption to be endogenous. If proven, this would 
then make the Fixed effects estimators inconsistent (Baltagi, 1995). Given the 
literature discussed in the first section, which shows a strong connection between 
TFP and matters such as efficiency, institutions, and more generally, governance, 
and given the literature on corruption and more specifically its link with ill-
functioning institutions (Méon and Sekkat, 2005), one may increasingly consider an 
endogeneity problem. This might justify the use of the instrumental variable (IV-
2SLS) and System GMM methods. Their estimators are more qualified in controlling 
for such problems. In particular, the System GMM proposed by Blundell and Bond 
(1998) provides consistent estimators that are likely to fulfil the orthogonality 
conditions while allowing rigorous control over the instruments. 
When the dependent variable (TFP) and the endogenous regressor (Corruption) 
directly influence each other, it could be difficult to guarantee that the instrument 
will be strictly exogenous, which may at the same time compromise the good quality 
of instruments. For this study, the variables used to instrumentally assess corruption 
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are corruption at the initial period (denoted Corruption1996), Government spendingt, 
Military expendituret, and lags corruption (Corruptiont-1 and Corruptiont-2).  
According to Dzhumashev (2014), corruption is generally nestled in public 
expenditures. Empirical evidence shows that corruption is positively associated with 
military expenditures (Mauro, 1998; Delavallade, 2006). These instruments are 
therefore likely to be strongly correlated with Corruptiont; which is one requirement 
of the good quality of an instrument. 
As noted in Section 1, TFP gains could be explained by innovation efforts or 
improvements to institutional contexts. As such, instruments relative to 
Government Spending or Military Expenditure may have weaknesses if they fund 
innovation or the acquisition of technologies that can enhance productivity gains. 
So it goes for instruments related to corruption. Likewise, the quality of institutions 
may impact at the same time corruption behaviours, as dysfunctional institutions 
are usually singled out as a cause of corruption. However, based on the criteria 
related to a good instrument, it is difficult to expect variables from lagged corruption 
to be strictly exogenous, since we think that corruption itself is endogenous. In any 
cases, the Sargan test should specify whether instruments are exogenous, thus 
pointing to their possible validity.  
The first-stage regressions in Appendix (Table A3) show that the estimated 
coefficients of instruments are all highly statistically significant, at the 0.1% level, 
using the OLS method. These correlations remain robust with Fixed effects 
estimators, also when determinant variables are included among explanatory 
variables. The findings therefore show that instruments are strongly correlated with 
the endogenous variable. The conclusion of the Fisher test on instruments also 
corroborates this finding. The null hypothesis that instruments are weak is clearly 
rejected, with a p-value systematically less than the 5% level.  
Moreover, in order to determine whether endogeneity exists (which actually 
underpins the use of the IV method), we carried out the exogeneity test (Wu-
Hausman). Residuals in the first-stage regressions were introduced as explanatory 
variables in the basic model. The estimations results, based on the OLS method, are 
reported in Table A4. One notices that the estimated coefficients associated with 
the residuals are all statistically significant at the 5% level – which suggests that the 
null hypothesis of exogeneity is rejected. Hence, an endogeneity problem certainly 
exists. The p-value of the Wu-Hausman test is consistently very low and always less 
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than 5%. This result is aligned with the statistical significance of the estimated 
coefficients of residuals that indicate OLS to be biased towards the IV method.  
As a last diagnostic on the instruments, we applied the Sargan test. The null 
hypothesis postulates that instruments are exogenous, while the alternative 
hypothesis indicates that they are in fact endogenous. In our case, the test is only 
applicable when there are more instruments than endogenous variables. For IV-
2SLS, Corruption1996, Government spending and Military expenditure are used to 
instrument Corruption. The probability associated with the Sargan test equals 
0.0079; which is lower than the standard 5% level. As a result, the null hypothesis 
that instruments are exogenous is rejected – meaning that since one instrument is 
not valid, all of them probably show this weakness. When the System GMM 
technique is applied, on the other hand, the full list of instruments is used alongside 
those generated by default, this time with more satisfactory results. 
5.3 RESULTS 
Our empirical analyses of Equation (1) commence with preliminary estimations. 
These results are reported in Table 2 (Model 1 to 3). TFP is solely estimated with 
respect to corruption, except in Model 3, which also includes the lagged dependent 
variable. The estimators used are those relative to Fixed effects, IV-2SLS and System 
GMM, respectively – with more attention on the latter method. Besides, in line with 
Isaksson (2007), several additional determinant variables are used for controlling 
TFP (Model 4 to 6 in Table 2, and Model 7 to 12 in Table 3). Such an approach could 
assess the robustness of the relationship between the variables of interest 
(corruption and TFP). On the other hand, but less importantly, one could also 
appraise the influence of TFP’s determinant variables in the estimations. The latter 
estimations would in turn use the System GMM estimators. Table 4 includes 
regressions (Model 13 to 18) taking into account the influence of a relatively strong 
tax burden on TFP. These estimations include, occasionally, interaction variables 
between corruption and tax burden (denoted CorruptionൈTax burden), thus 
capturing their indirect effect on the dependent variable. Likewise, the estimation 
technique applied is System GMM. Note that the introduction of time dummy 
variables as regressors in the preliminary estimations was not conclusive: their 
estimated coefficients stayed non-significant throughout the estimations.  
Preliminary findings from Table 2 suggest that corruption has a negative 
influence on TFP. The estimated coefficients of corruption are negative and 
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statistically very significant with all three estimation methods. This confirms the first 
trends drawn by Figure 1: that corruption is associated with a decline in productivity. 
In Model 1, which uses the Fixed effects estimators, the estimation suggests that a 
one-unit increase in corruption would reduce TFP by 0.024%, all things being equal. 
Meanwhile, such a decline in TFP is about 0.26% based on Model 2. In both cases, 
the measure of the general quality of the model (R-squared) is very low, which 
means that important determinants of TFP are not taken into account in the 
estimation. As already mentioned, the Sargan test seems to question the validity of 
at least one of the instruments used for the IV-2SLS regression. 
Model 3, however, predicts a smaller negative effect of about 0.041% when 
corruption increases in the same proportions. The Sargan test for over-identifying 
restrictions, with the null hypothesis that instruments are not correlated with the 
residuals, is robust to autocorrelation (p-value>0.05). Hence, instruments are valid. 
The Arrelano–Bond tests for first (AR (1)) and second (AR (2)), whose null 
hypotheses suggest that the residual from the estimations is first-order, but not 
second-order, correlated. Here the tests are conclusive, with the observed p-values 
respectively equal to 0.0048 (<0.05) and 0.17 (>0.05). The null hypothesis of the 
Wald test for coefficients argues that all coefficients are set equal to 0. Since the 
associated p-value is less than the standard probability level of 5%, the alternative 
hypothesis holds – i.e. that at least some variables are non-zero.  
Likewise, when one considers the estimations including more explanatory 
variables (i.e. Model 4–6 in Table 2 and Model 7–12 in Table 3), the findings also 
confirm that corruption constitutes a serious impediment to economic dynamism. 
The estimated coefficients of corruption are all negative while showing the best 
statistical significance standard. More specifically, over the nine regressions, it can 
be seen that the predicted drop in TFP is about 0.17% when corruption practices 
increase by one unit. Such results corroborate the preliminary estimations. The 
previously commented diagnostic tests, which display their expected p-values, again 
hold.  
Concerning the other explanatory variables, the results overall seem consistent 
with the textbook. Following this, we used variables related to tariff/non-tariff 
barriers, imports and openness within regressions in order to capture the ‘Creation-
transmission and absorption of knowledge’ dimension as a TFP determinant. The 
variables all displayed positive and significant influence on TFP. Openness has been 
used as benchmark for this dimension, as it presents the most satisfactory results. 
Its estimated coefficients stay positive and are always statistically significant. In 
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particular, Openness can also capture integration and competition as factors that 
may strongly encourage TFP growth (Maddison, 1997, 1999; Frankel and Romer, 
1999).  
Using access to Improved sanitation facilities as percentage of rural population 
as a proxy for health variables, our results clearly confirm the alleged positive 
relationship between health and TFP. Alternatively, access to Improved sanitation 
facilities as percentage of urban population and Health expenditure as percentage 
of GDP are also included in the regressions as explanatory variables. The estimated 
coefficients of the proxy overall have a positive effect on the dependent variable. 
However, the findings were not always as relevant as they are with our benchmark 
health variable. Cole and Neumayer (2006)’s empirical study on 52 developing 
countries over 1965–1996 also finds a negative correlation between the proportion 
of undernourished and the workforce. Furthermore, the incidence of malaria and 
other waterborne diseases is also found to negatively affect both human capital and 
labour productivity.  
To account for the institutional dimension, another highly influential factor for 
TFP, Property rights, is included among the explanatory variables. Surprisingly, our 
findings suggest that better legal frameworks would actually hamper TFP growth. 
According to Ulubasoglu and Doucouliagos (2004), institutions embody rules and 
organs driving the production climate. Their research concludes that democracy has 
a positive effect on TFP and human capital. However, a negative pattern clearly 
reappears with capital accumulation or labour force growth (see also Przeworski 
and Limongi, 1993; Isaksson, 2007).  
Furthermore, variables that proxy the infrastructure factor (Energy use, 
Electricity and Transport service) do not seem to have a significant effect in 
explaining the dependent variable. Estimated coefficients are overall positive, but 
seldom statistically significant. For example, Aschauer (1989) shows that 
infrastructures have a high return in terms of private capital productivity. However, 
this is possible only when their funding and management are more efficient 
(Aschauer and Lachler, 1998). Based on 46 developing countries with a 1970–1990 
time span, their data highlight a positive effect from infrastructure when financed 
through lower current government spending, in contrast to funding causing further 
increases in public debt. That probably explains our results regarding 
infrastructures. In addition, note that more than 2/3 of the countries in our sample 
are developing countries. 
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In the end, our findings also confirm the common reasoning regarding the 
pernicious effect of inflation on economic performance (Romer, 1993; Lane, 1997). 
The estimated coefficients of Inflation in Table 2 are constantly negative and highly 
statistically significant, which unequivocally points to a decline in TFP. Moreover, 
corruption has been partly identified as one of the causal chains of high inflation (Al-
Marhubi, 2000). Given that corruption at the same time tends to increase 
transaction costs, we thus hypothesise that together, they reinforce each other and 
seriously hinder TFP. 
Government spending is also found to reduce TFP. However, this indicator 
includes the level of government consumption and all transfer payments. Such 
expenditures are not truly productive; they are even perceived to be responsible for 
budget deficits and public debt; hence, they would tend to reduce economic 
dynamism. Moreover, Mauro (1998) finds evidence of the influence of corruption in 
favouring some sectorial budgets more than others. Thus, corruption indeed seems 
to be associated with a fall in expenditures in health, education or social protection 
spending (Delavallade, 2006) but also with an increase in military, energy, culture, 
order or public services spending. Dzhumashev (2014) empirically shows that 
expenditures related to social security are positively associated with corruption. 
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Preliminary estimations of TFP with respect to corruption 
Dependent variable: Total factor productivity (TFP) 
Fixed 
effects 
IV-2SLS System GMM 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Corruption -0.024***
(0.005)
-0.264***
(0.063)
-0.041***
(0.024)
-0.319***
(0.073)
-0.463***
(0.091)
-0.383***
(0.073)
TFPt-1 1.094*** 
(0.027) 
1.305*** 
(0.092) 
1.760***
(0.104) 
1.514*** 
(0.261) 
Openness 0.174** 
(0.184) 
0.106** 
(0.317) 
0.384** 
(0.258) 
Property rights -0.273***
(0.056)
-0.153**
(0.042)
-0.559**
(0.069)
Improved sanitation 0.092** 
(0.195) 
0.219** 
(0.395) 
0.407** 
(0.201) 
Energy use -0.031*
(0.039)
Electricity 0.025
(0.107) 
Transport service 0.001 
(0.038) 
Intercept 2.434*** 
(0.069) 
R-Squared 0.018 0.031 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.268 0.325 0.195 0.271 
AR (1) (p-value) 0.0048 0.001 0.000 0.003 
AR (2) (p-value) 0.170 0.371 0.309 0.103 
Wald test, coefficients
(p-value)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Wald test, dummies 
(p-value)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of 
observations
1088 1088 1984 1877 1606 1828 
Notes. Robust standard errors of System GMM estimator are in parentheses. The superscripts ***,** and * 
represent statistical significance at 0.1, 1 and 5% levels, respectively. 
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System GMM estimations of TFP including more control variables 
Dependent variable: Total factor productivity (TFP) 
System GMM 
7 8 9 10 11 12 
Corruption -0.043***
(0.012)
-0.074***
(0.024)
-0.067***
(0.021)
-0.068***
(0.034)
-0.084***
(0.017)
-0.055***
(0.022)
TFPt-1 0.946*** 
(0.032) 
0.984***
(0.020)
0.961***
(0.034)
0.904***
(0.031)
0.917***
(0.024)
0.984***
(0.038)
Openness 0.071*** 
(0.031) 
0.077***
(0.035)
0.068***
(0.027)
0.069***
(0.031)
0.072**
(0.030)
0.081**
(0.032)
Property rights -0.061***
(0.023)
-0.057**
(0.024)
-0.071**
(0.038)
-0.038**
(0.044)
-0.064***
(0.028)
-0.051**
(0.032)
Improved sanitation 0.071**
(0.047)
0.073**
(0.041)
0.061***
(0.034)
0.063**
(0.051)
0.071***
(0.063)
0.083***
(0.074)
Energy use 0.017
(0.005)
0.008*
(0.005)
Government spending -0.012*
(0.025)
-0.043*
(0.031)
-0.014*
(0.045)
Inflation -0.016**
(0.036)
-0.027***
(0.024)
-0.034***
(0.031)
-0.039***
(0.042)
-0.041***
(0.031)
-0.051***
(0.042)
Electricity 0.015
(0.027)
0.027
(0.061)
Transport service 0.053** 
(0.041) 
0.049* 
(0.038) 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.732 0.537 0.342 0.479 0.529 0.268 
AR (1) (p-value) 0.003 0.001 0.028 0.019 0.010 0.008 
AR (2) (p-value) 0.695 0.720 0.648 0.746 0.681 0.539 
Wald test, coeffic. (p-
value) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Wald test, dumm. (p-
value) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of observations 1877 1846 1606 1586 1828 1803 
Notes. Robust standard errors of System GMM estimator are in parentheses. The superscripts ***,** and * represent 
statistical significance at 0.1, 1 and 5% levels, respectively. 
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5.3.1 The influence of tax burden 
In the analysis of Table 4, the focus is on the role played by tax burden in the 
relationship between corruption and TFP. Again, the analysis starts with a basic 
estimation (Model 13) involving these variables of interest only. In particular, TFP is 
controlled for TFPt-1, Corruption, Tax burden and CorruptionൈTax burden. The 
estimation results regarding the effect of variables of interest on TFP indicate that 
their respective main effects are negative and statistically significant, while the 
effect associated with their interaction term is positive and statistically significant 
as well. This implies that the negative main effect of corruption on TFP is greater 
when tax burden is reduced (and vice versa). In other words, an increase in tax rates 
alleviates the detrimental impact of corruption.  
A scrutiny of Model 3 compared to Model 13 also strengthens that argument. 
The difference between both estimations is that the former ignores the influence of 
taxes on TFP, whereas the latter does not. As previously mentioned, Model 3 
predicts a 0.041% drop in TFP when the corruption level increases by one unit. 
However, by taking into account the influence of taxes in Model 13, the overall 
estimated effect of corruption (the sum of the estimated coefficient of corruption 
and that of interaction between corruption itself and tax burden) on TFP becomes 
positive (0.019), which represents a considerable variation, as compared to its 
previously estimated effect of -0.041 in Model 3. 
Moreover, the paper considers other regressions, including several alternative 
determinants of TFP among regressors (Model 14 to 19). When the interaction 
variable CorruptionൈTax burden is excluded from the regression (Model 14 and 18), 
the estimations show that the effects of corruption and tax burden on productivity 
are all negative and statistically significant. On the other hand, when 
CorruptionൈTax burden is introduced in the estimation alongside the main effects 
of corruption, tax burden and the other determinants of TFP (Model 15, 16, 17 and 
19), the same conclusion holds. Just like with Model 3, the estimated coefficients 
related to Corruption and Tax burden are negative and statistically significant, with 
CorruptionൈTax burden displaying statistically significant positive coefficients. 
Again, the findings suggest that tax rate increases mitigate the negative 
consequence of corruption on productivity.  
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System GMM estimations of TFP including more control variables: The influence 
of tax burden 
Dependent variable: Total factor productivity (TFP) 
System GMM 
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
Corruption -0.023***
(0.004)
-0.011***
(0.002)
-0.015***
(0.002)
-0.022***
(0.007)
-0.021***
(0.006)
-0.017***
(0.002)
-0.023***
(0.006)
TFPt-1 0.945***
(0.012)
0.956***
(0.013)
0.964***
(0.014)
0.971***
(0.011)
0.977***
(0.013)
0.963***
(0.016)
0.960***
(0.014)
Openness 0.063***
(0.019)
0.050***
(0.017)
0.089***
(0.024)
0.081***
(0.025)
0.062**
(0.025)
0.071**
(0.021)
Property rights -0.081***
(0.015)
-0.094**
(0.018)
-0.068**
(0.017)
-0.047**
(0.020)
-0.084***
(0.019)
-0.082**
(0.017)
Improved sanitation 0.052**
(0.014)
0.041**
(0.016)
0.037*
(0.018)
0.038**
(0.016)
0.039**
(0.016)
0.040**
(0.017)
Energy use 0.011*
(0.012)
0.012
(0.013)
Inflation -0.061***
(0.033)
-0.042***
(0.032)
-0.051**
(0.031)
-0.063***
(0.043)
-0.075**
(0.057)
-0.082**
(0.061)
Tax burden -0.033***
(0.063)
-0.031***
(0.06)
-0.018***
(0.066)
-0.024***
(0.072)
-0.023***
(0.081)
-0.037***
(0.059)
-0.022***
(0.061)
CorruptionൈTax burden 0.042***
(0.017)
0.023***
(0.006)
0.028***
(0.007)
0.025***
(0.006)
0.027**
(0.007)
CorruptionൈInflation 0.006**
(0.005)
0.006**
(0.004)
Electricity 0.007 
(0.006) 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
Transport service 0.047* 
(0.019) 
0.033** 
(0.020) 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.250 0.536 0.438 0.594 0.749 0.631 0.537 
AR (1) (p-value) 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.018 0.019 0.010 0.001 
AR (2) (p-value) 0.427 0.841 0.980 0.958 0.974 0.850 0.964 
Wald test, coeffic. (p-
value) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Wald test, dumm. (p-
value) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of observations 1980 1877 1873 1602 1602 1828 1824 
Notes. Robust standard errors of System GMM estimator are in parentheses. The superscripts ***,** and * represent 
statistical significance at 0.1, 1 and 5% levels, respectively. 
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5.4 CONCLUSIONS 
This study involved an empirical analysis that examined the effects of corruption 
and tax burden on total factor productivity (TFP). It made use of panel data from 90 
countries worldwide over the 1996–2014 time span, and employed the Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) provided by Transparency International (TI) as a proxy 
variable. 
The estimation results unambiguously suggest that corruption, like tax burden, 
has a negative effect on TFP. When productivity is only controlled for its lagged 
variable and corruption, the finding suggests that a one-unit increase in the 
corruption standard deviation leads to a decrease in productivity of 0.041%. Then, 
when the influence of tax burden and its interaction effect with corruption alongside 
the lagged dependent variable is taken into account, one can notice that the initially 
negative effect of corruption on productivity is drastically reversed. The overall 
effect of corruption on TFP turns positive, indicating that tax rate increases alleviate 
the negative effects of corruption on productivity. The same conclusion emerges in 
the alternative regressions when TFP is additionally controlled for other 
determinant variables. On the one hand, corruption and tax burden each have an 
overall effect that clearly lowers productivity in the first place. On the other, the 
presence of high tax burden at the same time mitigates the consequences of 
corruption on productivity. 
All in all, the paper maintains that TFP represents a narrow channel through 
which corruption highly undermines the economic prosperity of countries. To 
respond to the threat posed by corruption for economies, decision-makers must pay 
due attention to fiscal policy in its design and implementation. The latter is a 
‘double-edged sword’ for countries with regard to its intertwinement with 
corruption through the shadow economy and other illegal practices derived 
therefrom. Optimal taxation and the efficient use of tax revenues both constitute 
instruments for monitoring corruption efficiently; as such, they encourage 
economic progress. Conversely, their mishandling is likely to exacerbate corruption 
and significantly affect their contribution to the service of the community. 
For future studies, a long-term comparison of the influence of corruption on the 
twin factors (human-physical capital) and TFP would be revealing as well. Doing so 
would help determine whether corruption affects the dynamic of economic changes 
over time – If so, then to what extent and according to which determinants? 
Answers to this and other related questions can help better direct anti-corruption 
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efforts towards those factors displaying significant sensitivity to corruption, in turn 
ensuring their effectiveness.  
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APPENDIX 
Table A1.  Unit-root test, Augmented Dickey-Fuller (AD-F) and Phillips-Perron (P-P) methods 
Variable Augmented Dickey-Fuller Phillips-Perron 
DF statistics p-value DF statistics p-value 
TFP -9.846 < 0.01 -31.332 0.01 
Corruption -10.778 < 0.01 -32.583 0.01 
Openness -10.035 < 0.01 -31.959 0.01 
Property rights -9.953 < 0.01 -31.645 0.01 
Inflation -10.821 < 0.01 -31.664 0.01 
Tax burden -10.104 < 0.01 -30.934 0.01 
Government spending -9.720 < 0.01 -29.000 0.01 
Health expenditure -10.977 < 0.01 -32.182 0.01 
Improved sanitation -10.886 < 0.01 -31.853 0.01 
Electricity -9.306 < 0.01 -30.809 0.01 
Transport service -10.045 < 0.01 -32.198 0.01 
Energy use -9.249 < 0.01 -30.904 0.01 
Notes. For both methods, the null hypothesis (H0) is that the series contain a unit root, against an 
alternative hypothesis (H1) that at least one panel is stationary. H0 is rejected under the condition 
that the p-value associated with DF statistics is smaller than the critical value 0.05. Here, in both 
cases, all series are rigorously stationary.  
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Table A2.  List of countries/territories in the sample 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Greece, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, 
Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi 
Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United 
States, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
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Table A3.  First-stage regressions, Corruptioni,t  is the dependent variable 
 OLS 1  OLS 2  OLS 3  OLS 4 Fixed effects 
1 
Fixed effects 
2 
Constant 3.054*** 
(0.047) 
4.162*** 
(0.021) 
2.742*** 
(0.053) 
2.732*** 
(0.014) 
Corruption1996 -0.141***
(0.036)
-0.049***
(0.028)
Government 
spendingt 
0.218*** 
(0.091) 
0.205***
(0.133)
0.073*** 
(0.025) 
0.061*** 
(0.032) 
Military expenditure 0.002*** 
(0.073) 
0.001**
(0.033)
0.003** 
(0.042) 
0.001** 
(0.040) 
Corruptiont-1 0.012** 
(0.037) 
0.0014** 
(0.021) 
Corruptiont-2 -0.004*
(0.001)
-0.0034*
(0.001)
Inflationt 0.013***
(0.035)
Property rightt 0.044**
(0.018)
Health expenditure 0.014*
(0.364)
Improved sanitationt -0.053
(0.016)
Adjusted-R2 0.0381 0.1271 0.023 0.1506 0.1073 0.2454 
Number of obs. 1088 1088 1088 1088 1088 1088 
Fisher test (p-value) 8.44e-08*** <2.2e-16*** <2.2e-16*** <2.2e-16*** 
Notes. Regressions are based on OLS and Fixed effects estimators. ***, **, * symbolise the statistical significance at 0.1, 1 
and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Table A4.  Exogenous test regressions, TFPi,t is the dependent variable 
 OLS 5  OLS 6  OLS 7  OLS 8 Fixed effects 3 
Constant 2.547*** 
(0.028) 
2.830*** 
(0.037) 
3.135*** 
(0.015) 
2.652*** 
(0.027) 
Corruption -0.392*** 
(0.026) 
-0.149*** 
(0.046) 
-0.272*** 
(0.183) 
-0.248*** 
(0.082) 
-0.149*** 
(0.053) 
TaxBurden -0.164*** 
(0.015) 
-0.103*** 
(0.014) 
-0.117*** 
(0.011) 
-0.209*** 
(0.013) 
-0.018*** 
(0.035) 
Residual(OLS 1) 0.043*** 
(0.061) 
Residual(OLS 2) 0.162*** 
(0.038) 
Residual(OLS 3) 0.217*** 
(0.051) 
Residual(OLS 4) 0.251*** 
(0.028) 
Residual(Fixed 
effects 1) 
0.169** 
(0.009) 
Adjusted-R2 0.3312 0.4607 0.5028 0.6376 0.3401 
Number of obs. 1088 1088 1088 1088 1088 
Wu-Hausman(p-
value) 
2.16e-16*** 2.e-12*** <2.2e-16*** <2.2e-16*** <2.2e-16*** 
Conclusion IV IV IV IV IV 
Notes. Regressions are based on OLS and Fixed effects estimators. ***, **, * symbolise the 
statistical significance at 0.1, 1 and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Figure 1.1. TFP vs Corruption: Emerging Developing Asia (EDA
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Figure 1.2. TFP vs Corruption: Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
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Figure 1.3. TFP vs Corruption: Advanced economies (AE)
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Figure 1.4. TFP vs Corruption: Latin America - Caribbean (LAC)
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Figure 1.5. TFP vs Corruption: Middle-East - North Africa (MENA)
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Figure 1.6. TFP vs Corruption: Euro area (EA)
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Figure 1.7. TFP vs Corruption: Emerg. market and developing economies
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Figure 1.8. TFP vs Corruption: OECD
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